The Global Dividend

AMIDST A CHURN in the global order, developed and developing countries continue to bear the economic costs of the Covid-19 pandemic even as 2023 enters its second half. With an increasingly assertive China, sharpening US-China tensions and war re-entering Europe, unpredictability and uncertainty loom large and only a few countries have succeeded in maintain­ing their sway and influence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visits to France and the UAE after a successful visit to the US and Egypt in June underscore India’s rising global profile. What is striking is that New Delhi’s dynamic and well-navi­gated foreign policy is being appreciated and acknowledged by the public at large.

The Observer Research Foundation’s Foreign Policy Survey indicates this public support for the Modi government’s foreign policy. The survey is an annual initiative that intends to assess how Indian youth (18-35 years of age) perceive India’s foreign policy and global ambitions. The surveys are conducted through­out the country in multiple states and languages, with a sample size of 2,037 people in 2021 and 5,000 people in 2022. In addition to the majority of the respondents’ overall approval of India’s foreign policy (average of 75 per cent), the survey offers several crucial insights into public opinion and Modi’s foreign policy.

India has embarked on a clear strategic shift as to defending its borders and interests vis-à-vis China. Following the 2020 border clashes at Galwan, the Modi government seems determined to counter increasing Chinese assertiveness and border intrusions. Incidentally, the public has strongly favoured (73 per cent) the government’s approach towards China, post-Galwan. Further, even as India continues to increase its deployment along its Chinese borders, the large majority (average of 83 per cent) expressed concerns about the Chinese threat to India’s borders and a potential border conflict with China.

India has also been pushing back against Chinese influence and presence in the neighbourhood. Here too, the public seems to be in tandem with the government; nearly 70 per cent of them are concerned about China’s rise and the challenge it may pose to India’s position in the world order. High distrust (77 per cent) and least optimism (19 per cent) persist when viewing Beijing as a potential partner. An overwhelming 86 per cent of respondents even favour the government’s banning of Chinese mobile apps. Overall, this is an indication of the public understanding of China as a prominent and emerging threat.

That said, the possibilities of a two-front war and a history of hostilities and mistrust have compelled the Indian state and public to deem Pakistan as a strategic threat. Respondents see terrorism and border conflicts with Pakistan as significant challenges (86 per cent and 82 per cent) to India. Further, the government’s lack of trust in Pakistan and its motto of “ter­ror and talks cannot go hand-in-hand” are also reflected in the public’s distrust (78 per cent) for the country. In addition, toler­ance for Pakistan’s misadventures and terror sponsorship has also weaned low. Over 58 per cent feel the Modi government’s isolationist policy against Pakistan is beneficial to the region, and 68 per cent of India’s youth support its robust approach against Pakistan, such as the Balakot air strikes.

The Modi government’s Neighbourhood First policy has reinstated the South Asian region as the prime area of its strate­gic focus. A similar sense of understanding persists among the public too. South Asia is looked upon as the most strategically vital region for India (36 per cent), far ahead of the second cru­cial region—Central Asia (13 per cent). Respondents have also expressed satisfaction with the Modi government’s engagement with its neighbours in terms of trade, security, political engage­ments, cultural ties, people-to-people contacts, and infrastructure and connectivity (between 68 and 86 per cent). The respondents have also acknowledged India’s increasing bilateral relationship with small neighbours like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh and have expressed trust in these countries (between 54 and 67 per cent). The Indian public has supported India’s Afghanistan policy post-US withdrawal (68 per cent) and its political ties with the junta regime in Myanmar (74 per cent).

India’s robust engagement with the Quad countries and the West along with balancing of Russia has also received strong sup­port from the public. Considering the structural changes and increasing Chinese assertiveness, over 64 per cent of the respon­dents have favoured Modi’s policy of strengthening the Quad. At a time when India and the US are promoting technology trans­fer and defence cooperation, 77 per cent of Indian respondents have also expressed their trust in the US. An average of 82 per cent of the respondents also believe that the US will be India’s top-leading partner in the next 10 years. On an average, Australia and Japan are being ranked as India’s second (70 per cent) and fourth (65 per cent) leading partners in the next 10 years.

Further, even as the war in Europe has intensified, this gov­ernment’s Russia policy has been criticised by the West. India’s careful balancing of ties with Russia is due to its critical defence dependence and its concerns about strong relations between Russia and China. These sensitivities are also echoed by the In­dian public (87 and 68 per cent). Essentially, Indians continue to see Russia as one of India’s leading partners (average of 67 per cent) in the next 10 years. Indian youths see neutrality in the war as a way for India to continue its momentum with the US (66 per cent) while maintaining warm relations with Russia (68 per cent). India’s increasing trade and defence relations with other Western countries like the UK, France, and the European Union (EU) are also being received positively by the public.

As the government continues providing India a voice on a global stage, the public has largely been supportive of its initia­tives. The Modi government’s push for self-reliance (Atmanirb­har Bharat) for a strong India is being commended by the public (87 per cent). Respondents have also been supportive (average of 91 per cent) of India’s consistent push for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and its proac­tive engagement through multilateral organisations (average of 55 per cent). Nearly 90 per cent of the respondents even supported India’s selfless efforts to promote vaccine diplomacy (Vaccine Maitri) during the Covid pandemic, thus reinforcing the govern­ment’s quest for prominence in the evolving world order.

As the international order continues to be strained, not many nations have been successful in navigating new strategic chal­lenges and environments. India has been an outlier with its cache expanding at a time of grave global disorder. With challenges ema­nating from China, Pakistan, and terrorism to promoting stronger relations with its neighbours; from embracing new strategic and defence partnerships with the West to maintaining close relations with Russia, Modi’s foreign policy has well-positioned India and anchored it in the evolving world order. Most importantly, it has managed to earn the public’s approval and support.

About The Author

Harsh V Pant

Harsh V Pant is Vice President, Studies and Foreign Policy, at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, at ORF

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