The Globalisation of Bharat

IN FEBRUARY 2015, LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER THE 2014 GENERAL ELECTION, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed Indian diplomats working across the world and urged them to use the opportunities they had to help position India as a leading power instead of a mere balancing power that reacted to events but did not seize opportunities to shape the world.

The same clarion call was made by then-Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, in his Fullerton Lecture in Singapore in July 2015. Eight years later, India has made substantial prog­ress towards that goal. These, and more, have been highlighted in External Affairs Minister Jaishankar’s new book Why Bharat Matters. The book details how India is surging ahead under the robust leadership of Prime Minister Modi who has spared no effort to renew India’s engagement with the world, lifting it from the torpor it found itself in, in the years before.

Modi’s challenge was multidimensional. For one, the foundation of national power—its economic vitality—had come undone in the preceding years. While the headline numbers were impressive, they were largely the magic of cheap money available globally in the years before the 2008 economic crisis and the stimuli imparted to the economy after that. Once the steroids wore off, it was not a pretty sight. For an­other, India’s engagement with the world—seemingly strong, as the 2005 India-US civil nuclear deal showed—was in reality badly mired in domestic political concerns. An unwieldy coali­tion, appeasement and counter-appeasement prevented India from developing relations with countries that were to become its closest partners after Modi took charge. India’s ability to take charge had shrunk so badly that it could not even deal with ad­versaries in South Asia in a proper fashion.

THE ROADSHOW IN AHMEDABAD on January 9 had a sense of comfort and ease to it. Modi routinely refers to the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, as his brother. But behind this seeming ease is the careful nurturing of bilateral relations between the two countries that began early in Modi’s first ten­ure. As prime minister, Modi visited the UAE for the first time in August 2015. Since then, there have been 15 visits to West Asia by Modi, including five to the UAE (plus a brief halt and a meet­ing with UAE’s leadership in June 2022). This has not only led to a comprehensive economic partnership agreement in 2022 but also very close political and diplomatic relations between the two countries. India’s engagement with the Arab world has not precluded its very strong relations with Israel, a country with less-than-friendly relations in the Arab street.

Even a decade ago, this diplomatic finesse was considered impossible. In his 10 years in office, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had made a total of three visits to the region and these did not include a visit to Israel or any level of close engagement with its leadership. In fact, this weak level of engagement was com­mented upon in Singh’s first term when it was said that he had visited only one “Muslim” country—Afghanistan—until Sep­tember 2007, three years since he had become prime minister. Af­ter that, the domestic maelstrom left little room or mindspace for foreign relations. Pakistan’s attack in Mumbai in 2008 was prob­ably a blow from which Singh’s foreign policy never recovered.

The use of the religious term and not a geographic description was revealing: it showed that by then foreign policy had been completely entangled in domestic politics. Fear of the ‘minor­ity veto’ prevented a closer development of relations with Israel while an imagined fear of a ‘majority backlash’ prevented close relations with Arab countries.

Modi decisively broke this mould when he came to power. The secret of this success was not India finessing some kind of balancing trick—as suggested by the designation of the country as a ‘balancing power’ for long—but a clear enunciation of India’s national interests. As before, India did not believe in any form of ‘bloc politics’. But instead of stopping at the pious declaration, India under Modi has gone on to develop bilateral relations across the world without considering any third-country sensitivities or domestic concerns. One big reason for the latter, undoubtedly, is the government’s strength in Parliament. But an equally impor­tant—and underappreciated—ingredient is the resolve to pursue national interest even in the face of pressure.

The exemplar of this pursuit of national interest even in the face of pressure from one partner country is the India-Russia and India-US set of relations. After the conflict in Ukraine began in February 2022, India faced multiple challenges. On one side was a time-tested friend—Russia—that expected support. On the other was one of India’s closest partners, the US, which wanted nothing short of condemnation from India. In the event, India chose not to condemn Russia but at the same time not to support it either. This was not a walk-in-the-middle approach to a conflict but a carefully calibrated pursuit of Indian interests under Modi’s lead­ership. This became obvious within months when the price of crude oil shot up globally. Russia offered India deep discounts on its oil to begin with. And India purchased this oil notwithstand­ing a barrage of negative commentary and reportage in the West­ern press. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin noted perceptively during a recent public engagement that he was aware that India had been subjected to pressure on this score. It does not require much imagination to infer the source of this pressure.

MODI PUT HIS STAMP on India’s foreign policy right on the first day. It was an imaginative step that he invited leaders of neighbouring countries to his oath-taking ceremony in 2014. It also showed spatial imagina­tion that hidebound traditions of Indian politics had not imag­ined until then.

In Why Bharat Matters, Jaishankar conceptualises India’s ap­proach in terms of mandalas or concentric circles of interest, a con­cept that goes back to the Arthashastra. Applied to contemporary times, it is not another fancy word keeping in mind current trends but an appreciation of spatial and conceptual realities.

Jaishankar describes two immediate mandalas: India’s im­mediate neighbourhood and a wider circle of an extended neighbourhood from the near edges of West Asia to Southeast Asia. He goes on to say: “The spatial mandala is accompanied by a conceptual one. Indian foreign policy today recognizes more explicitly the imperatives of national security in setting priori­ties and making choices. But security itself is perceived in much broader and deeper terms. Atma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and Make in India are neither economic protectionism nor political slogans. They are, in fact, a quest to build deeper strengths and greater strategic autonomy that is required by a nation aspir­ing to be a leading power. Increasingly economic security also cohabits with technological security.”

It is interesting to note here that Modi’s first visit abroad was to Bhutan in June 2014. His latest visit, just a few months before the General Election, was to the UAE in late November-early Decem­ber. While the latter occasion was a multilateral gathering, the spatial imagination that Jaishankar sketches so vividly is evident even in the temporal sequence of events.

Jaishankar notes that Modi is not only focused on pursuing national interest but is also known to be part of solutions to global problems, such as climate change mitigation, helping less privi­leged nations with supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic and much more. He notes, “Prime Minister Modi, in particular, is per­ceived as a global figure who, while advancing his national inter­est, has a broader vision and commitment to collective good.”

One particular event in this respect was the pandemic. Jaishankar writes: “By providing vaccines to 100 partners and medicines and materials to 150 nations, India demonstrated an altogether different level of global responsibility. The accrued goodwill has clearly helped define its profile at a time when the world is in transition.”

Something similar was at work during the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow in 2021. In contrast to earlier Indian obduracy (or diffidence) on the issue, this time under Modi, India defined its own climate change mitigation targets. The panchamrit goals included achieving net zero emissions by 2070; reduction of car­bon intensity in the Indian economy by 45 per cent over 2005 levels by 2030, and meeting 50 per cent of India’s energy require­ments from renewables by 2030, among other goals. When seen objectively, India is doing much more than advanced industrial nations and without any compulsion. This is part of the idea of India as vishwa mitra or “world friend”.

IN MANY WAYS THE reorientation of India’s approach to the world under Modi’s leadership is not just a matter of extending its outreach and widening the country’s diplomatic ambitions. It is also, simultaneously, undoing the grave errors of the Nehru era. It is not as if these mistakes were not known before: Jaishankar lists how many leaders of that time, from Sardar Patel to Syama Prasad Mookerjee, and from BR Ambedkar to Minoo Masani, pointed out these mistakes. The interesting thing about such errors in decision-making is that they are noticed after the mistakes have been made. But these stalwarts who were intellectuals and practical men were aware of the wrong turns even as they were being taken. But to no avail. At that time, Nehru was not just a primus inter pares at the head of his Council of Ministers but a force unto himself.

Patel was the first leader to warn Nehru about the dangers of the course he had chosen. From relations with the US, recogni­tion of Israel, and the ruinous course on taking the ‘dispute’ over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to the United Nations (UN), Patel alerted Nehru on each of these matters. Mookerjee, who later resigned from the Nehru ministry over these disagreements, was equally aware of the dangers inherent in Nehru’s choices in J&K and Pakistan. Jaishankar writes that in 1953, the year he died during detention in J&K, Mookerjee “conveyed to PM Nehru that his handling of the Kashmir problem has neither enhanced our international prestige nor won us international support and sympathy. On the contrary, he felt that it had created ‘complica­tions’ at home as well as abroad.”

Both Patel and Mookerjee were practical men involved in the day-to-day affairs of a new country that had yet to find its feet. But they were not alone in criticising Nehru’s approach. Ambedkar, perhaps the most formidable intellect in Nehru’s Council of Ministers, too, was alarmed at his handling of India’s foreign affairs. Like Mookerjee, Ambedkar, too, left the Nehru ministry over disagreements. Interestingly, while Ambedkar’s anguish at the fate of the Hindu Code Bill is well-known and was the proximate reason for his exit from the ministry, it is less known that he had serious issues with Nehru’s foreign policy. Jaishankar writes: “Ambedkar also shared with Parliament his ‘actual anxiety and even worry’ about the directions of foreign policy.” Ambedkar specifically spoke about India’s poor han­dling of relations with the US and Nehru’s championing of China’s cause for a seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC). “In his view, instead of trying to make China a member of the UNSC, India should get itself recognized instead. His characterization of the Nehruvian approach was of its being quixotic, if not sui­cidal,” writes Jaishankar. The drafter of the Constitution was worried that we—India—were trying to solve others’ problems instead of pursuing our interests.

A GAP OF 61 YEARS exists between the death of Mookerjee in Kashmir and the elevation of Modi to India’s prime minister­ship. During these decades, Nehru’s mistakes have continued to cast their shadow over Indian foreign policymaking, to the point that mistakes have been clothed as virtues. It is this attitude that Modi has worked hard to exorcise. Nowhere was the problem more evident than in India’s neighbourhood, especially with respect to Pakistan.

In the wake of the Mumbai attack of 2008 that was organized and funded by the Pakistani establishment, the government of the day refused to take effective steps to check terrorism emanat­ing from that country. India’s so-called response to canvas global opinion in its favour went nowhere. If India garnered sympathy, it could do nothing to alter Pakistan’s behaviour. Even after pro­viding one ‘dossier’ after another and evidence to Pakistan, the masterminds of 26/11 continued to go about their business freely.

But such was the allure to come to terms with Pakistan that India continued to make one blunder after another. Jaishankar writes: “Instead of confronting the cross-border nature of ter­rorism emanating from Pakistan, we even appeared to be open at Havana and Sharm El-Shaikh to a narrative that suggested that both India and Pakistan were victims of terrorism. This was exactly the false equivalence that Mookerjee had cautioned us about in his time.”

This line of reasoning continues in certain sections right until the present day. But under Modi, this has been effectively banished from the portals of foreign policymaking.

While India under Modi changed how it responded to ter­rorism, the message got through late to Pakistan until the Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019) attacks led to responses that finally disabused it of any notions of parity with India and Indian obse­quiousness irrespective of what it did. There is ample evidence that in the wake of the strikes in Balakot, when a pilot of the Indian Air Force (IAF) was captured in Pakistan, Modi was ready to escalate India’s response if the pilot was not returned unharmed. This was another shibboleth propagated for long that India could not offer any response to a nuclear-armed Paki­stan as there were virtually no steps in the ladder to climb: even a stone’s throw would elicit a nuclear response. After Balakot, there was no credibility left in such claims. But these changes were not simple and were the product of heavy-lifting by Modi. In Jaishankar’s evocative words, “What the public sees is an el­egant swan; underneath there is furious paddling.”

Modi’s decade has probably been the most dramatic in India’s foreign policy-making. He has not been content to just manage and respond to challenges thrown at India’s relations with its neighbours but has also laid the foundations for India becom­ing a leading power. The idea of a leading power, in the eyes of Ashley J Tellis, a perceptive American analyst of India’s foreign policy, is no different from that of a great power. But like much else with Modi’s foreign policy ideas, the aim here is not to be­come a traditional great power in the Western mould but a power that successfully manages its own affairs and also extends a help­ing hand to other countries, a vishwa mitra.

BACK IN 2019 WHEN Modi outlined the ambition to make India a $5 trillion economy, the idea was scoffed at. Many economists said there was noth­ing significant about the figure: economies grow and the size of a country’s GDP is part of that process and nothing ought to be read in a particular value of GDP. Other economists questioned India’s ability to even attain that mark.

All of them missed the import of that number. India’s key foreign policy transitions are fairly well-correlated with its eco­nomic transitions. For the better of its post-Independence history, India’s economic strength was weak. This was the phase in which the country couched its external relations in a moralist, idealist framework. Then, after the liberalisation of its economy begin­ning in 1991, India’s economic growth picked up and reached an annual 5-5.5 per cent. This was the time it graduated to the ranks of a ‘balancing power’.

But the rules of international relations are based largely on power. As long as India’s relative economic strength remained low, its ability to convert it into military power—the determinant of power in the world—would remain low. Has that changed?

In one of the chapters of Why Bharat Matters, Jaishankar outlines the foundations that have been laid to make India a leading power. That is where the $5 trillion figure comes in: un­less India crosses that mark and steams its way even beyond, its military abilities will remain modest. And that is one reason why a renewed emphasis on economic growth is so very essential if India is to make a quick transition to the level of a leading power. This was a time-consuming process. At one time, when potential growth was thought to have come down to 6 per cent, it seemed India would not even have enough to end poverty, let alone be­come a leading power. In the last two years, that perspective has undergone a huge change. India’s economic prospects and, in turn, its leading power ambitions are now back on track.

While the size of the economy is a key ingredient in this drive, is it all that matters? The reality is that if a country cannot find its civilisational moorings, it can’t do much with economic strength. It is here that Modi has made all the difference. His emphasis was not on discovering India’s civilisational heritage but on putting the ideas of that inheritance to work. Here again, he was scoffed at. The idea of vishwa guru was derided. But of late, since vishwa mitra has been spoken of, there is a grudging acceptance. But again, this is on the ground that India is now one of the few bright spots in a gloomy global economic reality. For Modi, the emphasis on civilisational ideas has its own impor­tance: they give India the confidence to do what is necessary for itself even as it becomes a vishwa mitra. This is something that borrowed ideas like liberalism cannot do. Being vishwa mitra is not an exercise in ‘strategic altruism’ for there is no such thing in international relations; but it is a part of the package of rights and duties that accompanies a leading power. India is already doing that in its neighbourhood as a first responder to events and elsewhere as well.

Bharatforeign policyG20 Summitglobal powerglobalisationJawaharlal NehruNarendra ModiS Jaishankarworld leaders