The Kyiv Calculus

THE POSSIBILITY, YET to be officially confirmed, that Prime Minister Narendra Modi might be in Ukraine later this month on occasion of the battle-worn country’s national day is keeping Delhi’s political and diplomatic circles busy speculating on what is afoot. Is it just, as some commentators feel, primarily a ‘balancing act’ after Modi’s visit to Russia and his hugging of President Vladimir Putin was seen to have riled Western opinion? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky criticised it too, saying it was disappointing to see the leader of the world’s largest democracy hug a “bloody criminal” in Moscow on a day a children’s hospital was hit by a Russian attack. The Moscow visit did not go down well in Western capitals even though criticism was tempered by the recognition that Modi again publicly iterated that dialogue and not the battle­field is the pathway to resolving the war in Ukraine.

“As a friend, I have also said for the brighter future of our next generation, peace is of utmost importance,” Modi told Putin. “When innocent children are murdered, one sees them die, the heart pains and that pain is unbearable,” he had said, referring to the strike that killed 37 people in Ukraine. A cynical view would be that the comments are for public consumption. But Modi is perhaps the only world leader of standing who can, and is willing, to put across such a message to Putin. In turn, Putin has been appreciative of the Indian leader’s determination to toe a difficult path in global diplomacy by zealously guarding New Delhi’s autonomous foreign policy. Though suggestive of equidistance, this is a far cry from the professed non-alignment of yesteryears. It is rather defined as a pursuit of national interest and commitment to the principles of a rules-based international order rather than seeing the world divided into blocks. As Modi has explained in several interviews, India’s foreign policy is not dictated by either hyphenation or exclusionary choices. In making Russia an early port of call in his third term, the prime minister prioritised a relationship crucial to India’s energy security and its geopolitical concerns regarding China. If it enabled Putin to signal that he is not as isolated as the West might want to believe, presumably the leader will keep this in mind.

The resumption of in-person summits between Indian and Russian leaders has important implications for India’s manu­facturing and trade. It is also significant for areas such as nuclear energy, with the visit expected to see Russian state firm Rosatom move ahead with the construction of more nuclear power plants. The cooperation becomes more evident with the Union Budget revealing a plan for the government to partner with the private sec­tor in setting up Bharat Small Reactors and promoting research and development of a modular reactor. This will be an increasingly key element in India’s non-fossil fuel options and plans to reduce green­house gases. The visit was seen by some Western commentators as not having achieved anything substantial. The fine print can bear closer examination but projects such as the Vladivostok-Chennai maritime corridor are big investments in bilateral relations Modi described as based on “mutual trust and mutual respect”. In light of the war in Ukraine, and Putin’s pariah status in the West, Russia- China ties will not weaken. Yet, the perception that Putin and Modi enjoy a special rapport can be useful to Moscow too in ensuring that relations with China are not too unequal. Henry Kissinger’s definition of balance of power sees nations free to align with other states in a way no one nation becomes too dominant. Russia will find the lesson useful in the context of ties with China despite being committed to a relationship with “no limits”.

It is interesting that Jaishankar said it will be ‘fatalistic’ not to do anything to end the Ukraine crisis. He said there will be more talks between India, Ukraine and Russia for reasons like the fallout of the war across the Global South

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Amid critical commentary in the US, National Security Advi­sor (NSA) Jake Sullivan summed up the Biden administration’s practical viewpoint when he acknowledged India has a long­standing relationship with Russia which it will not end and also that Modi has a personal style in greeting leaders. He was in Delhi soon afterwards and a meeting with Indian NSA Ajit Doval saw the two sides agreeing, according to a Ministry of External Affairs statement, “to further advance India-US relations, which are built on shared values and common strategic and security interests. They reiterated the need to work collectively to address global challenges to peace and security and further expand the com­prehensive global strategic partnership.” It might be presumed that explanations were offered and possibly accepted. The Quad foreign ministers meeting followed on July 29 and resulted in a statement that said the grouping will work for a stable regional order so that no country dominates or is dominated and com­petition in the Indo-Pacific is managed responsibly. There were important commitments to expand the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) programme in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and a bigger role for India’s Information Fusion Centre based in Gurugram that monitors maritime movements. On Ukraine, the Quad statement said: “We express our deepest concern over the war raging in Ukraine including its terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences. We reiterate the need for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in line with international law, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Char­ter, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Despite mostly abstaining from a vote against Russia at the United Nations, India has not been reticent about speaking of the need to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the harm­ful impact of the conflict on energy and food prices and supplies, particularly in Latin American, Asian and African nations which had barely emerged from the shadow of Covid when the war began in February 2022. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s comments in Tokyo where deliberations were held are revealing. While he did not confirm Modi’s visit to Kyiv, he said there will be more conversations between India, Ukraine and Russia for reasons such as the adverse fallout of the war across the Global South. The war, along with the fighting in Gaza, is a risk to most economies, and India is no exception. In underlining the contacts with Ukraine and Russia, Jaishankar noted India is among a few countries that can speak to both sides. “Our feeling today is that more needs to be done (and) that we should not resign ourselves to the continuation of the current state of conflict and say ‘Let this take its own course and let us wait for events in other parts of the world to provide some kind of solution,’” he said, accord­ing to a report. He referred to Modi’s meeting with Zelensky on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Italy in mid-June and the visit to Moscow a few weeks later where the prime minister had the opportunity to discuss matters at length with Putin.

As Modi has explained, India’s foreign policy is not dictated by either hyphenation or exclusionary choices. In making Russia an early port of call in his third term, he prioritised a relationship crucial to India’s energy security and geopolitical needs

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It is evident that India wants to push and prod for a solution and is increasingly uneasy with the status quo which has been a stale­mate although Russian forces have advanced with reportedly high casualties. Seen in light of Jaishankar’s comments, it is possible the visit to Russia was more than bilateral ties, and could have been an exercise in assessing Putin’s mind on events. It is interesting that the foreign minister said it will be “fatalistic” not to do anything and wait for some other event to provide an opportunity to end the crisis. As leaders and political opponents have found out, it is not easy to fathom the prime minister’s moves even as it is clear that it does not pay to underestimate him. A diplomatic push on Ukraine is coming and it is possible that some quiet diplomacy with other nations, both in the West and in other parts of the world, is unfold­ing. Political sources agreed that the visit to Moscow at a time when a NATO meeting was to happen in Washington did not wash well with the US. So going to Ukraine will undoubtedly be a signal. At the same time, it is unlikely this will be the sole objective of the visit, if it does happen, the first by an Indian prime minister.

It will be an overestimation to see such a mission delivering all on its own steam, given the complex set of factors at play and the critical roles of the European Union and the US. But it could mark an effort to look for a solution and get two entrenched opponents to consider the process of dialogue. At times, this is difficult for nations committed to strongly articulated public positions to achieve. A less contentious entity, not so obviously wedded to a hostile stance, might be a more effective intermediary. The turn of events in Kyiv is uncertain. Yet, the developments are a confirmation that India be­lieves its leverage with G20 nations and its demonstrable commit­ment to global norms may give it a role on issues that might involve big-power rivalries but where it has a lot of skin in the game too.

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Rajeev Deshpande

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