Being Manmohan Singh

In the heyday of UPA 1, when the Congress-led coalition’s dominance of the political firmament was complete and the main Opposition Bharatiya Janata Party struggled to come to terms with its shock defeat in the 2004 Lok Sabha election, the Manmohan Singh-Sonia Gandhi tango seemed to be working perfectly well. Hailed by the media as “Jodi No 1”, the duopoly was an example of power sharing between an appointed Prime Minister who understood his remit and the Congress president who was the throne behind the power. The arrangement could well have run into trouble very quickly but there was a convergence in views over the rights-based legislation UPA rolled out and identifying urban renewal and infrastructure as key economic goals. The UPA inherited a healthy economy from the Vajpayee government and the global financial crisis of 2007-08 was still distant. The India story was gaining traction and a consumption boom was attracting foreign investors eyeing a growing market.

There was, of course, much that happened behind the scenes to ensure the Manmohan-Sonia relationship progressed smoothly and 10, Janpath and PMO remained in sync. There were decisions the party wanted the government to take and Singh understood this quite well. At the same time, he became the face of the UPA government and connected with the middle class who saw him as a decent man sharing their values and priorities. This was a significant factor in legitimising the government in popular perception despite Congress winning only a handful of seats more than BJP in the 2004 election. Drawing lessons from BJP’s ill-fated “India Shining” campaign, UPA implemented the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the Forest Rights Act along with the Right to Information Act. This was followed by Right to Education, Land Acquisition Act and the National Food Security Act during UPA II.

The NREGA (now MNREGA) acknowledged the limitations of the “trickle down” effect. At the time BJP advanced the 2004 election, GDP was galloping at 8.2% in the first quarter and affordable bank loans drove unprecedented growth in middle class housing. Yet, the benefits seemed to have bypassed a large section unwilling to wait till a rising tide lifted their fortunes too. The “revolt” of the grassroots does need more careful analysis since BJP did well in much of the tribal belt stretching across the middle of India. But the import of NREGA and NFSA can be judged by the Modi government’s decision to continue the programmes, wary of the being tarred anti-poor, despite evidence of waste and mis-targeting of beneficiaries. The NDA worked on improving accountability by reforming the payment mechanism for MNREGA and introducing Aadhar-based verification for the Public Distribution System, but did nothing to dismantle the landmark legislations. Problems arose for Manmohan Singh government when the limitations of such legislation were not recognised and the Sonia Gandhi-headed National Advisory Council, a think tank of Left-leaning activists, insisted on more of the same and legislation UPA brought to Parliament became overly bureaucratised and ran into fierce resistance from the ranks of Congress MPs and an assertive BJP.

Manmohan Singh’s finest hour was his gutsy decision to conclude a nuclear deal with the United States ending India’s isolation caused by its principled opposition to signing the highly discriminatory Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He understood the advantage and benefits of cooperation with the US and found in George W Bush a leader who grasped the importance of India as a geo-political partner and, odd as it might sound, the fairness of its cause. The path to the India-US nuclear deal began with the Vajpayee government’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 and a lengthy dialogue, best epitomised by the discussions between BJP leader Jaswant Singh and American diplomat Strobe Talbott. Yet, influenced by Cold War hawks in its benches, BJP opposed the deal and voted against it in the July, 2008, confidence vote in Parliament. Singh simply put his foot down on the nuclear deal. In a discussion attended by senior UPA leaders like Sharad Pawar, A K Antony, Pranab Mukherjee, Ahmed Patel and Sonia, he made it plain that he will not continue if the deal was abandoned. He had made up his mind. The deal had been on the table since 2005 and was vehemently opposed by the Left parties led by then CPM general secretary Prakash Karat, a doctrinaire communist who saw America as an ideological foe. Over months, Mukherjee engaged the Left, persuading Karat to allow discussions with the US to progress in bits, working on the theory that a bitter pill becomes more palatable if broken into small pieces. But there was a moment when the push would come to shove.

The truth is that Singh had begun to tire of the Left’s hectoring and moralising, not to speak of the presence of its nominees in bodies like the Planning Commission. On one occasion a CPM leader, who had sought audience with the Prime Minister, launched into a tirade that left Singh and PMO officials nonplussed as they tried to fathom what the offence offered was before realising that the reference was to an atrocity against a Dalit family in Khairlanji in Maharashtra. Loose talk by Left leaders was undermining the authority of the government on a daily basis as media flocked to them to seek reactions on policy decisions. The 2008 vote was a massive exercise that not only involved ejecting the Left and inducting the Samajwadi Party in its stead but also ensuring several defections from other parties including BJP which expelled eight MPs for cross voting. Though the Opposition called the vote a “black day,” it might be a case where political expediency and national interest went hand in hand. The vote was marked by the infamous “cash-for-votes” scandal but all of this did not cost Congress in public eye. Rather the middle classes instinctively recognised the benefits of cooperation with the US. In August, 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group lifted the ban on India from engaging in nuclear trade with its members. It is perhaps not surprising that in the 2009 Lok Sabha election, where Singh was UPA’s PM face against BJP’s L K Advani, Congress returned to office with an enhanced margin winning 206 seats.

The question whether Singh could have done more to prevent the 2G, coal and Commonwealth Games scams that paralysed his second term as PM will trouble historians. It was evident that he had little to do with the tainted allocations of spectrum or coal blocks that became rich material for the Comptroller and Auditor General’s scathing reports and were struck down by the Supreme Court. The manner in which 2G allocations were manipulated – in the name of bringing in “new” telecom players – right down to setting up of counters to distribute letters of intent that made physical fitness a factor in submitting compliances and the entry fee was scandalous. It was revealed that a select few had been tipped off to keep their drafts ready for submission. The coal block allocations through an opaque screening committee were equally problematic, with competitive bidding given a go-by in the name of need and efficiency. Unfortunately, the power production goals remained unmet and allegations of windfall gains surfaced. The organisation of the 2010 Commonwealth Games was in the hands of the late Congress leader Suresh Kalmadi, who proved unequal to the task and almost every project was hit by cost overruns, time delays and corruption allegations. India was able to hold the Games in the nick of time, with a picture of then Delhi CM Shiela Dikshit and the Cabinet Secretary travelling to the Games Village in a bus to oversee preparedness summing up the desperate situation.

Internal PMO papers submitted to the Public Accounts Committee revealed officials did indeed raise red flags. So much so that an official noted the need to keep Singh at an “arm’s length” from the potentially damaging developments. Official notes pointed to irregularities in the telecom ministry’s handling of 2G processes while pitching for a bidding process in coal allocations. If Singh had decided not to look the other way, would he have been at risk of losing his job? Though no one is indispensable, and certainly not in politics, he would not have been easy to replace. None of other candidates were as trustworthy and reliable and Sonia Gandhi was under no illusion on this count. Besides, it would have been rather difficult to explain why a Prime Minister was being replaced under such circumstances. It might be hard to imagine that Singh would go against the party high command’s diktat, but it might not be too much to consider that he could have influenced events in a more favourable manner. The price that he and Congress paid was heavy as the critical factor that had won UPA public support was the belief in its progressive credentials. This came unstuck and it was impossible to repair the damage. Functioning of the PMO became increasingly fragmented and subject to strong pressures from within even as it was buffeted by a determined BJP with articulate leaders like Sushma Swaraj and Arun Jaitley attacking its credentials as leaders of Opposition in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The PAC under veteran Murli Manohar Joshi submitted demining reports as did the parliamentary finance committee under Yashwant Sinha who along with Arun Shourie was to later dramatically part ways with BJP.

In his handling of foreign relations, Singh moved India away from the stranglehold of Cold War era thinking and the confines of the Non-Aligned Movement. His credentials as an economist gained him respect and the India rose in global reckoning. With relation to Pakistan, he genuinely believed that economic interests could build bridges and tried his hand at peace a few times. Soon after UPA returned to office, Singh made a miscalculation. A joint statement issued after a meeting with Pakistan PM Yousuf Gilani at Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt in July, 2009, noted “Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” The implied acceptance of the suggestion of an Indian role in aiding terrorism in Pakistan led to a political firestorm in India. Soon after he returned to India, Singh was informed of the political backlash and the red line he had crossed. There was the “cricket diplomacy” during the 2011 world cup when he saw the India-Pakistan semi-final match in the company of Gilani at Mohali. The attempt to repair relations after the 26/11 attack on Mumbai failed to deliver dividends. The consistent message from Pakistan, then under a PPP government, was to “move on” and forget about bringing those responsible for the outrage to justice. In the end, Singh gave up on looking for progress in ties but the problem was really one of seeing Pakistan in a light distant from reality. As previous prime ministers, Singh was troubled by Chinese intrusions on the line of control and he did begin a reappraisal of India’s border infrastructure and a report by former foreign secretary Shyam Saran revealed just how complacent India had been while China took big strides in developing its side of the LAC.

The NFSA which aimed to provide subsidised foodgrains to 66% of the population (75% rural and 50% urban) was the first item before the UPA cabinet after returning to office in 2009. It was only close to the end of its tenure that it was implemented. The tale is a revelatory one that encapsulates all that went wrong and why Narendra Modi rapidly captured the popular imagination in 2014. The final shape of NFSA was dogged by repeated interventions by the NAC that demanded that the scheme be expanded well beyond food grains. There were interminable discussions on the extent of coverage before the 66% cap was agreed on. Even at the time, it was felt that this was very large number and might dilute the focus on those who really need the assistance. Officials trained to examine the feasibility of policies and now wary over adverse Cag reports and emergence of corruption scandals dragged their feet and raised objections. Meetings were held and it took weeks for the minutes to be finalised. Other initiatives like a set of five bills intended to reform the education sector failed to make headway in Parliament, attracting criticism for proposing unwieldy regulatory structures and running into the well-represented “education” interests articulated by Congress MPs from Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh who feared any move to reduce the role of private professional institutions in admissions. And while legislation and decision-making slowed, fresh political challenges such as the demand for the creation of Telangana arose that sapped a stretched political executive. Parliament was witness to the extraordinary sight of ruling party MPs blockading proceedings and standing the well – in favour and in opposition to Telangana. One Congress MPs used a pepper spray in Lok Sabha, while another stood like Christ the Redeemer holding aloft a banner in the well of Rajya Sabha days on end.

The UPA responded to the 2007 global financial crisis with a set of three stimulus packages and most commentators agreed that at least the last one was not needed. The stimulus measures were overcooked and were more than what the Indian economy required. The debate on their utility might be argued on both sides but what is evident that easy money did not translate into sustained growth. The Indian economy rebounded by 2010 but poorly targeted expenditure increased government borrowings and led to an inflation spiral that lasted till the end of the UPA II tenure. A prolonged spell of double-digit inflation accompanied by rising fiscal deficit led to efforts to keep certain liabilities “off-the-book” reducing reliability of government accounts. In the meanwhile, cabinet ministers began to acknowledge the unproductive nature of MNREGA projects while environmental barriers slowed down project clearances. The Land Acquisition Act and environmental regulations were heavily influenced by activists who had the sympathy of the NAC and ended up increasing lack of transparency rather than empowering local communities. Pandering to activism proved costly, with growth falling below 5% in the 2013 and 2014 fiscals. The data was revised upward when a new base was adopted but slowing growth and high inflation spell trouble for most governments and UPA was no exception. Impatient with corruption and slothful governance, the middle classes began to look for alternatives while the UPA’s core constituency of the underprivileged grew disenchanted. The relations between the government and the Reserve Bank of India touched a new low with the central bank informing a parliamentary committee of a “policy stasis” in the government.

The most surprising aspect of the 2014 Lok Sabha result for Congress and the commentariat that supported it as a bulwark against BJP was the preparedness of the socio-economically weaker sections to support the saffron cause. Once BJP resolved its internal tug of war and named Modi as its PM nominee, Congress rapidly lost popular support. The UPA’s second term was marked by progressively urgent efforts to enmesh Modi in cases relating to the Gujarat riots and the encounter of a Lashkar module in 2004. In an extraordinary about turn, the intelligence bureau under the Centre revised its affidavit that the killed foursome, which included a young woman from Mumbra, was a terror cell assigned to carry out a political assassination. Congress functionaries worked closely with NGOs to move the courts over pleas relating to the 2002 Gujarat riots and other cases such the encounter death of arms smuggler Sohrabuddin that led to the arrest and imprisonment of senior police officers. All this only served to add to the confusion and lack of direction and the UPA coalition, which had delivered in the past, also weakened with regional leaders falling under the shadow of corruption cases.

History could, as Singh hoped, treat him kinder than contemporary accounts. In the end, his innate decency and ability to remain free of personal taint will stand out. It was not that he was above politics. At a meeting of the Congress parliamentary party after the P V Narasimha Rao government crashed to defeat in 1996, he did not hesitate in noting that the Ceasar’s wife must be above suspicion, an unmistakable swipe at his mentor. And though he maintained impeccable personal probity, he might have rued not exercising the option of taking tough decisions rather than regretting at leisure.

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