There was a case for reviewing AFSPA and removing the law selectively but it may still be premature to repeal it
Siddharth Singh Siddharth Singh | 08 Apr, 2022
An army patrol in Guwahati after the outbreak of violence during anti-Citizenship Amendment Act protests in December 2019 (Photo: Getty Images)
WHEN 14 CIVILIANS were killed in a case of ‘mistaken identity’ by security forces in Mon district of Nagaland on December 4 last year, there was a spontaneous uproar across the region. The Nagaland Legislative Assembly unanimously passed a resolution demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA). Last week, the Centre reduced the footprint of the law not only in Nagaland but in Assam and Manipur as well. The step was welcomed across the northeastern region that has borne the brunt of insurgency for decades.
AFSPA was enacted in 1958 when insurgency was raging in what was then known as the Naga Hills district of Assam. At different points, all states in the region have seen the use of the law to quell insurgency. All the while there have been allegations of the law providing a ‘cover’ for the armed forces to indulge in human rights violations. But this has never been conclusively proved. The Supreme Court, while disapproving of incidents wherein the law was abused, never ruled it as unconstitutional despite repeated challenges to its legality. But as the situation improved in the Northeast, there was decidedly a case for reviewing its use even if the case for its outright repeal remains questionable.
So what explains the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s initiative to reduce the footprint of AFSPA in these states? There are two competing explanations, one based on the changing security calculus in the region and the other based on the wider politics of BJP across the country.
If one looks at BJP’s forward electoral march since 2014, one can see a correlation with a steady reduction in the territorial expanse of AFSPA. In March 2018, the law was withdrawn fully from Meghalaya. Over the years, it was steadily withdrawn from various districts of Arunachal Pradesh. Originally, it was in force in three districts (Longding, Tirap and Changlang) and in bits and parts of eight other districts across the state. Now, it remains in force only in the three districts—Longding, Tirap and Changlang—and two police stations in Namsai district that borders Assam. The law was withdrawn from Tripura by the Left Front government there in 2015. Many of these decisions were based on security considerations and Arunachal Pradesh is a good example in this context. Something similar was at work in Meghalaya and Tripura as well.
The politics of the Act’s removal should be seen against the backdrop of the security situation in these states. If one looks at the areas where the Act is operational, the picture is now close to a patchwork. This is in marked contrast to the early 1990s when most of the northeastern region was under the blanket application of the law. Apart from purely security-based reviews, it is the political situation that has altered dramatically in the region. Since 2014, most of the states have come under the sway of BJP. Some of the longstanding issues have begun to be addressed. The signing of agreements with many overground militant networks, be they in the Bodo areas of Assam or some of the groups operating in the Karbi Anglong district, has prepared the political ground for the Centre to review the application of the law.
Much of the political initiative and heavy-lifting in this respect has come from the Centre. Having the same parties ruling at the Centre and in these states helps, but ultimately, the push came from New Delhi. State governments in the region, even those of BJP, are inclined to keep the security architecture unchanging. This is not just a matter of political and bureaucratic inertia but the fear of being caught on the wrong foot in case matters go downhill. In this context, it is worth noting that in Manipur, the entire state was declared a disturbed area on December 8 last year, barely four months before AFSPA was revoked in some areas.
Similarly, in Assam, on February 28 this year, the entire state was declared a disturbed area for the next six months, just a month before AFSPA was revoked in 23 districts of the state. This did not represent a marked change in the security situation within a span of a few months. If anything, it is worth noting that AFSPA continues to remain in force in Karbi Anglong after April 1 when the law was revoked in 23 districts of Assam. This, after a number of militant groups had signed agreements with the Centre.
BJP’s political calculation at the Central level is different. It feels sufficiently confident to remove AFSPA and reap the ‘low-hanging’ fruit by removing the law from those areas where the security situation has either improved or can be managed at a tolerable risk level. In Manipur, for example, AFSPA has been revoked in the Imphal Valley districts (Imphal East and West, Thoubal and Bishnupur) and two other districts. But the rest of the state continues to be a disturbed area for the purpose of the law. But it is a well-known fact that there is a division of labour between security forces in the state: the Army continues to manage security in the restive outlying districts like Churachandpur, Chandel and Ukhrul, among others. Something similar is at work in Assam where nine districts in Upper Assam continue to be disturbed areas. It is in largely peaceful Lower Assam and the middle range of the Brahmaputra Valley that AFSPA has been revoked. Even here, there is an element of calculated risk: Nalbari in Lower Assam is an erstwhile stronghold of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) where the security situation always needs a careful watch.
By removing the law from these areas, BJP is signalling a political shift of sorts. Usually, security issues, especially those around terrorism and separatism, have drawn the ire of the electorate in case they are not handled properly. BJP gained the most from these concerns and fears electorally. Once in power, it was not expected that a conservative party would do anything that militated against security in sensitive zones, thus risking its ‘security credentials’. But instead of treating the issue as a binary one, BJP has carefully prepared the political ground in the Northeast and now seeks to slowly normalise the region, to the greatest extent possible. Over the years, BJP has tried very hard to remove the ‘mainland’ versus ‘periphery’ distinction in the Northeast by giving greater attention to the region. That seems to be bearing fruit. Here, the contrast with Congress’ approach is instructive. Soon after it came to power in 2004, the Congress-led government at the Centre appointed a committee to review AFSPA. That committee, led by a former Supreme Court judge, BP Jeevan Reddy, recommended its repeal and enactment of a “humane law” to manage security. Even after it was armed with this report, the government did nothing. When the committee gave its report in 2005, two of the three states (Assam and Manipur) were ruled by Congress. But beyond the submission of the report, no steps were taken to either revoke the law or repeal it.
The politics of the Act’s removal should be seen against the backdrop of the security situation in these states. It is in marked contrast to the early 1990s
BJP has a commanding presence in the Northeast and in north India. This combination matters for its ability to take decisions that are politically difficult. In north India, national security is a major political issue. A weak position in north India makes it difficult, if not altogether risky, to ‘dilute’ security in restive regions like the Northeast. Very often, ‘civil society’ and activists do not appreciate the political factors that have a bearing on security decisions. The inability of Congress—a party that is sympathetic to civil society—was in no small part due to this factor. BJP is in a far more favourable situation on this front. Unless there are major security setbacks in the months and years ahead, it is likely that the reach of AFSPA will shrink.
OVER TIME, SOMETHING of a mythology has come to surround the use of AFSPA. Apart from the usual—mostly of leftist origin—claims about India turning into a ‘security state’, a more recent claim is that the law is inextricably linked to the politics of Hindutva. The most powerful statement along these lines is one from Perry Anderson, a Marxist historian. In his book, The Indian Ideology, he writes: “For what is perfectly obvious, but never seen or spoken, is that the hand of AFSPA has fallen where the reach of Hinduism has stopped.” The book lists the “three great insurgencies” in this context: Kashmir (Muslim), “Nagaland-Mizoram” (Christian) and Punjab (Sikh).
If read without care, this is a very corrosive claim, one that runs against India’s democratic credentials. But there are more prosaic explanations that offer a better fit with observations. The first thing to note is that there is no correlation between AFSPA and Hinduism: AFSPA has been imposed for decades in Assam and Manipur and both states have large Hindu populations. For another, AFSPA has been imposed in border states (Manipur and Nagaland, for example), or where there has been evidence of interference from other countries (such as Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab). The last also includes Assam: insurgents from the state have found shelter in at least two neighbouring countries.
As any other country, India is sensitive to insurgencies in its border states and takes whatever measures are necessary to quell them. The contrast with another long-running insurgency—in the “Red Corridor”—is instructive. At one time, the Maoist rebellion stretched from Andhra Pradesh all the way to West Bengal. Yet, at no point was AFSPA imposed in any of the 150 districts in the corridor. There was no external intervention in this rebellion nor did the Maoists seek aid and refuge in other countries. Going by the sheer scale of the territory that was once under Maoist control and the nature of the insurgency—described by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the “biggest internal security threat” to India—there was, arguably, a case for these districts being labelled “disturbed areas”.
By removing the law from many areas, BJP is signalling a political shift. It has a commanding presence in the Northeast and in North India. This matters for its ability to take decisions that are politically difficult
It is another matter that activists and ‘civil society’ are unlikely to be pleased at what the Centre did last week. There are faint voices that AFSPA should be repealed. This is to be expected. ‘Civil society’ in India has little understanding of security challenges and its appraisal of what happens in these areas is one-sided. Expressions such as “dignity of the people” and “human rights” are used so casually as to debase these important issues. No government in India—irrespective of its political complexion—wants citizens to be humiliated or subjected to degrading conditions. But if territory slips out of government control into insurgent hands, there will be no human rights left at all: life itself would be at the mercy of men with guns. The changes afoot in the Northeast, however, point in a positive direction. Hopefully, in time, AFSPA will be removed from the remaining districts in the region.
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