AAPocalypse

THE STRONG BI-POLARITY of the Delhi election presented strong evidence of just how hard-fought the campaign was with the Bharati­ya Janata Party (BJP) and the Aam Admi Party (AAP) going head-to-head in an epic clash. The near irrelevance of other players put the spot­light on the scale of BJP’s win and AAP’s precipitous fall from grace. A 10 per cent erosion in AAP’s vote and BJP’s gain of 7 per cent tells the story behind the ruling dispensation crashing to defeat as it lost support across all social groups barring Muslims. The loss shook not only AAP’s faithful supporters but also po­litical pundits who felt the party would make it back to office, even if with reduced numbers. It was not an altogether misplaced estimate as AAP counted on a wide swath of electoral support ranging from the middle class to residents of the capital’s teem­ing unauthorised colonies. They had all bought into AAP leader Arvind Kejriwal’s promise to work for the aam aadmi (common man), helping the party ace two Assembly elections in succession.

The 45.56 per cent vote BJP got is 1.99 per cent more than AAP’s 43.57 per cent but the secret of the saffron success lies in the decisive change in momentum between the 2020 and 2025 elections and crucial accretions. BJP allies, the Janata Dal (U) and Lok Jan Shakti (Ram Vilas), did not win seats allocated to them but added 1.59 per cent to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) vote share, tak­ing it to 47.1 per cent. Reducing leakage of the alliance’s vote to a minimum was critical in an election where every vote counted. The picture becomes clearer when AAP’s large margins on seven seats with a high Muslim population are considered. The other ‘secular’ party Congress failed to make a mark and only influential individu­als fielded by the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) had an impact on two seats, one won by BJP. But the votes for AAP in these constituencies add up to 11.6 per cent of the total number of votes the party polled, revealing its decline in other demograph­ics and providing an accurate context to its poor tally. Setting aside Muslim-dominated seats reduces AAP’s average winning margins and reveals a polarisation against the party among other commu­nities. Eight of AAP’s 22 MLAs won 12 of Delhi’s Scheduled Caste (SC) seats and another six secured seven seats with a high number of Muslim voters, adding up to more than 60 per cent of its legisla­tors. Outside these enclaves, BJP’s dominance was near complete.

Even when AAP’s success on seats with a high Muslim pres­ence is considered, there is erosion in support. In Chandni Chowk, AAP’s winning candidate got 54.7 per cent of the vote as compared to 65.9 per cent in 2020. Barring Seelampur, AAP’s votes registered between moderate to sharp falls in Ballimaran, Matia Mahal, Babarpur and Okhla. The party’s performance in these constitu­encies was an important reason why AAP was able to poll 43.5 per cent votes but here too it was not immune to the law of diminish­ing returns. Seelampur, Babarpur and Mustafabad fall within the North East Delhi Lok Sabha constituency and the results in the re­maining seven Assembly constituencies show a more even trend. This was the area that bore the brunt of anti-CAA (Citizens Amend­ment Act) rioting in 2020 that left 53 dead. The violence, triggered by anti-CAA activists who planned the protests to coincide with the visit of US President Donald Trump, has kept the communal pot boiling. The Jahangirpuri riot in April 2022, when a Hanuman Jayanti procession was attacked, added to the undercurrent. AAP’s ambiguity over CAA and the rioting led to a loss of support among Muslim voters in the 2022 municipal corporation election. Con­gress emerged as the beneficiary, preventing an AAP sweep though it displaced BJP in the MCD House. With stakes high in the 2025 Assembly election, the minority community rallied behind AAP but an underlying Hindu sentiment—though BJP did not rake up the riots—seems to have helped the latter.

Did the low-income voter, the targeted beneficiary of AAP’s schemes like free power and water, mohalla clinics and gov­ernment-run schools, stick with the party? A proportion did, explaining AAP’s vote share remaining above the 40 per cent mark. But again, just as with constituencies with high Muslim presence, the details provide a more granular narrative. The “low-income” voter includes Dalits seen to be receptive to AAP’s appeal but also a large population that delivers all manner of services to the capi­tal. This includes Poorvanchalis and there are seats with a strong presence of people from east Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. In 2020, AAP won all 12 SC seats in Delhi. This time round, BJP won four, a gain from zero right away. BJP did better on seats with a significant Dalit presence as compared to its poor returns in 2020. While the ‘free’ constituency—purported gainers from the AAP government’s largesse—might have been inclined to favour the party, there was a dip in enthusiasm. This is evident in the reduced voting percent­ages for AAP nominees on SC seats. Constituencies like Gokalpur, Sultanpur, Karol Bagh, Patel Nagar and Kondli saw AAP’s voting percentages drop by 5 to 10 per cent. In Ambedkar Nagar, AAP’s voting percentage fell almost 15 per cent. All of this indicates AAP’s voters, those on whom the party counted on, either did not turn up to vote in numbers it anticipated or changed preferences. It is likely that both assumptions are valid and the minor increase in Congress’ vote share from 4 per cent in 2020 to 6.3 per cent suggests a shift towards BJP. The margins of victory on SC seats vary from 392 votes that separated BJP from AAP in Trilokpuri, and the latter winning the Deoli seat by 36,680 votes. What is indisputable is BJP’s improved performance on seats and among voters where it suffered a deficit actually came at AAP’s expense.

IN A CITY where Punjabis have left an indelible imprint with many remaking their lives after the Partition, BJP has seen the community as an ally with leaders like Madan Lal Khurana and VK Malhotra playing a leading role in the party. It was not that Congress did not have its share of Punjabi leaders and the late HKL Bhagat was once the uncrowned king of East Delhi. But BJP could look for backers in Punjabi colonies of West, South and East Delhi as loyal voters whose families have supported it since the days of the Jana Sangh. BJP’s failure to keep abreast with the changing modes of the capital, particularly its younger voters, and factional squabbles saw Congress rule the roost under Sheila Dikshit who combined an urban suaveness with a keen eye for nurturing vote banks. And then, just as BJP might have felt its hour had arrived, the party found itself upstaged by AAP led by activist-turned-pol­itician Arvind Kejriwal. Under him, AAP moved along the path of untrammelled populism and lost sight of its claim to represent alternate politics in keeping with its roots in the anti-corruption agitation of the Gandhian Anna Hazare. To BJP’s chagrin, the party was ousted from constituencies like Shalimar Bagh, Rajouri Gar­den, Hari Nagar, Janakpuri, Jangpura, Malviya Nagar, and Krishna Nagar. These were worrying losses as they meant BJP was out of sync with a core constituency and had lost out among both Hindu and Sikh Punjabis. This time, of the 17 constituencies with a sizeable Punjabi presence, AAP won just three and BJP staged a resound­ing comeback. The results will be particularly gratifying for the party that could not have hoped to revive its fortunes without its traditional voters in residential colonies, many of whom had since 2013 considered Kejriwal as the local choice while backing Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the Centre. The corruption scandals that hit AAP and its unrepentant stance blaming BJP for launching a witch hunt harmed the party’s standing in middle-class colonies.

Though salience of the community diminished as it made way for others like Jats and Gujjars who populate villages within the urbanised spaces of outer Delhi with leaders like BJP’s Sahib Singh Verma rising from the ranks, Punjabis retain influence in busi­ness and commerce. No party can expect to win elections without their support and BJP’s improved showing was matched by the backing it received from the Jats—in contrast to the situation in neighbouring Haryana where the party struggled to counter the community’s disaffection. The urban villages as well as the ones designated agrarian voted AAP in the last two Assembly polls, and the party’s candidates reflected this so­cial fact. AAP promoted candidates it felt have local clout, raised resources to fund campaigns and deployed manpower for voter mobilisation. This time, nine of 10 constituencies with a large number of Jat and Gujjar voters chose BJP. It was telling that BJP’s margins were comfortable on most seats and the gap was not much narrower, even in constituen­cies like Bawana and Deoli, which are also reserved SC seats.

The importance of Poorvanchali voters and, consequently, leaders from these regions has risen by leaps and bounds. During Congress’ hey­day, leaders like Mahabal Mishra, who had made their way up moving from being councillor to MLA to MP, represented the rise of the Poorvanchalis. Their path was of­ten opposed by politicians with more established roots and greater economic clout, but waves of migrants changed the city’s political dynamic. Just as Kejriwal’s ill-considered comment claiming the BJP government in Haryana was poisoning the Yamuna evoked widespread criticism and cost AAP dearly, his remarks accusing the rival party of bringing in people from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to enrol them as voters was a mistake too. BJP latched onto the dis­paraging comment to claim Kejriwal was insulting Poorvanchalis. The missteps are reminiscent of Dikshit dismissing AAP ahead of the 2013 Assembly election as “monsoon pests” who were a pass­ing nuisance. Leaders out of step with voter sensibilities seem to make such errors. In the just-concluded election, BJP won nine of 17 seats that have a good- sized Poorvanchali population. Of these, Ambedkar Nagar, Seemapuri and Kondli are also reserved seats and returned AAP candidates. BJP narrowly won Sangam Vihar with 344 votes with AAP’s Dinesh Mohania losing a tight race. On the other hand, BJP won Uttam Nagar with a large margin of almost 30,000 votes, consolidating its advantage. BJP registered another gratifying win in Trilokpuri where it nosed ahead by 392 votes.

The argument that Congress was the difference between BJP’s success and AAP’s loss on a dozen odd seats requires closer examination. The truth is that Congress was a non-starter with its candidates losing deposits on 67 seats. The party’s organisation in Delhi has withered and Congress struggled to find viable can­didates. As in the Maharashtra election last year, the supervision of the state unit and decisions taken by city leaders was minimal and ineffective. The barely 2 per cent rise in vote share is revealing and candidates like former MP Krishna Tirath got a paltry 4,654 votes. Former student leader and ex-MLA Alka Lamba, fielded from Kalkaji where AAP leader Atishi contested, managed 4,392 votes. Elections are never fought on suppositions that all parties and votes aligned against a particular party must converge. In any case, it was Kejriwal who announced AAP did not need Congress as an alliance partner and any benefits accruing to BJP cannot be retrospectively corrected. The assumption that votes that went to Congress would necessarily have transferred to AAP if the for­mer was not in the fray as an independent entity is flawed. For one, voters seeking change may have considered BJP if Congress was not a choice or could well have sat it out if they did not like available options. Just how many would have chosen AAP over BJP despite their disenchantment with Kejriwal is a speculative question. The results on SC seats show Congress nominees getting more than 6,000 votes in half-a-dozen constituencies. While Dalits are obviously just a section, even if a numerous one, in these con­stituencies some voters did choose Congress even when AAP was the favourite, indicating an antipathy towards the ruling party.

Kejriwal’s politics has relied on a mix of grievance monger­ing, an assortment of freebies and his I-am-one-of-you charisma. His decision not to resign despite a long stint in jail on corruption charges last year in the run-up to the Assembly election brought the already stuttering Delhi government to a grinding halt. Civic services worsened and key Budget proposals such as the promise to roll out a monthly stipend for eligible women remained on pa­per, reducing AAP’s prospects among a voter group it had wooed assiduously. When Kejriwal first took charge of office, Delhi was remarkably free of debt. Its revenues grew over the years, mask­ing the state government’s growing profligacy. At the time AAP formed the government, given the state’s healthy finances, any multilateral funding agency would have advanced loans on fa­vourable terms to improve the capital’s infrastructure. Welfarism and freebies worked well over two terms from 2015 to 2025, but fi­nally ran out of steam as the AAP model came apart at the seams.

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