The unravelling of secular intellectualism, from Kashmir to Ayodhya
Swapan Dasgupta Swapan Dasgupta | 22 Dec, 2023
(Illustration: Saurabh Singh)
FIRST, IT WAS A KEY feature of the secessionist movement that escalated to the point where, for at least two months, the authorities were in real danger of losing control of the Valley altogether. Indeed, the proponents of azadi made no attempts to conceal the fact that they wanted the Pandits out because the community was inherently pro-India.
Secondly, the Islamist dimension of Kashmiri separatism was well-known and recognised all over India. However, it was extremely curious that India’s secular parties chose to put a lid on this incontrovertible reality. The horrific expulsion of an entire community was sought to be either glossed over as a minor hiccup or blamed on the machinations of Governor Jagmohan. Indeed, it was left to BJP (and its ally Shiv Sena) to highlight the plight of those languishing in refugee camps in Jammu and press for their rehabilitation.
BJP was vocal in suggesting that the political dislocation in the Kashmir Valley and the persecution of Kashmiri Hindus by the pro-azadi forces owed entirely to the separatist mindset that had been nurtured by Article 370. This was contested by the entire range of secular forces. They argued that asymmetric federalism was necessary because Kashmir was a ‘special case’. What was ‘special’ about Kashmir— apart from the fact that it was claimed by Pakistan and had become ‘disputed’ following Jawaharlal Nehru’s unwise decision to refer the dispute to the United Nations—was never explicitly stated.
Indeed, it was often suggested that Article 370 had now become permanent because Kashmir no longer had a Constituent Assembly that could co-endorse the final curtains for Article 370.
The most significant feature of the national debate that erupted over Article 370 after the Hindu exodus of 1990 was that it became a confrontation between secular intellectualism and ‘communal’ common sense. The secularists attempted to project the entire Kashmir problem as stemming from alienation caused by the dilution of federal rights post-1953. It was made out that separatism would end abruptly if the state government was conferred all powers except defence, foreign affairs, currency, and communications. Against this was ranged the Hindu common sense, articulated in everyday conversations across India, that suggested that the only thing ‘special’ about Jammu and Kashmir was that it was Muslim-majority. Article 370 was presented as another example of Muslim appeasement.
At the same time as there was simmering outrage over the happenings in Kashmir Valley, there was
Another growing mismatch between secular intellectualism and Hindu common sense over the Ram Janmabhoomi temple. Although the dispute over the 16th-century Babri Masjid had been a feature of the erstwhile kingdom of Oudh and had again excited the local Hindu imagination in 1948, it became a national issue in 1988-89. Whether this was a consequence of the Ram shila pujas organised by the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) or a function of a growing mood change in the country is best left to future historians to unravel. What can be said with a measure of certainty is that the issue began to grip the national imagination because of the political intervention by then BJP President LK Advani.
In the early stages of the movement, the demand for a Ram temple at the site of the Babri Masjid was presented as an article of faith centred on the local belief that Lord Ram was born in that very place that now hosted the Babri Masjid. For those who viewed this movement as antediluvian and an affront to all modernist impulses, it was relatively easy to debunk this insistence on identifying the exact spot where Lord Ram was born. Historians had a great time passing resolutions in sessions of the Indian History Congress attacking the equation of history with mythology.
However, the debate took a different turn once the temple issue was incorporated into the political agenda of BJP at its Palampur national executive meeting in 1988. Advani’s thrust was twofold. First, the emphasis was no longer on determining the spot where Lord Ram was born, but on the fact that the Babri Masjid was built on the site where a grand Hindu temple stood. The issue therefore shifted from establishing the historicity of mythology to the record of Muslim invaders. Secondly, it was argued by BJP that the ruling Congress Establishment was loath to respect the sentiments of Hindus because it pursued a policy of ‘pseudo-secularism’ centred on ‘minorityism’.
LIKE IN THE EMERGING DEBATE ON ARTICLE 370, THE AYODHYA controversy soon escalated into a battle between secular denial and Hindu common sense. The secular Establishment marshalled many ‘eminent’ historians, usually of a Left persuasion, that tried to whitewash the record of temple destruction by Islamic invaders. It was argued that temple destruction was less for religious objectives and more as an assertion of political power and that this practice predated the Muslim invaders. In the context of Ayodhya, it was claimed that there was no evidence of temple destruction by Babur’s general in 1528. It was further suggested that the dispute in Ayodhya had been an outcome of the British ‘divide and rule’ policy that incorporated the mindset of today’s Hindu nationalists.
In its judgment, the Allahabad High Court had many harsh things to say about the historians who jumped into the Ayodhya controversy despite lacking the requisite expertise to comment on either archaeology or medieval history. Reading the judgment, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a large body of public intellectuals who determined the tone of secularist intransigence during the protracted Ayodhya dispute were charlatans.
However, the debate was less about today’s presentation of India’s past than about popular perception. Despite many decades of intellectual engineering by Nehruvians and the Left, Hindu common sense held to the view that, with some exceptions, Islamic rule in India had been a history of persecution of Hindus and the wanton destruction of their places of worship. Regardless of what historians suggested about the rulers exercising political power, Hindu common sense—backed up by a tradition of ballads and folklore—held that Hindus had lived in servitude under the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughals. The Hindu heroes were Maharana Pratap, Chhatrapati Shivaji, and Guru Govind Singh—stalwarts of the fight against foreign rule.
There was a natural common sense feeling among Hindus, fuelled by ballads and oral histories, regarding the significance of the shrine in Ayodhya, just as there was over the demolished temples in Varanasi and Mathura. Consequently, the demolition of the ‘disputed structure’ in 1992 was viewed as a landmark in the battle to reclaim India. Despite the angry response of the Supreme Court to the broken assurances, the demolition enjoyed a post-facto legitimacy whose political consequences were steadily felt over the next 15 years. The phenomenon was described by VS Naipaul as “a mighty creative process”. He added that “Indian intellectuals, who want to be secure in their liberal beliefs, may not understand what is going on… But every other Indian knows precisely what is happening. Deep down he knows that a larger response is emerging even if at times this response appears in his eyes as threatening.”
The dominant intellectual elite had indeed felt extremely threatened by the Ayodhya agitation and particularly the triumphalist response to the demolition in 1992. Not entirely persuaded that the secular parties would successfully resist the BJP advance electorally, it laid great store in the dispute getting mired in a labyrinthine judicial process and losing its emotive sharpness. Unfortunately, things didn’t quite work out the way the secularists anticipated. After the second consecutive BJP victory in 2019, a proactive Chief Justice of India decided to force a judicial conclusion of the controversy. The unanimous Supreme Court was an unqualified triumph for the Hindu side and paved the way for the construction of the temple where the pran pratistha of the deity will be undertaken by Prime Minister Modi on January 22, 2024.
The Supreme Court judgment on Ayodhya was viewed by a section of the anti-BJP forces as a complete betrayal of the secular principles on which the Indian Republic rests. However, many in the political class who weren’t terribly enthusiastic about the temple were relieved at the closure of a dispute that had changed the face of Indian politics. Without drawing larger conclusions, they hoped for a return to normal politics, away from hyper-emotionalism.
For Modi, electoral politics and governance are small steps in effecting a fundamental transformation of the Hindu mind, something that Swami Vivekananda had first spoken of
These hopes appear to have been dashed by the unanimous Supreme Court judgment putting a closure on the removal of Article 370 from Jammu and Kashmir. This judgment, too, was viewed by the old elite as a betrayal since, quite clearly, the judiciary attached greater significance to national unity (and the national mood) over the legislation’s supposed procedural flaws.
Coming shortly after BJP’s emphatic win in three Assembly elections and a month or so before India goes into euphoria over the Ram temple, the Article 370 judgment has prompted renewed discussion over the changing nature of the Indian state. Has India, it is being asked by a vocal (and increasingly hysterical) tribe of sceptics, formally turned its back on the inheritance of the Constituent Assembly and inaugurated the Second Republic, a Hindu Republic?
THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL SHIFT ISN’T in doubt. In crafting a new and efficient welfare architecture that makes full use of modern technology, the government has been guided almost entirely by the universalism of the sabka saath, sabka vikas principle. The criterion for welfare payments has been strictly non-denominational and there has been no suggestion that the new welfarism is biased in favour of Hindus. However, the 10 years of Modi rule have also witnessed the prime minister reaffirming a nationhood that is at variance with the post-Independence assumptions of Congress.
Let us look at two significant interventions.
First, there was Prime Minister Modi’s speech in Ayodhya in August 2020 to mark the inauguration of construction for the Ram temple. Unlike Nehru, who was not merely opposed to the reconstruction of a Somnath temple in Gujarat but also sought to prevent President Rajendra Prasad from attending the function, Modi had no inhibition about participating in the groundbreaking ceremonies. “The time has come,” he declared, “when a proper temple can be provided to the deity of Lord Ram by moving it from the makeshift tent and canopy, where it was kept for decades… Today, the Ram Janmabhoomi has become free from the centuries-old chain of destruction and resurrection… Friends, several generations devoted themselves completely during our freedom struggle. There was never a moment during the period of slavery that there was not a movement for freedom… August 15 is the embodiment of the sacrifices of lakhs of people and a deep yearning for independence. Similarly, several generations have made selfless sacrifices for several centuries for the construction of the Ram temple. Today marks the culmination of that centuries-old penance, sacrifice, and resolve.”
Secondly, there was his Independence Day speech of 2022 where he spelt out the contours of the Amrit Kaal that would take India to the centenary of azadi in 2047. “We must take up the responsibility of fulfilling all the dreams of the freedom fighters… by 2047. The Panch Pran of Amrit Kaal goal of developed India, to remove any trace of colonial mindset, take pride in our roots, unity and sense of duty among citizens… How long will the world continue to distribute certificates to us? How long will we live on the certificates of the world? Shall we not set our own standards? Can a country of 130 crore not make an effort to exceed its own standards? Under no circumstances should we try to look like others. It should be our temperament to grow with our own potential. We want freedom from slavery. The element of slavery should not remain in our mind even under the distant seven seas.”
Read together, these appear more than either policy pronouncements or homilies. They suggest that for Modi, electoral politics and governance are small steps in effecting a fundamental transformation of the Hindu mind, something that Swami Vivekananda had first spoken of in the last decade of the 19th century. Many of these ideals influenced the course of the freedom struggle and shaped the ideals of the freedom fighters. Indeed, the pre- 1947 Congress had internalised these ideals and aspirations, and Mahatma Gandhi had always tried to forge a uniquely Indian idiom. It is a different matter that an alternative set of cosmopolitan and progressive ideals won the day after 1947 and steered India to a different trajectory. The protracted spell of Congress rule based on a Nehruvian worldview produced an India where the impulses of the ‘natives’ were at variance with the mindset of the intelligentsia.
For Modi, electoral politics and governance are small steps in effecting a fundamental transformation of the Hindu mind, something that Swami Vivekananda had first spoken of
In the past 10 years, Modi has sought to restore India’s authenticity. He has sought to combine it with a lofty aspiration of taking India to the status of a developed country and perhaps even a viswaguru. The challenges he has faced and will face have less to do with the end goal. He is hated by some because he has forced the pace of change with a show of aggression that some consider un-Hindu. However, breaking the stereotype of what Swami Vivekananda mocked as the ‘patient Hindu, the mild Hindu’ was necessary unless timelessness became the mantra of governance.
Modi is shaping a new, purposeful India. It is a far cry from the orientalist India that was loved, patronised, and subjugated.
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