Hindutva with a Difference

IMAGINE MK STALIN, THE current Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) supremo—or, for that matter, his late father, ‘Kalaignar’ M Karunanidhi, or heir apparent and son, Udhayanidhi Stalin—campaigning in Varanasi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s constituency. Sounds bizarre? Rightly so.

How many people would come to listen to them, even out of plain curiosity? And suppose, further, that they spoke only in Tamil? What might be the extent of the disconnect with their audience, even with a consecutive or simultaneous Hindi translation? Finally, to conclude such an improbable thought experiment, what if any of the above-mentioned worthies, transpositioned to the so-called ‘cow belt’, continued to spew their anti-north, anti- Hindi, and yes, anti-Hindu ideology, which has come to be characterised by the umbrella category ‘Dravidianism’? Would they make any headway, let alone win votes? Not for themselves, for they have zero presence outside their state, but even for their allies?

We don’t have to look long or far and wide for answers. The unlikelihood of such a scenario is obvious. Right now, on the eve of the General Election, despite the uneasy and tottering protraction of the I.N.D.I.A. bloc, no Dravidian leader is seen campaigning north of the Vindhyas. Forget about campaigning, they are rarely visible with local alliance partners or candidates on the same dais. Why? Because they would prove to be liabilities.

Now, flip the situation. Though I admit that the lack of appeal of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is not quite as catastrophic as that of DMK outside Tamil Nadu, the above thought experiment might give us some idea of how heavily the odds are stacked against their penetrating the southernmost bastions of the nation. Despite all the personal charisma and draw of Narendra Modi, not to mention his laudable efforts to speak in Tamil. Or attempts to revive age-old cultural and religious bridges between the southern state and his own constituency, Varanasi. Even the great appeal of K Annamalai is by itself insufficient to throw the switch that BJP so fervently hopes for.

Indeed, winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil people is not as simple as flipping a switch from off to on. BJP’s top strategists are well aware of this. They know about the fatigue, if not outright anti-incumbency, against not just DMK, but Dravidianism itself. They also know that Modi’s relatively clean image, developmental agenda, and appeal to aspirational India cannot be denied even in the deepest interiors of the state. What is more, the Tamil people, like their Kerala counterparts, are traditionally pious by nature and devout Hindus too. Despite the ‘godless’ communism that plagues the latter and the overt anti-Sanatanism and active proselytisation that prevails in the former geography.

This is where BJP has a real opportunity but also encounters its biggest challenge—the lack of resonance of northern-style Hindutva in both Tamil Nadu and Kerala. How then, one might ask, did BJP succeed in Karnataka? One reason is that Karnataka, itself made up of former territories of what used to be the Bombay and Madras Presidencies and erstwhile princely states of Mysore and Hyderabad, was easier to polarise along religious lines. The cultural memory of the masses was not entirely washed clean of the depredations and distortions of Muslim rule, despite all the attempts to paint Tipu Sultan in nationalist hues or portray the Nizam of Hyderabad’s rule as benevolent, even ‘secular’.

In contrast, the standard BJP playbook draws a blank in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Whether it is Hindutva icons such as Veer Savarkar or the narrative of Hinduism under threat, there is little purchase for conventional Hindutva down under. Even the ‘love jihad’ narrative, unleashed with all its fury in Kerala not only on mainstream or social media but even in hard-hitting movies, proved little more than a storm in a teacup. Similarly, the Khilafat atrocities of the Moplah rebellion or the ‘anti-national’ rhetoric of the banned Progressive Front of India (PFI) hasn’t as yet consolidated Hindu votes as was hoped.

What is missing? The lack of visible or viable leadership, at least in Tamil Nadu, no longer holds true. K Annamalai, a very bankable and promising political force, is already their rising star. What then is needed? The answer is a much more nuanced and culturalist Hindutva, inclusive more than aggressive. The rudiments of a southern Hindutva, the flavour in addition to the face, are there for everyone to sense, if not openly see.

Such a culturalist turn, however, needs a strong linguistic basis. Here, BJP’s Hindi-Hindutva toggling proves to be a major impediment. BJP needs more non-Hindi speaking leaders in its central leadership, as much as it needs local Tamil and Malayali leadership.

In addition, an anti-minority Hindutva will not work as well in Tamil Nadu or Kerala. I understood this in a rather intriguing manner inside the famous Vadakkunnathan Temple in Thrissur, Kerala. This beautiful, ancient temple, is believed to be established by Parashurama, who according to Puranic lore, founded Kerala by requesting the sea to recede. It is this grand Shiva temple, with the entire Shiva family residing there, which gave Thrissur its popular medieval epithet as Dakshina Kailasam or the southern Kailasa. Naturally, it also has shrines dedicated to Shiva- Parvati, Subramanya, and Ganesha, as also to Shri Rama. A perfect setting for Hindutva?

Not quite, as I realised. At least, not without a Kerala inflection.

The Ganesha shrine faces the kitchen, which is quite appropriate given this deity’s fondness for treats. Sweet appam, deep-fried in ghee, is his favourite food. Worshipping this form of Ganesha is believed to bring prosperity to the sincere devotee. When I stood before the elephant-headed god, I saw many huge bells dangling down from the rafters right in front. Instinctively, I reached out and announced my presence by ringing a couple of them rather insistently. The silence that ensued reverberated with the beautiful sound of ancient and noble chimes.

Just then a gentleman in shirt and veshti (dhoti) approached me and spoke softly in shuddh Hindi, albeit with a Malayali accent: “Aap kahan se aye hain?” Since I myself was dressed in a dhoti and angavastram, I thought I blended in well. Obviously, I was mistaken. Did I stick out so obviously I wondered with dismay? Certainly, my nationalist sentiments of all of India being one were slightly upended if not dislodged. I nodded and said simply, “Dilli.” Now in English, he said, “I knew you were not from these parts.” Then he paused and asked, “Is everything okay?” It was my turn to be surprised. “What do you mean?” I posed the counter-question. He smiled and said, “Here, we don’t ring the bells unless there is an urgency. We don’t like to disturb the gods.”

The penny dropped. In “God’s own country”, ruled by a just ruler, the benevolent and beneficent deities do not need to be disturbed with every trivial need or demand.

Political Hinduism, in other words, cannot be strident here. The recidivist ressentiment and belligerence that work in the northern lands battered by invasions, conquests, and colonialism do not strike a sympathetic chord here. The interests of the majority are not seen as automatically opposed to those of the minorities nor is an antagonist identity politics likely to succeed as well. Hindutva, which is not monolithic, needs several regional expressions and inflections. This is true not just in the south, but also in the east, especially Bengal and Odisha. Regional variations and innovations would actually show the flexibility and adaptability of Hindutva, rather than diluting or watering down its core principles and tenets.

This adaptation and transformation, however, requires not just political strategising, but intellectual and cultural proficiency. Also, hard work. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the parent body of BJP, has members and branches all over India, with a considerable resource base in the south. Some of its top leaders have, and continue, to be South Indians. But their template of nationalism does not permit great regional variety or variation. Rather, they promote the idea of a substantially similar, even if not uniform nationalism, in all parts of Bharat. As such, they have not been able to leverage the historically significant cultural and linguistic boundary of the Vindhyas to their advantage, whereas that difference has been the bedrock and mainstay of Dravidianism.

If BJP is to succeed in the deep south, it will also need Hindutva with a southern face and flavour.

Bengalcultural barriershindutvaideologyOdishapoliticsSouth India