Setting the House In Order

A CHATTY GROUP SITTING in the shade along the Jaipur-Sikar highway unhesitatingly declared their support for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and spoke of their expectations plainly. They were voting BJP in recognition of the Modi government’s success in rolling out welfare schemes and exhibiting the political will to tackle difficult problems like Article 370 and the Ram Janmabhoomi dispute. But they had a few grouses too. They complained of a serious lack of opportunities in the region apart from a tile manufacturing unit or two. Inadequate water supply for agriculture and domestic use was a challenge. Yes, progress at the national level was a good thing, but the men sought a development roadmap plan for their neck of the woods as well. As it turned out, the disconnect between national and the local narratives was stronger among other sections of voters and BJP lost the Sikar Lok Sabha seat to veteran Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) leader and farm unionist Amraram, whose win broke a losing streak of six election defeats.

BJP’s losses in the ‘Jat’ belt of east Rajasthan had much to do with the community’s disgruntlement over being dealt out of the power equation after the party won the state polls in November last year. The denial of ticket to sitting Churu MP Rahul Kaswan, who switched to Congress, deepened the discontent. And while the Jat factor has attracted attention, suspicions among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) over allegations that BJP’s ‘400 paar’ slogan signalled an intent to alter the Consti­tution and remove reservations weighed heavily on the party’s prospects. Election campaigns are not predictable and can be like T20 cricket matches where the scope for course correction is narrow. Despite the threat posed by the reservation narrative fanned by Congress and its allies, BJP’s messaging got bogged down by angry exchanges with the Opposition. BJP’s social media handles were busy in daily dogfights that were essentially allegations and counter-allegations. It was a scrappy affair that failed to offer an account of what the BJP agenda offered voters, as distinct from the daily mud-wrestling. Just as the plea for an enhanced majority inherent in the ‘400 paar’ slogan needed to be made more tangible to voters in terms of regional contexts, BJP’s soundbites often slipped into historical references against Congress icons rather than issues relatable to the present and forward-looking aspects of the party manifesto.

A churn over BJP’s not getting a majority on its own unlike in the last two Lok Sabha elections did not take long to manifest. Speaking at an event on June 10 in Nagpur, Rashtriya Swayam­sevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat alluded to the need for humility in public life and referred to the lack of decorum during the just-concluded Lok Sabha campaign. The remarks were not specific, but are certainly not casual or tangential despite some of the rhetorical aspect to some questions posed by Bhagwat. The speech was followed a few days later about how the next BJP president will reflect the views and choice of RSS. A process of consultation is certainly on the cards during which the Sangh is likely to offer its views but it will be the BJP leadership that will take the call on who will replace JP Nadda. The post-election eddies may take a while to settle and while they reflect differ­ent viewpoints on the elections and the way ahead, the task of applying correctives lies primarily with BJP. Ahead of the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, BJP fielded a battery of spokespersons who were able to put across the party’s viewpoints articulately, focusing on scams dogging the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and its lacklustre governance, winning media debates and middle class opinion. The party was a first mover on social media and came up with parallel interventions like youth and student groups highlighting Modi’s record as Gujarat chief minister.

The BJP media team regularly organised an audio bridge that connected hundreds of BJP spokespersons down to the districts who were briefed on issues and arguments that needed to be transmitted. The crucial link has been all but missing with the party struggling to field quality spokespersons even as the Opposition caught up with the social media war games. There was an absence of regular stock-taking of the day’s news and likely issues that could figure in election-related discussions, an essential communications exercise that prepares the party response to the Opposition’s strategies. Overall, it appeared BJP had lost some of the agility that distinguished it when it came to communicating ideas and setting the agenda. While Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s messaging is not dependent on the party machinery, the organisational mechanism is important in ensuring that priorities outlined by the leader reach relevant voter segments. A degree of complacency might have set in based on the assessment that the Modi effect would override local turbulence. This was indeed the case in many constituencies, such as Meerut where actor Arun Govil won narrowly despite failing to enthuse voters. But BJP failed to cross the finishing line ahead of rivals in other constituencies. The party’s sub-par total can be traced to poor performances in Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and West Bengal, but BJP leaked seats in other states too. A 70 per cent win record in straight fights with Congress is impressive, but it is a decline from the 2019 election where BJP won more than 90 per cent of such contests.

The BJP organisation is not the same across states and some units have better functioning election machineries as in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh where the mobilisation of voters was reflected in Congress winning just one of 55 seats. The party organisation was sluggish in other states which admittedly are a tougher contest for BJP since they have not always been saffron strongholds. The reluctance to do the unglamorous work of grassroots outreach that involves wearing out shoe leather has seen a reliance on closed-door meetings with local elites, business leaders and social groups. At times, putting up billboards has become a preferred option for local leaders with birthday greetings figuring as subject matter. These boards come across as a melange of faces and slogans and are hardly a substitute for knocking on doors and tramping through bylanes. In recent elections, BJP has fielded MPs and even Central ministers in state polls and that strategy was extended to the Lok Sabha too. The move did work in state polls and to some extent in the General Election. But the problem seems to be that a similar effort has not happened in the party organisation that seems limited in terms of capacity, talent and organisational skills. This took a heavy toll on BJP’s popular connect and made it heavy-footed in responding to shifts and challenges in the electoral arena. The feedback loop that provides important inputs to the party high command appeared clogged, perhaps due to complacency setting in. Compounding the party’s troubles was a resurgence of factional rivalries in battleground states where BJP has gained dominance in recent years but are not quite saffron forts. The reverses in the 2024 polls underline that social segments like Other Backward Classes (OBCs), SCs and Scheduled Tribes (STs) can reconsider allegiances and even small shifts can damage BJP’s prospects as the party does not have vote banks similar to the Mandal outfits and must contend with a high polarisation of Muslim votes.

THE EMERGENCE OF local, state and regional factors that diluted the national narrative that had propelled BJP to big wins in 2014 and 2019 can be put down to reasons such as incumbency, enhanced expectations, and a failure to join the dots at the constituency level apart from defective narrative-setting. The effect of inflation and rural disgruntlement figures in election post-mortems and while jobs are a perennial issue in Indian elections, there is little evidence of rural distress on a significant scale. States with large rural populations—which include OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis as in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Karnataka—did not reject BJP. In alliance with National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partner Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and JanaSena, BJP did exceptionally in Andhra Pradesh. There is, however, a palpable desire among younger voters in particular for better opportunities and dissatisfaction with rural stagnation that extends to semi-urban areas too. Economic development that provides employment for India’s large labour class will top the to-do list for Modi 3.0 with a section of economists arguing the solution lies in increasing manufacturing and making businesses more competitive.

BJP’s vote in UP fell by 8.6 per cent and this can be in part explained by a drift of OBCs towards the Samajwadi Party (SP)- Congress alliance. But lethargy among BJP voters is also evident which could have been even more pronounced but for Modi’s energetic campaign targeting Congress as a real and present danger. The extent to which the attack on Congress for its redistributive agenda and its signalling to Muslims on quotas worked can be debated but given SP’s resurgence in UP, it can be surmised BJP’s tally may have fallen further but for Modi’s rallies. What is worrying for BJP is the preparedness of Dalits in UP to consider the I.N.D.I.A. bloc, a movement aided by the presence of Congress as an SP ally. These are hard questions with no easy answers even though it will be incorrect to underestimate or dismiss the Modi-Yogi model’s success in creating a large labharthi (beneficiary) class through a web of schemes. It’s just that caste is never far from the surface in UP and a near-optimum consolida­tion of anti-BJP votes resulted in SP winning more seats. The next act in the Hindutva-welfare versus Mandal conflict is awaited.

Any course correction in BJP will inevitably focus on the next party chief since Nadda’s extended term is ending and he has been inducted into the Cabinet as health minister. Some of the likely replacements are also out of the reckoning since they too are in the Union Council of Ministers. The choice will be read in the context of the next BJP chief’s ability to address the organisational clutter and energise the party’s functioning by ensuring the right persons are picked as key functionaries. This is apart from the consideration of political signalling that could see credentials such as OBC, Dalit or women matter. The process is linked to the revival of a more robust internal discussion on political issues and goal-setting. Modi’s campaign comprising hundreds of meetings and several roadshows and his promise to accelerate development while castigating Congress for appeasement politics helped ensure BJP returned 240 MPs which, though a loss of 63 seats from 2019, is still a solid core around which NDA can function. Since there is no other formation or party with matching numbers, the political balance is in favour of BJP even if Parliament will almost certainly see heightened confrontation due to the bigger Opposition contingent. The prime minister has indicated he remains focused on the political and economic objectives he outlined in the campaign and a stronger welfare push is on the cards. The translation of schemes into political capital requires the BJP organisation to deliver by making sure the information reaches the needy sections and to further assist in meeting the goal of saturation coverage. While Union and state administrative machineries are the vehicles for implementing government programmes, the party has an important role in communication and feedback that has suffered in recent years.

The Modi government’s inclusive schemes, which include specific initiatives for small artisans and loans for micro businesses, have generated substantial support for BJP among those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. Modi’s appeal with those on the margins and the trust he engenders have vexed BJP’s opponents who see the party as representative of upper-caste interests and Hindutva values. The expectation that BJP’s support among OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis must perforce be limited has been belied time and again. BJP has been adept at incorporating and promoting OBC leaders and the process gained momentum under Modi who hails from a backward community himself. Decisions the BJP brass will take with regard to the party organisation have a major bearing on its ability to hold on to its political primacy and solidify the new footholds it has gained in states like Odisha, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.

Andhra PradeshKeralaNarendra ModiOdishapoliticsTamil NaduTelanganaUnion cabinet