Modi’s Global Playbook

THE LARGE DELEGATION accompanying German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to India last week included Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, a member of the Greens whose advocacy of “values-based” policies has been tested by the war in Gaza and Ukraine. The presence of the foreign minister was not in itself a surprise but gained salience as an important part of the conversation in New Delhi centred on Ukraine and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Having met Putin twice since he returned to of­fice in June, Modi is the only world leader to have met the Russian leader frequently and with the war in Ukraine approaching its third anniversary, the search for a solution is growing urgent. The prospects of the German chancellor placing a call to Putin soon have grown, much more than not too long ago. Modi’s reading of the mood in Moscow and his interactions in Kyiv could offer cues to breaking the bloody stalemate in the dark, muddy plains of eastern Ukraine.

Not only is the war in Ukraine not progressing well from the West’s point of view, opinion in Europe and elsewhere is not as united as Western leaders might have anticipated. Despite sanctions and a host of other crippling restrictions, Russia has not been brought to its knees. There is no popular discontent against Putin—the scope for dissent has in any case shrunk—and a significant opinion in Europe is unenthused about the billions being spent in sustaining Ukraine. Even in other parts of the world, the outrage over the invasion of Ukraine is uneven and countries like India have demonstrated they will not put their economies at risk by boycotting Russian crude oil. India’s export of refined crude to Europe has grown steadily, exposing Western double standards in demand­ing New Delhi join the condemnation of Putin. Since the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk in August, the battle lines have changed slowly to Russia’s advantage as it gained control of nodes like Vuhledar and sundry villages despite losing an estimated 1,270 fighters every day in September. Much of Europe does not share the Biden administration’s commitment or keenness to oppose Russia even as the first F16s promised by the Netherlands arrived in Kyiv. All in all, despite the desperate and heavy fighting, no largescale territorial changes or major battlefield developments are anticipated.

The view that the war, notwithstanding Russia’s incremen­tal gains, is unwinnable for both sides has grown with Germany and France tilting to such a conclusion. Assessments were shared during Modi’s talks with Scholz as well as with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez who reached India around the same time. The key questions: Are Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky and Putin ready to see things the same way? And what are the outcomes they could consider worth making peace for? There is a strong nationalist sentiment in Ukraine that bristles at sugges­tions that it accept the de facto occupation of parts of the country’s east. If the situation becomes direr, Ukraine may be tempted to launch strikes on hundreds of military bases and ammunition depots deep inside Russia, something it has been banned from doing by Western nations. The possibility of an uncontrolled es­calation that sees the use of deadlier weapons is a troublesome sce­nario for European leaders. As the hunt for a resolution grows, the search for an acceptable middle ground is gaining pace even if it means leaning on allies and cajoling opponents. The conflict is taking a toll on Russia as well even though its opaque political system and ability to call reserves while pushing weary troops well beyond their limits make it more immune to the costs of war.

Modi’s visit to Moscow for a bilateral meeting with Putin in July was criti­cised by Western commentators and US officials but the prime minister followed the engagement with a visit to Kyiv a lit­tle later. The discussions with Zelensky were not cosmetic efforts or a balancing act. India does have a dog in the fight.

As the war prolongs, Russia’s dependence on China is increas­ing with Beijing becoming Moscow’s biggest exporter and im­porter. This trajectory is not to Russia’s liking either, as it increas­ingly cements Putin as the junior partner despite the two nations announcing a “no limits” partnership in February 2022 and their leaders meeting more than 40 times.

“The heightened dependency on China will go against the grain of Putin’s pride given his imperial view that the county must re­gain its lost glory,” former diplomat and author Dilip Sinha told Open. Reports of Russia requesting help by way of soldiers and weapons from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un or the use of Iranian drones only underscore Putin’s vulnerabilities, not some­thing the strongman would be happy to acknowledge. Despite their current bonhomie, the history of Russia-China ties is not smooth. China developed rapidly after the communist takeover in 1949 with Soviet assistance but soon enough its supreme leader Mao Zedong chaffed at being seen as an understudy. Mao’s ambi­tion saw him consider himself an equal if not a bigger leader than Joseph Stalin as far as Asia was concerned. Relations deteriorated further when Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and Mao’s sense of his own importance as the flag-bearer of global socialism grew. In fact, Mao’s irritation at Jawaharlal Nehru over the Indian prime minister seeing himself as a player on the world stage— which the communist leader found pretentious—fed into Chi­na’s decision to attack India in 1962. Russia has experienced the aggressive edge of China’s ambitions in military clashes along the border and Mao’s secret opening to the US during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Indian and Russian leaders have shared experi­ences of dealing with China and since Putin has been around since December 1999, he has interacted with Indian Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Modi. His remark that Modi does not need a translator to understand him is not a casual aside. It is a reminder of the closeness in ties that is relevant for the US but not without implications for China.

WHILE INDIA HAS the motive to play a role in re­solving the Ukraine war, what would its options be? Of the two major wars, India is better placed to influ­ence outcomes in Ukraine than in Gaza where Israel is unlikely to halt its military action unless it feels that threats in the region are suppressed and a deal is reached for the release of hostages still in the hands of Hamas. So far, India has limited its interventions to conveying or sharing views and assessments in Moscow and Kyiv with the two combatants and other leaders. An enhanced role will mean more than being a postman, even if one with in­fluence. Nudging the two sides towards negotiations and testing what would be acceptable to key players like the US—the mainstay behind Zelensky—needs more work. Active diplomacy would en­visage External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar engaging in shuttle diplomacy with the stakeholders. This would beg the question whether the US would be supportive of such a course of action or if it would prompt Zelensky to dismiss the proposals. The Ukrai­nian leader’s recent comments call on India to shed “neutrality” but also to play a “role” in the same breath. The lay of the land is not entirely clear. The risk of carrying out diplomatic manoeuvres lies in possible rejection. This might have a fallout in domestic politics, with the Opposition unlikely to miss an opportunity to accuse the Modi government of overestimating its influence. The prime min­ister has shown he has the capacity to take risks and has banked on equations in various capitals to further India’s interests in times of crisis or at multilateral forums where consensus has been elusive.

The Camp David Accords of 1978 resulted in a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and while the US brokered the agree­ments, it had fairly direct interests in the Middle East. The role of Norway in the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and in the stalled talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was more like that of an honest broker. It might seem far-fetched to suggest India could host talks between Russia and Ukraine al­though both might be more willing to visualise such a prospect and a Western setting could be less palatable to Putin. The future path will be clearer once the two sides are prepared to admit, even tacitly, that the war is either unwinnable or will continue in the foreseeable future without an acceptable conclusion. Both Putin and Zelensky will have to ‘lose’ something, either a tangible piece of geography or a coveted goal. Only when this happens can creative solutions and nomenclatures be found for the area under Russian control which do not sanctify loss of sovereignty. The added incentives for peace can be provided by Indian manu­facturing stepping in to meet some of Russia’s needs currently supplied by China. Reports point to a reluctance of Indian banks to support business initiatives involving Russia, even through collaborations, due to fears of being exposed to third-party sanc­tions. There is a need for specific initiatives that have the backing of the government to increase bilateral trade. The Indian public and private sectors are involved in Russia’s defence and energy sector but the cooperation needs to acquire a broader hue.

The cessation of the Ukraine war and a stable Russia are in India’s interests for reasons other than the China factor and con­cerns about the stress in the world economy. The alleged Indian plot to kill US-based Khalistani wanted leader Gurpatwant Pannun has raised an unexpected question mark over ties that have other­wise deepened over the past decade. The statements of some US of­ficials, particularly US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti, that such “behaviour” is unacceptable and crosses a red line, point to a strong opinion in the Democratic administration and political circles that India must act in the Pannun case. Seen in the context of charges being announced in the US against former Indian official Vikash Yadav, this means the case could potentially flare up. The narrative in the Pannun affair obscures the Khalistani’s repeated threats of violence against Indian leaders and assets, attacks on the Indian consulates in Chicago and San Francisco and the regular obstruction faced by Indian diplomats in public spaces in the US. The involvement of Khalistan supporters in migrant rackets— Pannun’s law firm claims to be driven by a mission to help im­migrants in need—and in criminal activities that stretch back to India has been given a convenient go-by. The sharp downturn in India-Canada ties over the shooting of Khalistani activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar stands in a separate category and does not bear comparison, but the lack of sensitivity or acknowledgement of the security threat posed by Khalistani activities does not sit well with American claims that it sees India as a partner in all aspects. These episodes serve to remind commentators about the utility of the relationship with Russia and the need to remind other powers that India has options and interests that it has steadfastly refused to abandon.

The “safe harbour” provided to Pannun and other Kha­listanis, including wanted criminals who plot crimes in their host nations as well as in India, is a potential hazard in Delhi’s relations with the US and can sharpen the Modi government’s quest for other partners who strengthen India’s security and can be part of efforts to address crises and conflicts that affect most of the world. India’s credentials as an intermediary or facilitator in discussions on Ukraine draw on its influence with groupings such as the G20, BRICS, the Quad, and ASEAN. The rapport Modi has established with Gulf nations and important European leaders like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and French President Emmanuel Macron—who can barely be in the same room together—as also Scholz and heads of the Nordic nations feeds into his ability to come across as someone who can deliver results in trying conditions.

The current round of state polls in India is witnessing tough contests between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its rivals and while the outcomes are not easy to predict, it is evident that BJP is not in decline. The bounce back in the Haryana elections and consolidation in the Jammu region in the J&K polls is evidence of the prime minister’s standing as a popular campaigner. His high ratings within India are an important reason why he is held in regard by his counterparts abroad. It is apparent that criticism of his July visit to Moscow and his “hug” of Putin were premature. He has since made it evident that he remains steadfastly in favour of ending the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and his recent visit to Kazan, where he met Putin yet again, did not attract similar chimes. A little more than a month after he met Putin in July, Modi’s embrace of Zelensky was a reminder that superficial optics and short-term thinking are not part of the Modi playbook. It might be time US officials, including the ambassador to India, understood that Modi will not be deterred by what others think of his actions, allowing the process and results to speak for themselves.

ASEANBRICSdiplomacyG20geopoliticsIndia-GermanyNarendra ModiRussiathe QuadUkraine