The Power of Choice

ON DECEMBER 3, 2024, IN A LOK SABHA stumbling along amid exasperating disruptions and adjournments, Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar rose to brief his fellow parliamen­tarians on recent developments along the Indo-China Line of Actual Control (LAC), the oft-disput­ed demarcation line that zigzags across the high Himalayas, creating an uneasy buffer between the world’s two most populous nations.

It was Chinese transgressions across the LAC in the summer of 2020 that led to skirmishes between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), resulting in the unprovoked Chinese incursion into the Galwan Valley, while resisting which 20 Indian soldiers were martyred. Even as India slammed the brakes on its diplomatic, technological and—after a fashion—investment-related engagement with China, we remained at a disadvantage along the LAC. According to a research paper submitted, but not discussed, at the Intelligence Bureau’s (IB) annual Director General of Police Conference in 2023, attended by the prime minister and home minister, as many as 26 out of 65 patrolling points in eastern Ladakh previously accessible to both armies were now barred to India. India’s ‘play safe’ approach did not help either, turning ar­eas where our Army had patrolled before April 2020 into informal ‘buffer’ zones, leading to the loss of pasture lands at Gogra Hills, the North Bank of Pangong Tso, and Kakjung areas.

Finally, after much inconclusive back and forth between the diplomatic and military leadership of the two countries, a thaw in the frigid relations between India and China ap­peared earlier this year. In July, Jaishankar twice met his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in Astana, Kazakhstan and Vientiane, Laos. Not long thereafter, to bring the promise of these crucial meetings to fruition, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval met the Chi­nese foreign minister in early September in St Petersburg, Russia. All of this paved the way for the October 21, 2024 agreement between India and China, whereby troops of the two coun­tries disengaged at Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh, allowing for patrolling and grazing to “resume as per longstanding prac­tice before friction started in these areas.”

As Jaishankar told Lok Sabha, with this agreement, “disengagement has now been achieved in full in eastern Ladakh through a step by step process….” While this is a much welcome breakthrough, two goals—upon which hinge the future of Indo-China rela­tions—remain elusive. These are the twin goals of completely securing our frontiers against Chinese belligerence and territorial avarice, and effecting a fair and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Echoing this sentiment, Jaishankar proclaimed that if there is to be a restoration of “peace and tranquillity” and overall good relations with China, “three key principles must be observed in all circumstances.” These he outlined as follows: one, “both sides should strictly respect and observe the LAC”; two, “neither side should attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo; and three, “agreements and understandings reached in the past must be fully abided by in their entirety.” Later this month, with these three non-negotiable principles at the forefront of his mind, Doval will parley with the Chinese for­eign minister at the Special Representative talks which will shape the future of our relationship with China. At these talks, last held in 2019, we will not only try to fashion a roadmap for de-escalating in the high Himalayas but also try to define and delineate the LAC more clearly and foster greater mutual trust and accountability, all in the hope that China—acting in good faith—will honour to the letter the arrangement arrived at.

While India and China sue for peace on a knife-edge, the dawn of an uneasy dynamic between these two Asian giants, India may well find itself having to strike a precarious balance between (possibly) happier relations with China and (already) thriving relations with the United States of America, compelling it to confront a vital question: Are we again facing a crucial choice in a bipolar world?

MY ANSWER WOULD be a qualified yes. Yes, because two major powers—the US and China—are once again vying for uncontested global pre-eminence; but qualified, for this is not the bipolarity we knew during the Cold War. For one thing, the US and China have multiple con­nections with each other that were absent between the US and the Soviet Union: the US is the largest investor in the Chinese economy, the Chinese own more US Treasury bonds than any other government, the US sends more tourists to China than to any other Asian country, and there are more Chinese students in the US than those of any other nationality. These are two powers at odds, but with numerous avenues of diplomatic dialogue and economic cooperation that simply did not exist during the Cold War.

As Would War II drew to a close, it became evident that of the victors, only the US and the Soviet Union had the geopolitical, economic, and war-waging might to lord over the world; the Axis powers defeated, Washington and Moscow soon began to jostle on the international stage for supremacy. Representing a global order of bipolarity, then, the Cold War was an era when these two rivals mar­shalled their satellite states into their respective camps, sundered by the “iron curtain”, which divided Western and Eastern Europe—the former, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), being the fiefdom of the US, and the latter, through the Warsaw Pact, being a redoubt of the Soviet Union—and com­peted to enlarge their nuclear arsenals. The end of this bipolarity coincided with the advent of globalisation, heralding a new age: “the unipolar moment”, which lasted a couple of decades and in which Washington enjoyed untrammelled global dominance in spheres political, military, economic, and technological.

But soon it became clear that the US would not remain uncontested for long. Around the 2008-09 financial crisis, the spectre of Beijing emerged on the global scene. China’s ‘peaceful rise’ over the last quarter of a century—fu­elled by American investment in its industries and a booming export trade in manufactured goods—has re-hauled the global order. China has supplanted the US as the world’s lone manufacturing and industrial giant, rivalling it in economic size and exceeding its surpluses, as also challenging it in such new technologies as 5G. (So it was that Donald Trump, during his first bid for the presidency, blamed China for the loss of American manufacturing jobs and intellectual property, and waged a trade war against Beijing while in the Oval Office.) Thus, after decades of uncontested hegemo­ny, another aspiring hegemon has emerged, challenging American dominance across the board and deploying a new assertiveness under Xi Jinping. The US is evolving a strategy to counteract China—an effort that will gain fresh impetus during Trump’s second in­nings—much as George Kennan’s famous ‘Long Telegram’ from Moscow in 1946 led to the birth of the “containment strategy” that hemmed in the Soviet Union.

It should be stressed that the fundamental elements of American global power remain un­challenged. It is still the world’s largest, most di­verse and most innovative economy. Its military budget dwarfs those of the rest of the planet’s countries combined. It has a remarkable level of energy security, with its own domestic sources of oil, gas, solar and wind power, and seems to be gradually expanding its nuclear capacity as well. Its labour force may have priced itself out of the manufacturing business but American labour productivity and its talent for business and entrepreneurship remain incomparable. Its capital markets are thriving and stable, defy­ing every doomsday prediction since the Great Depression. It has more billionaires than in any country on Earth; the US dollar remains the world’s benchmark currency; and the average working American is still better off than the av­erage worker almost anywhere else in the world. It is still a land that wields an unparalleled influ­ence over global culture—as the home of Coca- Cola, Starbucks, Levi’s, McDonald’s, Disney, Hollywood, CNN, Google, Microsoft, and Nvidia, it sets the global cultural agenda in ways that no one else comes remotely close to approaching. The ‘unipolar moment’ that lasted from roughly 1990 to 2010 may have passed, but these factors mean that whatever degree of multipolarity may be dawning, it is very much amongst sec­ond-order powers jostling for space with each other, rather than truly competing with the US for global dominance.

Yet, the US also finds itself reckoning with some undoubted weaknesses. Its industrial base has been weakened by decades of over-reliance on imports from China. Its public debt is out of control and is expected to rise to 122 per cent of GDP by 2034. Not only is Trump acutely aware of these facts, he understands that if Bei­jing is allowed to gain unchallengeable domi­nance over East and Central Asia, the resources and markets it would command would enable it to seriously challenge American strategic and economic interests. A struggle for influence in this part of the world will certainly ensue over the next few years and India will be called upon to define its stand in relation to it. But just as today’s Sino-American rivalry is starkly differ­ent from the Cold War’s bipolarity, so must the contours of such a strategy—and India’s reac­tion to it—differ from the past.

The US and China are intertwined econo­mies, unlike the total economic separation between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, Beijing’s economic might makes its claim to global hegemony greater than Moscow’s ever was. China’s indispensability to global supply chains and, therefore, to the global economy is precisely why some observers choose not to use the label ‘cold war’ to describe the Sino-American bipolarity, preferring instead such terms as ‘competitive coexistence’, ‘cold coexistence’, or ‘conflictual coexistence’. It was in recognition of this that American rhetoric shifted from ‘decoupling’ from China—suggesting severance of ties—‘to de-risking’, which implies curbing risks while avoiding a hostile estrangement.

What is more, as superpowers rising from the ashes of World War II, the US and the Soviet Union were nearly equal militarily. But China is nearing parity with, and now threatens to outstrip the US. According to the Pentagon, the Chinese navy has surpassed America’s in the number of battle-force ships over the past decade, owing to China’s status as the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage. Senior US Air Force officials have also acknowledged the PLA’s potential to become the world’s largest air force. Yet military commen­tators believe that at least till the PLA’s centenary in 2027, there will remain a significant gap between China and the US. Also, unlike in the Cold War, proxy wars between the two rivals do not litter our world today, nor is there much appetite for any in either Beijing or Washington (whose capacity for global adventure has especially shrunk and might increasingly prompt American administrators to withdraw from the current engagements across the world and cease to make the monumental efforts required to manage and defuse international conflicts). Positing a Cold War-level bipolarity, then, overstates both the status quo and the threat China poses to the global order.

In tussling with the Soviet Union, America also aimed to establish the pri­macy of capitalism over communism and liberal democracy over single-party authoritarianism. The Sino-American competition, however, is not about ide­ology, much though Americans like to portray it otherwise. An ideological zeal to convert the world to communism does not galvanise China, which is really only interested in securing global hegemony for itself. Since 2021, Wash­ington has futilely experimented with the Summit for Democracy, hoping to conflate its desire for subduing its foremost political and economic rival with championing democracy. But even Europeans did not buy into President Joe Biden’s “democracy versus autocracy” binary. America’s instinct to pack­age all its vested interests as a crusade for democratising the globe—an all too familiar playbook—has proven unsuccessful. So, instead of playing this game, China is glibly choosing to deride it as “Western-style democracy”, which—ar­gues Beijing—serves not ordinary citizens but the forces of capitalism.

What also makes the Sino-American rivalry distinctive is that Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, is never far from the action. Russia can play a menacing role in today’s brewing bipolarity; given its size, abundant natural resources, daunting defence capabilities, and immense stockpile of nuclear weapons, it outranks most middle powers. Many, therefore, argue that America’s bipolarity is not with China but the axis of China and Russia. Josef Joffe, for instance, defines our world as a “Two-and-a-Half Power World”, where Russia “is held back from full parity with the US and China by its lack of ‘usable power.’” Moscow—with an economy smaller than Italy’s and a military budget that is only one-quarter of China’s—is far from a third pole: but it is Beijing’s junior partner, a fact manifest in China’s support of Russia’s Ukrainian misadventure, which demonstrates President Xi Jinping’s resolve not to be intimated by the West.

That both Russia and Iran will only play second fiddle to China in this new bipolarity became evident recently. On December 8, 2024, Moscow and Tehran, helplessly overstretched elsewhere, merely looked on as a coalition of armed rebels stormed the Syrian capital of Damascus, compelling the despotic Presi­dent Bashar al-Assad to flee to Moscow. Thus ended the 13-year-long Syrian civil war and the 54-year-long reign of the al-Assad dynasty. Under the al-Assads, Syria had increasingly become a protectorate of Moscow and Tehran, which were its most redoubtable allies all through the civil war—which, over the years, became increasingly convoluted and internationalised. While the US, Türkiye, and Gulf countries supported and sponsored anti-Assad rebels, Moscow and Tehran pro­vided financial and military cover to al-Assad. In turn, Moscow especially gained a military and diplomatic perch in Syria, whence it projected power across the Arab world, seeking to portray itself as a counterforce to US hegemony. However, when the al-Assad regime suddenly crumbled, Russia (attenuated by its “spe­cial military operation” in Ukraine) and Iran (sparring with US-backed Israel across West Asia) resigned themselves to this reality without protest, leaving their adversary Türkiye in charge of a vital territorial corridor that links Europe and the Gulf through Syria. China has no allies, but its emerging nexus with its junior partners—Russia, Iran, and North Korea—which Admiral John Aquilino, former commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, dubbed the “axis of evil”, could yet pose challenges from Taiwan to the South China Sea.

The greatest consequence of this geopolitical churn has been the creation of an entirely new canvas: the Indo-Pacific, a term encompassing three overlapping developments. These are China’s goal of creating a blue-water navy—a formidable naval force capable of operating and projecting power on the high seas—and becoming a transcontinental economic giant, India’s emergence as a possible counterbalance to China, and the role that the US will play in shaping the con­tours of the seemingly inevitable shift in power from the West to the East: from the Atlantic to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The much-vaunted Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) of Australia, India, Japan, and the US is driven by the vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”; more recently, it has been augmented by the ‘Squad’ of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US, created to bolster the efforts of the Philippines—a crucial ally of the US in the region and for long the target of Chinese aggression, which has imperilled its maritime security—at confronting Beijing’s maritime menace in the South China Sea. Added to the mix is AUKUS—the trilateral security partnership for the Indo-Pacific between Australia, the UK, and the US—through which the US and UK assist Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.

THAT INDO-US TIES have long been flourishing is indisputable, and even with recent US political developments, this is unlikely to change. Yet it can be said that the ‘America First’ policies of the new incumbent in the White House, Donald Trump, may cause some inconve­nience to India. As a rightwing transactional leader, Trump’s economic and trade protec­tionism, for instance—with an emphasis on greater domestic production, reduced reliance on imports, and increased tariffs—could prove detrimental to Indian exporters of automobile parts, textiles, technologies, electronics, and pharmaceuticals, among other commodities. (At the same time, though, his raising tariffs even higher on imports from China could in­directly benefit Indian exports, making them more sought-after in American markets.) One thing is certain, however: President Trump will have no qualms about wielding tariffs—or the threat thereof—to pressure even his partners, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, into compliance, as he did recently by threatening to slap a 100 per cent tariff on BRICS countries should they try supplanting the US dollar with another currency. Also concerning are the president-elect’s immigration policies, which could restrict H-1B visas to Indian profes­sionals, especially in the field of in­formation technology.

For all that, there remains ample reason to be bullish about the Indo-US partnership, not least in the realms of defence and security, with Trump being a proponent of closer defence cooperation with India. While this will enable a more robust exchange of military and defence technology and intelligence, as also closer collab­oration in counter-terrorism, it may become a double-edged sword. After all, the US regards India as a reliable partner to counter China; and under Trump, fiercely insistent on clipping an overweening China’s wings, the Quad may go into higher gear, fostering closer collaboration in such realms as intelligence and logistics, to contain Beijing’s menace in the Indo-Pacific. A Trump administration may go beyond, pressing the Quad to conduct joint mili­tary exercises, an idea to which India has been resistant. But were India to prove skittish—and, given our ongoing pursuit to forge an enduring rapprochement with China, which constrains us not to antagonise it, we well may—Trump could scale up the new ‘Squad’, the alternative quartet in which the Philippines replaces India.

The US under Donald Trump will undoubtedly seek to contain China, limit Russia, disempower Islamic Iran, and further isolate North Korea—the new ‘axis of evil’ identified by Washington—while it promotes Israel and whips Europe into shape. US support for India will be contingent on how adroitly we manage to navigate our own relationships with these countries so that we are seen as willing to go along with, or at least not undermine, these objectives.

The Indo-Pacific arena symbolises the realignment of traditional alliances and geopolitical theatres. At the same time, it reflects the fact that should New Delhi seem unwilling to lock horns with Beijing in the Indo-Pacific, Washing­ton will not hesitate to turn, perhaps at the cost of India, to its other geostrategic partnerships in this tempestuous region. Thus, with the Indo-Pacific emerging as a crucible of clashing Chinese and American ambitions, India’s deepening ties with the US and the Quad bristle with both challenges and opportunities. We cannot forget that only we, and not the other members of the Quad, face a land threat from China. So we must not be deterred from engaging with the Chi­nese diplomatically where we must, safeguarding our sovereignty by working to restore the status quo ante along the LAC, bolstering our military deterrence, and promoting our geopolitical and economic interests on our own terms.

As President-elect Donald Trump gears up for his inauguration next month and India inches closer to a negotiated settlement with China, New Delhi must deftly tackle several crucial questions: How to leverage its partnership with the US to advance its geopolitical interests with­out provoking a volatile and vindictive China, upon which its import dependence is growing with each passing year; how to manage its close relationship with a Moscow that is increas­ingly becoming a client state of Beijing; how to manage its friendship with Iran at a time when Israel’s war with Hamas and Hezbollah, and the US-led attacks on the Houthis, are rendering Iran an undesirable region; and how to defend its own strategic autonomy in a world where the freedom to manoeuvre we have so far enjoyed among all these actors is narrowing. Caught be­tween the aspiration for peaceful relations with China and the pursuit of deeper geostrategic ties with the US, India cannot afford to be reduced to a pawn in a renewed bipolar contest.

2025 New Year IssueDonald TrumpgeopoliticsIndia-China relationsIndia-US relationsUS-ChinaXi Jinping