Breaking the Chain Reaction

THE SEQUENCE OF retaliatory violence in Manipur has acquired a deadly even if somewhat predictable quality to it. On November 8, one Zosangkim, a 31-year-old woman belonging to the Hmar community, was killed in Zairon village in Manipur’s restive Jiribam district. Three days later, on November 11, six members of a family—three women and three chil­dren, including an eight-month-old baby—were kidnapped by terrorists in Borobekra in the same district. The kidnapping took place even as terror­ists, belonging to the Kuki community, engaged in a gunfight with CRPF troopers at the nearby Jakuradhor camp. It is suspected that the events were linked: the attack on the paramilitary camp, in which 10 terrorists died, was a diversionary tactic to enable the kidnapping in the area nearby.

Over the next week, between November 14 and 18, all six were killed and their bodies were found floating in the Barak River that forms the bound­ary between Manipur and Assam. Jiribam lies at the extreme western edge of Manipur and borders the Silchar district of Assam. In the intervening pe­riod between the kidnapping and the discovery of the bodies, Laishram Herojit, head of that family, appealed for help in securing the release of his family members. To no avail as the tragedy unfolded over the next few days. Any killing is brutal but the manner in which terrorists executed the infant and other members of the family is gory even by the standards of Manipur’s saga of violence.

In the days after these events, violence spread to other parts of the state. In capital Imphal, irate mobs set on fire the homes of legislators belonging to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) even as a political slanging match broke out between Congress and BJP. The Opposition alleged that BJP was not serious about managing the situation in the state.

In a review meeting soon after the incidents, the Centre took two important decisions. One, it decided to send another 5,000 paramilitary forces to the trouble-torn state. There are some 36,000 Central paramilitary force members already deployed in Mani­pur. Two, on November 14, the Centre re-imposed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in areas under the jurisdic­tion of six police stations across five districts in the state. These police stations are Sekmai and Lamsang (in Imphal West district), Lamai (Imphal East district), Jiribam (Jiribam district), Leimak­hong (Kangpokpi district), and Moirang (Bishnupur district).

These police stations were part of the set of 19 such stations that had been excluded from the list of “disturbed areas” by the state government on October 1. But the incidents in Jiribam prompted a review by both the Union and state governments. The review found the problem of ethnic violence to be sufficiently serious in the areas adjoining Bishnupur and Churachandpur districts, the Imphal East-Kangpokpi-Imphal West district area, and Jiribam district. It noted the participation of insurgent groups in violence in these areas.

Security experts advocate stringent steps from the Centre to stem the tide of violence in Manipur. “The continuing violence requires a firm response by the Centre and state governments. The leaders of the militias must be identified and tracked down. If they do not agree to lay down arms, force must be used against them. These militias cannot be allowed to threaten civilians with impunity,” Colonel (retired) DPK Pillai, who has served in the region and is currently a research fellow with IDSA, told Open.

Any lasting political solution will have to take into account the demand of the Meitei community for representation within the reservation system as there is a basic imbalance between their rights and those of tribal communities like Kukis. Due to long neglect, law and order has taken a beating in Manipur because various provisions of the law are simply not enacted. “Laws are simply not enforced, creating a new normal. When laws of the state are not enforced, a situation is created where a new normal, one that hurts the people, comes into being,” Pillai said.

THE SITUATION MAY BE best addressed by direct Central rule as the government faces an extraordinary challenge from militias with cross-border support and the role of evangelist organisations looking to stir trouble. The attack on the CRPF camp was a deliberate attempt to keep the fires burning and cre­ate pressure for the removal of the paramilitary force from the area. Abducting and killing Meitei women and children were intended to provoke counter-violence and the so-called tribal organisations have played a dubious role as their actions do not seem to promote peace.

The trouble for the centre is that random events lead to a chain reaction. The only way to ensure that such events do not spiral out of control is to prevent them in the first place. That is a very demanding dimension of this conflict

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After nearly 18 months of intermittent violence that refuses to die, a nagging question remains as to why the Centre and the state government have been unable to restore normalcy. The question can be answered in two parts. First, the nature of the conflict; and second, the difficulties in taking ‘direct’ steps to restore normalcy.

At any time in the past five decades, India has witnessed the continued existence of insurgency and separatist conflicts in different parts of its territory. In contrast to these, long-duration conflicts, episodes of ethnic violence and communal violence are often of short duration and die out quickly. Usually these kinds of violent incidents take the form of riots and clashes that are often sorted by established methods of policing. The ethnic conflict in Manipur is of a different kind. For one, it has lasted considerably longer than other such types of incidents. For another, it is not just couched in a zero-sum language but even the means to attain goals by the communities involved in the conflict are deadly and beyond negotiation. The Kuki demand for a “separate administra­tion” is impossible for the Centre to concede. This is for several rea­sons. One, the Kuki inhabited areas do not form a geographically contiguous territory. A look at the map shows this clearly: there is no way to bunch Churachandpur and Kangpokpi districts into a separate administration. Another reason is that even if such a demand were to be conceded, it would require the Centre to fund its running as there is no economic activity worth its name in the proposed ‘separate administration’ areas. Finally, if such a demand were to be conceded, it is likely to open the floodgates for more such demands elsewhere. There is no appetite for such demands anymore in India. Above all, any such concession is certain to destroy Manipur’s unity as a state, something unacceptable to the Centre and most Indians.

Seen from that vantage, the Centre’s strategy is sound even if it appears bumbling to analysts and commentators. The first pri­ority for the Centre is to ensure that ethnic violence goes down, first to manageable levels and then, finally, its elimination. This is tough since neither the Meitei community nor the Kukis are unwilling to let go of violence as a tool to achieve their goals. This makes the Centre unpopular with both communities even as it tries to bring down the levels of violence. One instance of this unpopularity is the alleged partiality of different Central paramilitary forces (CAPFs) towards dif­ferent communities. The Meiteis claim that the Assam Rifles are partial to Kukis even as the latter distrust the CRPF. It is of course outlandish to be­lieve that ‘partiality’ is part of the mandate of any of these forces.

Any lasting political solution in Manipur will have to take into account the demand of the Meitei community for representation within the reservation system as there is a basic imbalance between their rights and those of tribal communities like Kukis

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The second priority for the Centre is to ensure that the conflict does not spill over into neighbour­ing states like Mizoram and Assam. One part of the problem is the ethnic overlay and spread of these populations across state boundaries. The Kukis, the Hmars and the Mizos are part of a large group of eth­nically related communities. A crackdown on one such community is bound to lead to resentment and even violence in different states. Avoiding this requires a carefully calibrated strategy of directing coercion towards insurgents instead of a more dif­fused approach that can create bigger problems. A raging civil war in Myanmar and the complete loss of authority in the neighbouring Chin state of that country has created a dangerous vacuum that insur­gents from the Kuki community are exploiting. The dangerous influx of illegal immigrants from these areas into Manipur has further complicated mat­ters. Preventing the emergence of an insurgency that goes beyond India’s borders is an overriding concern for the Centre. This point is seldom appreci­ated by critics who do not see the tinderbox-like situ­ation that has engulfed this part of the Northeast.

It is fashionable in New Delhi and even among certain sections in Imphal to say that the Centre has failed to take necessary steps to contain violence in Manipur. The interesting part of these claims and analyses is that while they berate the Centre, they never suggest concrete steps that could help restore normalcy beyond the pro-forma statements about “broad-based consultations” and “involvement of civil society”. In a situation where ethnic conflict quickly congealed into a ze­ro-sum game, these nostrums are unlikely to be of any use and may even exacerbate the conflict if they are implemented. Such gimmickry was tried in a very different situation, in Jammu & Kashmir, and it led nowhere. It is least likely to work in Manipur.

The trouble for the Centre is that random events, such as the one that led to the killing in Zairon, lead to a chain reaction. The only way to ensure that such events do not spiral out of control is to prevent them in the first place. That is a very demanding dimension of this conflict. There are multiple friction zones be­tween districts populated by different communities and even within districts where mixed populations live close together. The answer lies in saturating these areas with security forces, sound patrolling and not sparing any insurgents and terrorists. The Centre and the state police are already doing that even if the environment is getting tougher for them.

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Siddharth Singh

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Rajeev Deshpande

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