The Kabul Question

THE NIGHT-VISION PICTURE of the last US soldier leaving Afghanistan just minutes before the deadline imposed by the Taliban will remain etched in public memory for a long time. Comparisons will be made with another evacuation many decades ago in circumstances not very different from the recent one in Kabul.

These are all in the past, for now. The real challenges for all participants in the Afghan game—the US, China, India, Russia and Iran—will begin now. Another key participant—Pakistan—is in a triumphal mood at the moment. Whereas other countries worry about blowback, Pakistan is least concerned: it has managed to weather extremely high levels of violence, illicit flows of drugs, weapons and, in general, the ill-effects of its quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan. Where others will be singed, Pakistan can trot along.

But that is not the only ‘withdrawal effect’ from Afghanistan. An unsaid motivation for the US to leave was to enable greater attention to a far more pressing problem: China. But it is not clear if the US will be any closer to that goal in the time ahead. If anything, the events of the last few days show that Russia and China have joined hands and are filling the vacuum left by the US. The Eurasian chessboard is getting complicated for Washington.

EVEN BEFORE AMERICA had left Afghanistan for good, a Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar travelled to Tianjin in China and met foreign minister Wang Yi. There, the Taliban assured the Chinese that they would not let terrorists use Afghan territory for attacks on China. China is concerned with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), one of the Uighur fronts.

A month later, in late August, these confabulations bore fruit when China, along with Russia, abstained from an anodyne UN Security Council resolution (Resolution 2593, passed on the night of August 30th) that highlighted the need to maintain peace in Afghanistan and prevent its territory from being used for terrorist activity. In their “explanation of vote”, the two countries said the resolution was “hurried” and China, in particular, said it was “unbalanced”. Beijing wanted to include ETIM and the Islamic State (IS) mentioned specifically in the resolution. Both countries, with their friendship with Pakistan, have begun making a distinction between “our” terrorists and “your” terrorists in the fashion that Pakistan has done for different factions of the Taliban.

Many have argued that India, which had an extensive, non-military, presence in Afghanistan, has lost out after the Taliban takeover. The manner in which India’s diplomats and other functionaries had to be evacuated from Kabul, even as the Haqqani faction of the Taliban, along with terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) roamed freely on the streets of Kabul, fuelled that speculation. India has, however, opened diplomatic contact with the Taliban.

On August 31st, India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, met the Taliban’s Head of Political Office in Doha, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. During the meeting, requested by the Taliban, India expressed its concern that Afghanistan should not be used for anti-Indian terrorism. A release by the Ministry of External Affairs said “the Taliban representative assured the Ambassador that these issues would be positively addressed”. Earlier, in a video message, Stanikzai had said: “India is very important for the region and we want trade and economic relations with it. We expect the relationship will continue like before.”

Stanikzai’s moderate tone and the promises of “good behaviour” by the Taliban have led to an almost industrial level output of commentary on how the Taliban have “changed” and countries can now do business with it. These are strange arguments that ignore the reasons why the Taliban are “behaving well” for now. A look at Afghanistan’s balance sheet as a country tells a very different story.

In 2019, Afghanistan’s import bill was a tidy $5.3 billion. That may appear peanuts from an Indian perspective, but it should be remembered that Afghanistan has low government revenue as its economic activity is largely based on agriculture and exports of primary commodities like dry fruits, minerals, animal hides, etcetera. In 2020, the country’s gross financing requirements were about $6.3 billion according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates. These were largely met by official transfers of about $7.2 billion provided by other countries. That source of funding dried up the moment the last American C-17 left Kabul. If that were not all, the US has blocked $9 billion worth of the Afghan central bank’s assets.

All this leaves Afghanistan in a very precarious economic situation. Moreover, the mass exodus includes its precious manpower and talent necessary to run the country. In a series of tweets on August 16th, the country’s former central bank governor Ajmal Ahmady detailed how he escaped from Kabul. He was later told that the Taliban had come “looking for him”. This is just one example of an important functionary leaving to escape the Taliban. In the last 10-12 days, skilled Afghans have left the country in droves.

Stanikzai, who works in Doha, realises that unless the Taliban remain open to the idea of working with governments, even if they don’t agree with them, managing Afghanistan will be difficult. His emollient statements do not in any way signal that the Taliban have abandoned their extreme religious ideology or have given up the idea of persecuting minorities and other, non-Pashtun, ethnic groups. Some early signs of that could be seen outside Kabul where door-to-door searches for former officials, military officers and intelligence officials are being carried out vigorously. In many cases, executions, too, have been reported.

INDIA’S COMMITMENT TO Afghanistan was based on furthering its old relations with the people of that country. Indian investments were largely in building Afghanistan’s infrastructure and included construction of the Salma Dam over the Hari river in Herat province. The dam was built at an estimated cost of $273 million and was commissioned in 2016. Similarly, India built the Zaranj-Delaram highway in Nimruz province at a cost of $135 million. India also built the Afghan Parliament that cost $90 million. In all, India had an investment of $3 billion over many years and around 400 projects that ranged from electricity lines to schools.

Critics of the Government have ‘written off’ these projects and other ‘investments’ in Afghanistan. This is an extremely narrow reading of what is understood by an investment. It is not an asset that gives a return in the conventional sense. Unlike Pakistan, which has a land border with Afghanistan, India’s ability to directly influence events is extremely limited. What India’s projects—mostly non-military—afford it is the goodwill of the Afghan people who benefit from them. India has always avoided any military involvement in Afghanistan for good reason. Some years ago, an Afghan government delegation visited India seeking military equipment. India was lukewarm to the idea and provided modest help in terms of repair infrastructure. India’s understanding that any military involvement would be counterproductive and would lead to the erosion of goodwill, built painstakingly over decades, has been proved correct. Even the Taliban understand that.

The trouble for India does not lie in a ‘loss of opportunities’ in Afghanistan; the loss is one of Indian help for the Taliban. The Taliban now have new benefactors in the form of China and their erstwhile foe, Russia. But unlike India, any help that comes from China is strings-attached and politically expensive. This is borne out by the use of debt as a political instrument by Beijing. India has never adopted that tactic.

What India needs to worry about is Pakistan. Whatever Stanikzai might say, the truth is that in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan, it is strongmen who control the government and territory. This ‘faction’ of the Taliban is beholden to Pakistan for military and material support over two decades. These groups include some very violent terrorists, including the Haqqani network of the Taliban, people who are dead set against India. Pakistan, which has finally managed to secure ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, is sure to try and use these groups and dispatch terrorists to Kashmir. The last time the Taliban were in control of Afghanistan, all manner of terrorists, from as far away as Sudan and Bosnia, found their way to the Valley.

At the moment, the Taliban appear to be moderate, but it is hard to imagine them discarding their extremist ideology to the point that they can become a ‘normal’ ruling party. Apologists would like to project that Taliban would like to see maximum autonomy from their Pakistani handlers. That may be true, but Pakistan has mastered the art of control over the decades and it is unlikely to lose control to the point that Afghanistan will not be a headache for India.

Outreach and access to Afghanistan for its traders seem fine on paper. Yet India must exercise caution in ensuring that it does not end up providing resources for terrorism on its soil. To that extent, a dialogue with the Taliban may not be out of place but any commitment for funding projects in Afghanistan must await political clarity there. The question of providing direct financial help simply does not arise.

The trade-off for the Taliban is clear: not allowing Afghan soil to be used against India and getting Indian help in return. For Pakistan, it is the opposite: use of ‘strategic depth’ to inflict maximum harm on India while providing the Taliban with some kind of material support. This help can also take place indirectly, via China and Russia. At the moment, the scales seem to be tilted in favour of the second option. India must prepare for an adverse outcome.

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