The Enemy Within

THE FRACAS in Parliament over BR Ambedkar’s legacy gave a bloody nose, literally, to one MP and left another injured. It was also the latest outbreak of Congress’ deep-rooted and well-documented pro­pensity for violence. Its origins can be traced to the first split in the ‘original’ Indian National Congress in 1907 held at French Gardens, Surat. The so-called Moderates had hired armed Bohra Muslim goons to ostensibly “teach a lesson to the leader from Maharashtra, Mr. Tilak.” What followed was a violent clash right on the dais between the Moderates and the Extremists.

But the top Congress leadership had also perfected the art of non-violent victim-taking each time things didn’t go its way. Ambedkar was one of the high-profile victims of this skuldug­gery. His caustic resignation speech in Parliament on October 10, 1951 gives us some dark hints of how Jawaharlal Nehru got rid of people who didn’t kowtow to him.

“The House has no opportunity to know how the Cabinet works from within, whether there is harmony or whether there is a conflict… I was in the opposite camp and had already been condemned as unworthy of association when the interim Government was formed in August 1946… I have never been a party to the game of power politics inside the cabinet or the game of snatching portfolios… I believe in service…

“From my early childhood I have dedicated myself to the upliftment of the Scheduled Castes… if I had joined the Congress, I would have reached to the highest place in that organization…

“[W]hy is no relief granted to the Scheduled Castes? Compare the concern the Government shows over safeguarding the Muslims. The Prime Minister’s whole time and attention is devoted for the protection of the Muslims… what I want to know is, are the Muslims the only people who need protection? Are the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes… not in need of protection?”

As painful as it is to read this, it is also the first-person account of a well-known truth—of Ambedkar’s shabby treatment at the hands of both the Gandhian and Nehruvian Congress.

It appears that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in the last ses­sion of Parliament, acted passionately than clinically, when it invoked Ambedkar’s name.

On a broader plane, the biggest casualty, once again, is the same. Over the past half- a-century, public discourse truthfully evaluating Ambedkar’s overall legacy has been derailed and mauled beyond recognition. This outcome owes to a singular factor: his blind deification, instead of objective appreciation. The closest allusion to this approach is found in a lovely phrase in Sanskrit literary tradition: Sahrudaya Sameeksha—critical evalu­ation by a literary connoisseur.

Thus, Ambedkar today occupies the same position that Gandhi once did in the Indian political pantheon. Anything spoken or written about Ambedkar in less than a eulogistic tone invites instant wrath, condemnation, effigy-burning and a bloody nose.

While there is much to appreciate Ambedkar for, there is much to critique as well. Even a superficial perusal of his body of work shows that had he been alive, he would have himself welcomed any critique of many of his formulations. If anything, he was open-minded.

BJP, in its attempt to combat the Congress-led cacophony of the Opposition, hammered on the infamous 1952 election to North Bombay in which Jawaharlal Nehru personally ensured Ambedkar’s defeat, with the support of the violent communist leader, SA Dange. BJP merely stopped at this election instead of going further.

North Bombay was the same battleground where a similar drama was enacted exactly 10 years later with the same climax.

Acharya Kripalani now occupied the place of Ambedkar. The obscure Narayan Kajrolkar, who had defeated Ambedkar, had now been replaced by VK Krishna Menon, India’s defence minister and Nehru’s Man Friday.

It was also the election that sealed both their fates.

The 1962 General Election, largely forgotten today, was historic because of the North Bombay constituency. It was dubbed the battle of the giants.

The February 2, 1962 issue of Time magazine characterized it in ominous terms, citing “Nehru’s aggressive socialism and left-leaning neutralism” and issued grave warnings against his “appeasement” of China, and told its people that “Americans have an important stake in this outsize election.” Above all, its cover featured an unflattering caricature of Krishna Menon, “flanked by a hooded cobra and a snake-charmer’s flute.” [Public Affairs journal: Volume 36, No 2]

Back home, the Sunday Standard, Times of India, and Indian Express had sounded similar warnings as early as October 1961 al­most immediately after the poll announcement had been made.

The Indian Express, especially, invested all its resources in a single-minded quest to defeat Krishna Menon. Its formidable pro­prietor, Ramnath Goenka gave carte blanche to his editor Frank Moraes to go after both Menon and Nehru. In a taunting editorial headlined ‘Trojan Horse’ (October 18, 1961), Moraes un­ambiguously declared that “both India and the Congress party stand at the cross-roads and the outcome will force­fully indicate which way the country and the party are to go.” To spell it out, Krishna Menon was the Trojan horse of communist China, which had already gobbled up Tibet two years ago but Nehru had remained obstinately blind.

Unlike Ambedkar, Kripalani was armed with an entirely different set of credentials. A year older to Nehru, he was widely respected as an elder states­man, a term that carried a lot of weight in that era. He was one of the closest as­sociates of Gandhi and had occupied all top posts in Congress before and after Independence. His frugal habits and unsullied reputation commanded fear and respect from weaker Congressmen who were now in powerful positions. Nehru had no such qualms. In 1951, Kripalani met the same fate as others in Congress who had dared to disagree with Nehru. He quit the party then, and now contested as an independent.

Kripalani also drew the unstinted support of all anti-Congress parties and various pressure groups which backed him vigor­ously. Here is a short list of his supporters: the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party, the Praja Socialist Party, the Muslim League, the Catholic Association, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the Republican Party, the Peasants’ and Workers’ Party, and the Akali Dal. The Muslim League, which was slowly rehabilitating itself, instructed its 80,000-strong vote bank to vote for Kripalani.

A frail and emaciated Acharya Kripalani, who was pushing 75, campaigned energetically beginning in October 1961. He personally directed the whole campaign and gave broad outlines of strategy. Like a man possessed, he addressed 10 public rallies a day, did door-to-door canvassing, and also maintained an open-door policy. He ensured that he was always available to the pro­spective voters of North Bombay and did not rest till voting day.

But the biggest headache for Krishna Menon and Nehru came not from Kripalani and his formidable, unlikely coalition. It came from within.

In the 1957 elections, the Congress rank and file had grudging­ly worked for Krishna Menon’s victory despite their misgivings about his extreme leftist ideology. And when Nehru had once again bulldozed Menon’s candidature, the protests had grown louder. Maharashtra Congress strongmen like SK Patil and Morarji Desai had openly declared their disgust at Menon. They correctly claimed that due to his “pro- Communism, the future of the country is not safe.” Nehru, as usual, paid scant heed but got a rude wake-up call when 25 members of the Bombay Pradesh Youth Congress quit the party and joined Kripalani’s side.

An enraged Nehru flew down to Bombay. In a vituperative public address delivered at Shivaji Park, he explicitly mentioned the 25 members and asked them to “go to hell”. And regretted it when the papers carried the news and wrote fiery editorials. Nehru’s speeches and conduct through this cam­paign revealed for the first time the extent to which he could and did stoop not just to protect his protégé but his personal prestige. It was also the first campaign in which he set the precedent for the debasement of elec­toral campaigning and public discourse.

Kripalani’s whole campaign was hinged on Krishna Menon’s intimacy with the com­munists, which implied he was an agent of Maoist China and, therefore, a threat to In­dia’s security. His ubiquitous slogan printed on posters in capitalised bold typeface was unambiguous: ‘MENON REPRESENTS CHI­NA—NOT INDIA’. Two other former Con­gress giants added firepower to Kripalani’s unrelenting barrage—C Rajagopalachari and Jayaprakash Narayan.

A day before voting, Rajaji made a public appeal: “Much has been said and argued about Sri V.K.K. Menon’s candidature in North Bombay. I once again appeal to all patriotic men and women not to be led away [by] irrelevant considerations… there is enough [ground] to justify preventive action in the interest of national security and refuse to vote for Sri Krishna Menon.”

But earlier in the campaign, Jayaprakash Narayan had been even more vitriolic. This is what he had thundered at a public meeting on February 12, 1962: “Menon has willingly allowed himself to be used for all he is worth by the Communist Party for the purpose of securing a commanding position in the very heart of the Central Govern­ment and the Congress Party… his victory would in effect be a victory of the Communist Party… it would be childish, therefore, to believe that the issue involved is just one of somebody’s defeat or victory or the Prime Minister’s prestige. It is the future of Indian democ­racy and our spiritual values that are at stake.” [Emphasis added]

A spate of such attacks unnerved Nehru. He began spending more and more time in North Bombay, marshalling every bit of sup­port he could get. Three of his chief support bases included the full apparatus of the (undivided) Communist Party of India (CPI), Bol­lywood, and Blitz, a tabloid which acted as Congress’ fifth column.

For a measure of how CPI had usurped Congress’ North Bom­bay campaign, here is an excerpt from an ‘open letter’ written by some Congress workers addressed to SK Patil, BM Yagnik (presi­dent of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee), and Chief Minister YB Chavan: “Lately, to our great disappointment and consternation we find that especially in North Bombay, commu­nists and fellow-travellers have not only captured the election machinery of the Congress but even the Congress offices.” As a consequence, substantial numbers of Congress members openly worked to defeat Krishna Menon.

On the part of Bollywood, we can sample an excerpt from an ‘open letter’ from “prominent film folk” published in Blitz on Feb­ruary 24, 1962. It was addressed to “Fellow-citizens and friends” and declared that “the attacks on Krishna Menon, from various quarters, are only a cover to attack our beloved Prime Minister, to weaken and undermine his basic national policies and to over­throw his inspiring leadership.” It was signed by Raj Kapoor, Dilip Kumar, Mehboob Khan, Bimal Roy, Dev Anand, Rajendra Kumar, Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, BR Chopra, and Balraj Sahni.

Jayaprakash Narayan hit back with equal fury, aimed directly at Nehru: “Even the Prime Minister has chosen to use invective rather than reasoned argument. It all goes to show how weak is their case… [It] has indisputably vindicated my stand that Mr. Menon’s victory would in reality be a victory for the Commu­nist Party and would clear the way… for the Communist mahout to seize control of the Congress elephant.”

JP was prophetic.

Unable to counter Kripalani and JP’s charges, Nehru indulged in open intimidation. He especially warned JP, “I do not know where he stands… I think he should decide whether he is on [my] side or the other side, in politics or out of it.”

Nehru also warned the “hidden hand of the CIA.” He warned the “rich people of Bombay… who own big newspapers… the Jute Press, and the Press pindaris” who backed Kripalani. This was a clear reference to the owners of the Indian Express and Times of India. Violet Alva, the deputy home minister (and Margaret Alva’s mother-in-law), had reportedly called for the burning of the Indian Express building in Bombay.

Sixty per cent of the 750,000 voters of North Bombay voted. VK Krishna Menon won by a landslide, netting double the votes cast in favour of Kripalani. A brilliant academic analysis of this election by Norman D Palmer (Pacific Affairs, Volume 36, No 2, Summer 1963) delves deep into the causes of Menon’s victory and concludes that the victory really belonged to Nehru.

But the crux of the election was the manner in which Kripalani’s team had run the campaign. It had scared Nehru to the extent of making him indulge in heinous and unscrupulous practices. Indeed, Rajaji had grasped this part of Nehru’s psyche when he declared in a speech: “Whether we win or not, making the attempt to really oppose is worthwhile.”

Time magazine’s commentary in its March 9, 1962 edition is telling: “Menon’s victory… also immeasurably strengthened the more extreme left-wing elements in the Congress Party and the Government, and placed them in a better position, either openly or behind the scenes to influence Nehru’s actions and policies in the last years of his political career and to assume the leadership of the Congress and the Government when Nehru passes from the scene.”

In the final reckoning, Menon’s electoral victory, as Kripalani had forecast, was the military defeat of India. Later in the same year. At the hands of China.

Acharya Kripalanidiplomacyfreedom struggleIndian foreign policyIndian post-Independence historyJawaharlal NehruJayaprakash NarayanTime MagazineVK Krishna Menon