A Chance Against China

THERE IS A directness and urgency to the Resolve Tibet Act, passed by the US Congress on June 12 with rare bipartisan support, empowering the US Department of State to actively counter the Chinese government’s “disinformation” on Tibet, its institutions and the Dalai Lama, and reject claims that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. The Act calls on the US government to promote substantive dialogue between the Chinese govern­ment and the Dalai Lama or “democratically elected” members of the Tibetan community. The communist leadership of China is to be urged to recognise and address aspirations of the Tibet­an people, keeping in mind their distinct historical, cultural, religious and linguistic identity. The Act seeks to rewrite China’s script and revive the discussion—often seen as a lost cause—on Tibet by referring to it as a “dispute” to be settled between Tibetan representatives and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as per international law.

The Act is a significant step up from the 2002 Tibetan Policy Act and the 2020 Tibetan Policy and Support Act as it asks the US government to counter “disinformation” by China and challenges the Chinese claim on the assimilation of Tibet. The 2002 and 2020 Acts were much milder, calling on China not to interfere in the selection of the Dalai Lama’s successor and to protect the envi­ronment and water resources of the Tibetan plateau. The 2024 Act is evidence of the US’ preparedness to open a new front in China’s backyard, touching on a sensitive point, even as big power competition in the South and East China Seas and the Indo-Pacific hots up. Read without blinkers, the Act plainly reopens the debate on Tibet’s status, seen to be a settled matter. Even India has not in any substantive manner argued that Tibet’s merger with China is not a settled fact. There has been an acceptance of Chinese con­trol over Tibet, based on an unstated admission that it cannot be reversed and annoying Beijing may carry consequences that require cautious consideration. Yet, some things changed not soon after Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed office for a third term on June 9. A bipartisan group of US lawmakers led by Republican Michael McCaul and including former US Speaker and Democrat Nancy Pelosi met the Dalai Lama at Dharamshala on June 19 and after the meeting McCaul said the delegation informed the Tibetan leader about the new legislation. “This legislation makes it clear the US believes Tibet has a right to self-determination—free from repression. I hope our visit served as a symbol of the US government’s support for the people of Tibet and the friendship between our two peoples,” McCaul said.

There has been no top-level political dialogue since the Galwan episode and meetings between external affairs minister S Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi have seen India consistently iterate that normalcy on the borders is sine qua non for restoring bilateral ties

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The story did not end with the US delegation meeting the Dalai Lama. Two days later they met Modi and a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement later noted that India’s position on the Dalai Lama was “clear and consistent” in that he is a re­vered religious leader respected by the people of India and is free to conduct his spiritual activities. The Indian statement sidestepped China’s angry comment on the US delegation’s visit which urged America to recognise the Dalai Lama’s anti-China and separatist nature, but Modi’s decision to receive the Congressional group was an unambiguous signal that India saw nothing objection­able about the meeting at Dharamshala. Questions about the US delegation’s discussions and objectives were best answered by the US. The developments injected new energy into the question whether India should revisit its Tibet policy and take advantage of the tougher American posture. The suggestion raised the question whether India has had a policy beyond acceptance of the status quo. Was there a Tibet card that might be relevant in how India deals with China and which addresses its security concerns? The likely downsides were obvious. US policy might change in days to come. While Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has a strong anti-China record, he could be trans­actional too in the event of his becoming president again. In any case, US policy may not remain as committed and a flip-flop could place India in a disadvantageous position with the Tibet issue causing further deterioration in bilateral ties with Beijing—on the rocks since the 2020 Galwan clash and China’s intrusions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Former diplomat and author of Imperial Games in Tibet: The Struggle for Statehood and Sovereignty Dilip Sinha says the US decision to prod China in its backyard is an opportunity for India to reconsider options on an issue that is absolutely central to India’s security. “The Resolve Tibet Act is a change in the US viewpoint. The Act refers to Tibet as a dispute to be resolved in accordance with international conventions. This reopens a discussion on an issue long regarded as a lost cause, and India’s thinking reflected the same,” Sinha told Open. The seasoned diplomat, who served as India’s permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva, agrees that US policy may change but argues that India needs to consider the current posture and recognise it needs to reinforce its preparedness to exercise a range of actions. “India has tried to please China in the past. We did everything to help China after Independence. But relations were damaged the moment India gave asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959,” he says. India’s acts of friendship, such as backing the communist government’s claim to China’s seat at the UN or according centrality to Beijing’s concerns at the 1955 Asian-African Bandung conference and indeed more recent efforts to insulate the relationship from border clashes, have failed to improve ties. The Chinese ownership of Tibet has had a direct impact on India’s security and there is a need to recognise this as the bone of contention, Sinha argues. With the most at stake, it did not make sense for India to allow the current moment to slip away without repudiating its One China policy.

The US delegation’s visit has injected new energy into the question whether India should revisit its Tibet policy and take advantage of the tougher American posture. Is there a Tibet card that could be relevant to how India deals with China and which addresses its security concerns?

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Any decision to raise the heat on Tibet calls for a careful assessment of the economic and military asymmetries between China and India as well as the fallout of adding another irritant—one that could further escalate tensions. There has been no top-level political dialogue since the Galwan episode and meetings between External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, who is a member of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) politburo, have seen India consistently iterate that normalcy on the borders is sine qua non for restoring bilateral ties. The call for de-escalation is essentially a demand that Chinese forces return to positions they occupied prior to the border flare-up in May-June 2020. “There is a need to understand the US intent be­hind the Act passed by Congress. It comes in the backdrop of China raising the stakes in the East and South China Seas and over Taiwan,” Lt General (Retired) Harinder Singh, formerly GOC XIV Corps and Commandant, Indian Military Academy, told Open. General Singh said India was narrowing the capacity gap, most evident in border infrastructure, and the next six to eight years were crucial for this process. “It is not that asymmetries will vanish, but they will be less of a concern than they have been in the past,” he said. Chinese President Xi Jinping has set the goal of realis­ing the basic aspects of developing China into a great, modern socialist country by 2035, ahead of the centenary of the found­ing of the PRC in 2049. Singh points out that the deadline is not sacrosanct and can well be advanced in keeping with the goals set by Xi. Indeed, some commentators say that China’s economy, despite weaknesses and the increased caution of foreign inves­tors, has shown more resilience than anticipated and recorded an increase in manufacturing. “India has successfully demonstrated it can counter or even deter Chinese aggression in the immediate context and China knows this. China may be more unsure about the medium or long-term aspects and both sides are looking to build capacities,” Singh said, even as he also said that reports on China developing infrastructure along the Pangong Lake are over­cooked. “We should not be alarmed by anticipated developments. We are also strengthening our positions. We should concentrate on developing all-around capabilities that increase India’s com­prehensive national power,” he said.

Although there has been no dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama’s representatives since 2010, the religious leader invokes sharp and derogative references from Beijing CPC mouthpieces like the Global Times regularly run down the leader as a “splittist” and lampoon him offensively. The anger and derision are revealing since China’s political and military control over Tibet is seemingly vice-like. It does appear the Dalai Lama evokes fear and loathing among the Chinese leadership despite his advancing age and absence from Tibet. “China remains unsure about its control of Tibet and it is a sensitive point. The Dalai Lama represents the Tibetan cause and a large Tibetan community in India needs to gain a stronger voice,” says Sinha.

Since the massing of troops along the LAC, India has quick­ened its engagements with ASEAN and looked to deepen strategic engagements with countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore and Japan much to China’s dislike. Modi did make considerable efforts to rework ties with China through one-on-one meetings with Xi in Wuhan and Chennai but the events of 2020 convinced him that Beijing does not want to see the emergence of a strong leadership in India. Rather than viewing a leader with political capital as an opportunity to build ties, China has sought to keep India off balance through border incursions. While India has held back in the past, choosing to manage border tensions, Modi has made peace on the LAC central to normal relations, driving the message home by restricting Chinese participation in the Indian economy. The current junc­ture provides an opportunity to borrow from the Chinese play­book of “salami slicing” tactics on the border—repeated incur­sions to change the alignment of the LAC—in another domain. Given that China continues to undercut India’s interests in its immediate neighbourhood, such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Mal­dives and Bangladesh, India can increase its engagement with Taiwan and make it more overt. “Just as the US has needled Chi­na on the Tibet flank, India can up its presence in Taiwan,” says Singh. In the past, visits by Chinese leaders to India had seen the Tibetan community being locked into its areas of residence in the capital. This can give way to greater visibility and presence of Tibetan scholars and experts in official and non-government think-tanks.

The turn of events offers an opportunity to write a new script on Tibet, one which might expose vulnerabilities in the Chinese position seen as unassailable. Xi’s aggressive moves since becoming supreme leader have overstretched China’s capacities. Recent approving commentary in the Global Times on Modi’s visit to Russia has a self-serving ele­ment: it hopes to remind the US that it is dealing with a mul­tipolar world where its interests will not prevail, even with “like-minded” partners. But Modi’s engagements with Russian President Vladimir Putin are aimed at ensuring Moscow remains alive to India’s concerns about China and that defence and eco­nomic cooperation deepens the India-Russia relationship.

Second chances are rare to come by. In its early dealings with China, India’s leaders failed to recognise the hostility and contempt with which the communist giant regarded its neigh­bour. Though tempered by India’s military response since 2020, China continues to try and contain India as a subsidiary power in South Asia. Some accounts of the 1962 war state that Mao Zedong was vastly irked by what he felt were Jawaharlal Nehru’s preten­tions to being a leading voice in global affairs, a sentiment India’s first prime minister failed to read. The window to rework a stale dynamic that has hindered India for long is now available and needs to be utilised before it closes again.

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Rajeev Deshpande

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