The Karpoori Thakur Effect

IN HIS OBITUARY of Karpoori Thakur, George Fernandes wrote: “Many years back, in 1969-70, when you were head of SSP and I was general secretary, I told you that you are like an eel fish, which is difficult to catch. It was difficult to tie you down on any issue, be it policy matter or organisational. And whenever we tried to catch you, you escaped. I remember only once when you fell in our net, in 1969. The issue was regarding the Chief Ministership of Bihar. You kept on saying that you were not interested in the post and you wanted Ramanand Tiwari to become the chief minister. I scolded you and said that Karpoori Ji, it’s not enough just to say that you are not interested, you have to show it by your actions that you actually wanted to see him as chief minister… Once Ramanand Tiwari publically declared that he cannot form a government with Jansangh while we were of the opinion that without the support of the Jansangh, we cannot form the government. That time you did exactly what we expected you to do all along, you formed the government with the Jansangh’s support and after making Tiwariji retract his statement, you made him Police minister in your cabinet…”

On January 23, 2024, the Union government decided to confer Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian honour, on Karpoori Thakur and, within a week, the political equations in Bihar changed as Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, architect of the Indian National Devel­opmental Inclusive Alliance (I.N.D.I.A.), joined the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) again. While the political oscillation of the Bihar chief minister is a known fact, his centrality even in the face of a declining support base remains an enigma. However, a look at Bihar’s socialist politics would reveal that Nitish Kumar is not the first slippery customer. Late Dalit leader Ram Vilas Paswan used to be called a weather scientist. But no one matched the political acumen of Karpoori Thakur, who always operated in layers as he had to face two hostile social blocs: the upper-caste dominated Congress and the dominant backward castes from his own party. Thakur hailed from the barber caste (Nai), was a veteran socialist leader, a trusted lieutenant of Ram Manohar Lohia, and a cham­pion of the interests of the Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs). Thakur became the deputy chief minister in the first non-Congress government in 1967-68 and twice chief minister, in 1970-71 and 1977-79. Thus, Karpoori Thakur signifies an assertive politics from leaders hailing from socially vulnerable backgrounds whose constant manoeuvrings were strategies of survival. Nitish Kumar, despite coming from a dominant backward caste, faces the same vulnerability on account of the grudge of dominant upper castes as well as feudal-minded Other Backward Classes (OBCs), particularly the Yadavs. Hence, the enigma pertaining to Kumar’s ebbs and flows needs to be contextualised in the history of backward caste politics in Bihar and the role of Karpoori Thakur therein.

THE BACKGROUND

Although Bihar was a part of Bengal with Calcutta (now Kolkata) as capital, the Bengal Renaissance did not affect the region. Even after Bihar became a separate province in 1912, the benefits of employment, education, and political participation were enjoyed by the upper castes who themselves were divided along caste lines.

Karpoori Thakur signifies an assertive politics from leaders hailing from socially vulnerable backgrounds whose constant manoeuvrings were strategies of survival. Nitish Kumar, despite coming from a dominant backward caste, faces the same vulnerability on account of the grudge of dominant upper castes as well as feudal-minded OBCs, particularly the Yadavs

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Nevertheless, the creation of a separate province opened up new avenues of employment and created the need for educational devel­opment. The socio-political specificity of the state ensured that the consciousness about availing these opportunities went along caste lines too. This was on account of two simultaneous events, one representing the whole and the other, the parts. While there was a demand for a separate province of Bihar since the end of the 19th century, many caste associations were also being formed by the upper castes as well as the lower castes. Among the lower castes, the upper ranks of the Shudras were the first to think of and start movements through caste associations. First among them were the Kahars who began the Rawani Kahar Sabha in 1906. Then in 1910, the All India Kurmi Kshatriya Mahasabha was registered at Patna. The Ahir’s Gope Jatiya Mahasabha was founded in 1912 at Sahabad. In March 1912, the first session of the Kushwaha Kshatriya Mahasabha took place at Chunar in the district of Mirzapur, known as the Koeri Hitakarni Sabha.

Thus, in the absence of a strong alternative, caste associations became the most important institutions in modern Bihar in terms of their utility for the members to garner new socio-eco­nomic, educational, and political benefits.

By 1910, it was the Gwala movement that had emerged as the central factor to backward caste politics in Bihar. Around that time, several local meetings, predominantly of Gwalas along with a section of Kurmis and Koeris, were organised in different parts of Bihar, particularly in Patna, Saran, Shahabad, Muzaffar­pur, Champaran, and Hazaribagh. The main emphasis was on wearing the sacred thread; giving up liquor and meat; preventing the early marriage of girls and the exclusion of women from public places; and the protection of cows. The leading figure of the Gwala movement in the early phase was Rash Bihari Mandal of Madhepura, who was also the leader of the cow protection movement. This movement representing the socio-political assertion of the dominant intermediary castes culminated in the formation of the Triveni Sangh.

The Triveni Sangh was formed in April 1933 at Kargahar in Bihar’s Shahabad district. This was a coming together of three better-off intermediary castes—Ahirs, Kurmis, and Koeris. It described itself as an organisation of the Sachhe Kisan (true peasants) of the Hindu Jatis and mazdoor (labourers), as opposed to the nakli kisan (fake peasants) represented by the Kisan Sabha. Its members were also prominent representatives of their respective caste associations.

The Triveni Sangh’s objectives were to establish samajik samata (social equality) among the Hindus and to enlist every section of society for independence. Further, it regarded Congress policy on issues like go raksha (cow protection), Assembly elections, and the Communal Award unsatisfactory. The Triveni Sangh had realised the importance of the politics of numbers wherein it claimed to represent 75 per cent of the state’s population and appealed to its constituencies to exercise their voting rights even if it required the loss of a day’s work.

It must be noted that despite the Kisan Sabha taking the agrar­ian question seriously and launching a struggle for the rights of the tenants and labourers, it was not able to get the Triveni Sangh’s leaders within its fold. This was because in the perception of the Triveni Sangh leaders, the Kisan Sabha was a Bhumihar-dominat­ed organisation.

Thus, the Triveni Sangh was central to shaping both backward caste identity and backward politics in Bihar. With the formation of the first Congress ministry in 1937, it had demanded affirmative action for backward castes. It was at the forefront with its anti-upper caste policies. Later a large number of Triveni Sangh’s activists joined the Bihar Provin­cial Backward Classes Federation (BPBCF) which was formed on September 10, 1947, with RL Chandapuri as its founding president. The federation petitioned for the implementation of the long-ignored report of the Backward Classes Commis­sion and for the creation of a ministry to see to the problems of backward classes. The politics and agenda of the Triveni Sangh in creating a distinct backward-caste identity and back­ward politics in pre-independence Bihar proved to be a major driving force and a reference point for post-Independence backward politics in Bihar.

Intra-backward caste fissures and divergences in Bihar have been as pronounced as the upper caste vs backward caste conflict. The interface of caste and politics strongly point to the perpetual conflict between the dominant backward castes and EBCs. The literature on Bihar politics has mentioned this trend in passing but has avoided a serious engagement with this contradiction among the backward castes. Therefore, the gap between the dominant backward castes and EBCs remains understudied. In the case of Bihar, the phenomenon is captured in the divergent political moves and rhetoric adopted by BP Mandal (a Yadav) and Karpoori Thakur (a Nai) from 1950s to the 1980s and later by Lalu Prasad Yadav and Nitish Kumar since the 1990s.

BP MANDAL vs KARPOORI THAKUR

Since the beginning, Ram Manohar Lohia was very critical of BP Mandal in Bihar poli­tics. The most prominent fissure between dominant backward castes and EBCs could be traced to the formation of the first non-Congress Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) coalition government wherein Karpoori Thakur became deputy chief minister. At that point, BP Mandal, a big Yadav landlord from Saharsa in northern Bihar, had been elected as an MP of the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) in Lok Sabha. However, when SSP formed a non- Congress government in Bihar, Mandal insisted on becoming a minister in the SVD government. Lohia, who had publicly declared that no MPs would be allowed to join a state ministry, refused to concede to the demand. Mandal refused to give in and ultimately succeeded in becoming a minis­ter in the Mahamaya Prasad Sinha-led SVD government. Further, the fissure within the dominant backward castes and EBCs and the question of backward caste leadership in the state was revealed in the conduct of Mandal against the first non-Congress SVD government wherein Karpoori Thakur was deputy chief minister. Thakur was the first EBC to hold the post of deputy chief minister and subsequently chief minister, not only in Bihar but also in India as a whole. However, this didn’t go down well with a section of the dominant backward caste MLAs, particularly the Yadavs.

Karpoori Thakur had only taken his first steps in office when, within 10 months, the government was brought down with BP Mandal playing an important role. Accusing the gov­ernment of inefficiency, Mandal, on August 26, 1967, resigned from SSP and formed his Shoshit Dal which had 25 MLAs among whom 18 were Yadavs. Backed by Congress and with the help of RL Chandapuri, a Yadav, Mandal, in January 1968, orchestrated the downfall of the SVD government and formed his Shoshit Dal government with the Congress’ help.

The hostility of dominant Yadav castes and their leaders vis-a-vis EBCs could be seen in the instance when, after the fall of the SVD government, Mandal’s government constituted the JR Mudholkar Commission to look into complaints of corruption against Karpoori Thakur and his ministers, though nothing could be substantiated.

BP Mandal, who later became chairman of the Mandal Commission and favoured a caste-based reservation at the national level, was the first to oppose the reservation policy of the Karpoori Thakur government by calling it a ploy to divert the attention of the masses from its inability to deal with other issues

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Again, with the initiation of the policy of affirmative action, reserving 60 per cent of the total OBC quota for the weaker backward castes in 1977, Karpoori Thakur signalled that in the coming days backward class politics would not remain in the hands of the heirs of the Triveni Sangh. Rather, EBCs would play a central role in backward caste politics. Although this change was not clearly visible initially, the changing dynam­ics within the ruling and opposition parties in Bihar clearly brought out this aspect of altered caste equations. By voting the Nitish Kumar-led coalitions to power in Bihar, EBCs have proven their strength in the last four elections.

It’s interesting to note that BP Mandal, who later became chairman of the Mandal Commission and favoured a caste-based reservation at the national level, was the first to oppose the reservation policy of the Karpoori Thakur government by calling it a ploy to divert the attention of the masses from its inability to deal with other issues.

This intra-backward caste tussle was further revealed in the 1980s when Takur fell out with Charan Singh, leader of the Lok Dal. Prominent senior Yadav leaders like Munshilal Rai (Vaisha­li), Tulsi Singh (Bhojpur), Gajendra Himanshu (Sitamarhi), Jay Narayan Yadav (Munger), Devendra Yadav (Madhubani), Lalu Prasad (Gopalganj), Nitish Kumar (a Kurmi who first went with Charan Singh, but then returned to the Karpoori Thakur group) drove a campaign to wrest the mantle of backward caste leadership from Thakur.

Another glimpse of the fissures and divergences between dominant backward castes and EBCs could be seen in the observation of Marxist thinker Prassan Kumar Chaudhary: “In my understanding, being as good a politician as he was, he [Karpoori Thakur] probably anticipated that the struggle for backward empowerment would give rise to the leader­ship of dominant backward classes as Yadav-Kurmi-Koeri, and more specifically of Yadavs.” This reflects the attitude of EBCs towards the dominant backward class groups. In fact, he remained careful not to let the leadership of backward caste politics pass into the hands of the dominant among those backward castes. He feared that if that would happen, then there would be no meaning to his politics. Thus, to ensure the success of his social model, he favoured the leadership of weaker sections within the backward castes. Consequently, the dominant backward caste groups like Yadavs tried to challenge his leadership.

The conduct of Yadav MLAs of his own party, Lok Dal, towards Karpoori Thakur on February 12, 1988—when he was dismissed as the leader of the opposition through a notification by the speaker of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, Shivchandra Jha—was one of hostility and conspiracy. At that time, the breakup of the Lok Dal had taken place at the national level. It had little impact on the party in Bihar. The speaker had cited the same incident of breakup in the Lok Dal as grounds for ousting Thakur from the post of opposition leader, saying that he had lost the support of the requisite number of MLAs to retain his post. It is alleged that some prominent Yadav leaders were hand-in-glove with the Congress leadership and the speaker on that issue. In response, Karpoori Thakur paraded 39 Lok Dal MLAs outside the Assembly and before the governor.

While the ascendency of Lalu Prasad signified a new phase of backward-caste assertion, there was a subtext to it when seen from the vantage of EBCs in Bihar. Since the 1990 assembly election, Yadavs claimed a disproportionately large share in the Janata Dal and later the Rashtriya Janata Dal

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Thakur was an isolated man in his last days. Nevertheless, he was determined not to lose the leadership of backward caste politics in Bihar. In this regard, Indra Kumar advised him to go to Hyderabad and meet NT Rama Rao (NTR) to emphasise the fact that at that juncture there were three non-Brahmin leaders, NTR, Devi Lal, and Karpoori Thakur. Hence, a collective quest of a new pan-Indian subaltern politics was to be underscored. Thakur went there. Sunderlal Bahuguna gave him the money for travel. The meeting was very suc­cessful. Apparently, NTR agreed to start the campaign for the upcoming state elections in Bihar. But Karpoori Thakur died soon after.

The social assertion of dominant intermediary castes like Yadavs and Kurmis and the incidents of atrocities upon Dalits also frustrated the political agenda of Karpoori Thakur to forge an alliance between backward castes and Dalits. The divergence of the political trajectory of Dalits and backward castes in Bihar gets obvious in an analysis by James Manor whereby he compared the position and situation of Karpoori Thakur with that of D Devaraj Urs of Karnataka. He wrote: “On one side while he [Karpoori Thakur] was able to bring together anti-Brahmanical castes with his reservation policies, on the oth­er, in heart of Dalit communities and their leaders there spread a fear of dominant backward castes. The distance between the two communities grew and the situation reached a point where to bring down his government, leaders of forward and extreme backward communities came together in an agreement, and before a backward-Dalit alliance under his supervision could be formed the government was brought down. Whereas in Karna­taka, the measures taken by Devraj Ars resulted in a powerful alliance of backward castes-Dalits and Muslims.”

The social assertion of dominant intermediary castes like Yadavs and Kurmis and the incidents of atrocities upon Dalits also frustrated the political agenda of Karpoori Thakur to forge an alliance between backward castes and Dalits

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Also, a section of Yadavs and Kurmis imitated the upper castes in having private armies (senas). The Bhumi Sena repre­senting the landed interests of Kurmis was the first of its kind in Bihar. It was the most dreaded private army notorious for its anti-Dalit massacres. Most heinous was the 1977 Belchi massa­cre. Similarly, a significant section of Yadavs, another dominant backward caste that represented feudal backwardness, had its own private army, the Lorik Sena, which was perpetually at war with Dalits. As late as 1991, the ex-Union minister Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav formed the Kisan Sangh, an anti-Naxal force.

The death of Karpoori Thakur, an EBC, in February 1988, a year before the election, led to the leadership of backward caste politics pass into the hands of dominant backward castes. Thus, the balance and complexity that Karpoori Thakur had orchestrated came to an end. By the late 1980s, Yadavs, for the first time since the 1960s, were in command of backward caste politics in Bihar.

LALU PRASAD vs NITISH KUMAR

After BP Mandal and Karpoori Thakur, the leadership of back­ward caste aspiration and politics passed on to two individuals, Lalu Prasad and Nitish Kumar, at different intervals in the 1990s. Lalu Prasad chose to inherit BP Mandal’s legacy. One of the policy measures that Lalu Prasad went for was replacing the ‘Karpoori model’ with the ‘Mandal model’ whereby the 60 per cent share of total reservation for backward castes, exclusively reserved for lower OBCs and EBCs, was abolished despite vehement protests by the state’s EBC leadership. That in turn compelled the EBC leadership to approach the high court alongside a popular agitation, leading to the with­drawal of the government circular and the restoration of the Karpoori model.

While the ascendency of Lalu Prasad signified a new phase of back­ward-caste assertion, there was a sub­text to it when seen from the vantage of EBCs in Bihar. Since the 1990 Assembly election, Yadavs claimed a dispro­portionately large share in the Janata Dal and later the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). They got 100 tickets out of 227 seats that the party con­tested in 1990. Important contracts, liquor licences, casual and semi-permanent government jobs, chairmanships of boards and corporations, all began falling into the hands of people close to Lalu Prasad. Besides, Yadavs were preferred in the ministry, party, bureaucracy, business, local self-government, and various committees. As has been extensively reported, they were cornering the largest chunks in recruitments to the lower bureaucracy within or outside the OBC quota.

The 1995 Bihar Assembly election was a setback for EBCs. Despite constituting around 28-30 per cent of the population, EBC MLAs made up less than 5 per cent of the Bihar Assembly. This lopsided representation between Yadavs and other OBC groups betrayed RJD’s anti-EBC approach. This intra-backward representational discrepancy, coupled with the disappearance of the state and the arrogance of community behaviour in the public sphere wherein EBCs and Dalits found themselves at the receiving end, remains in popular memory among the weaker subalterns who support Nitish Kumar. Of all the mainstream parties, RJD, until the 2019 Lok Sabha polls, had been giving the least representation to EBCs.

On the other hand, Nitish Kumar meticulously attempted to inherit the legacy of Karpoori Thakur, both in opposition and as chief minister, by earmarking special policy provisions for EBCs and Mahadalits. EBCs likes Mallahs, Nais, Kalwars, Kewats, Binds, and Tantis supported Nitish Kumar because there was a strong perception that the RJD leadership catered to the empowerment of the Yadav community.

Despite shortcomings in governance, development and rhetoric, from the perspective of EBCs and Mahadalits, Nitish Kumar continues to represent political agency that could moderate the aggressive assertions of dominant castes. He has shown the centrality of EBCs in Bihar

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As a result, Nitish Kumar has faced a concerted challenge from the dominant groups, a section of upper castes and Yadavs who otherwise are diametrically opposed to each other. In 2009, Nitish Kumar attempted to empower the vulnerable groups by implementing the recommendations of the Vishvamohan Rishi Mohan Commission set up in September 2007 to identify the Mahadalits, the Udaykant Chaudhary Commission on EBCs constituted in September 2006 to identify and outline provisions for EBCs, and the D Bandopadhyay Commission on Land Reforms formed in 2006 to suggest measures that would benefit the landless in the state. Nitish Kumar hoped to introduce a series of develop­mental measures that would improve the conditions of these sections and provide him political gains in future. However, these policy pronouncements in the aftermath of the 2009 Lok Sabha polls proved controversial and politically charged the atmosphere during the campaign for the bypolls in Sep­tember 2009. Opposition parties, notably RJD and the Lok Jan­shakti Party (LJP) along with a section of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) upper-caste leadership, projected the recommen­dations as politically motivated and stridently opposed them. This affected voting patterns, leading to unexpected electoral outcomes whereby the Janata Dal (United)-BJP won just five of 18 seats. Expectedly, Nitish Kumar had to dilute the provi­sions pertaining to EBCs and Mahadalits while he rejected the recommendations of the D Bandopadhyay Commission on Land Reforms to appease the dominant castes.

THE CENTRALITY OF VULNERABLE CASTES

Despite the setback, Nitish Kumar was able to unite both EBCs and Mahadalits of Bihar politically—an objective desired and attempted by Karpoori Thakur. It is this section that is wary of the political assertion of both dominant groups, be they upper castes or intermediary castes like Yadavs. Despite all the failures and shortcomings in governance, development and rhetoric, from the perspective of EBCs and Mahadalits, Nitish Kumar continues to represent the political agency that could moderate the aggressive assertions of the dominant castes. It was the si­lent support of this core base—EBCs, Mahadalits, Kurmis, and a section of women—that not only sustained Nitish Kumar but also accounted for the improved performance of JD(U)’s ally BJP. It is noteworthy that despite all the conducive determi­nants, RJD’s performance without Nitish Kumar in 2020 was poorer (75 seats of 145) compared to 2015 (81 of 101) when it had contested the election partnering with JD(U).

Despite his declining political fortunes and constant flip-flops, Nitish Kumar has demonstrated the centrality of EBCs in Bihar. They have become indispensable to the political calculation of all parties in the state. Herein lies the victory of the Karpoori model of egalitarian backward-caste politics and the defeat of the BP Mandal model of feudal backwardism. Karpoori Thakur’s legacy may resonate at a pan-India level once the recommendation of the Rohini Commission is implemented by the Union government.

About The Author

Sajjan Kumar

Sajjan Kumar is a political scientist and co-author of Maya, Modi, Azad: Dalit Politics in the Times of Hindutva. He is a fellow at the Prime Ministers’ Museum & Library, New Delhi

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