Donald Trump: Disruptor Or Reformer?

Much before Donald Trump won the US presidential election in November 2024, the world was a mess, with the post-World War II global system slowly giving way to a world without order. The upheaval and profound developments of recent years—from the return of “might makes right” and ground-breaking advances in biotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) to major shifts in trade and investment flows—underscored that a new age of international relations was dawning amid a fundamental transformation of the international system.

Trump’s barrage of policy actions since returning to the White House has only intensified the geopolitical and geo-economic turbulence, reinforcing the belief that the world is at a crossroads. It is unclear what will emerge from the present tumult.

What is clear is that Trump’s policy actions and moves are contributing to shifts in the global landscape, instilling increased instability and complexity. The erosion of multilateralism has become more distinct following the Trump administration’s withdrawal from international agreements or organisations, including the Paris Agreement on climate change and the World Health Organization (WHO). His critics see this as a retreat from US leadership in multilateral efforts.

More pronounced are the Trump-caused trade disruptions. The imposition of a 10 per cent tariff on all countries and the initiation of trade disputes with both friends and foes are disrupting global trade patterns and spurring economic uncertainty. Applying tariffs as a political weapon is bringing America’s relationships with key trading partners under pressure and furthering a sense of instability in the global economy.

Although Trump returned to office in a volatile geopolitical environment, his policies are only generating greater geopolitical tensions, including bringing America’s longstanding alliances under strain, especially in Europe. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman have hosted US talks with Russia and Iran, respectively, is an indication that Europe’s importance for US policy is on the decline.

Trump sees traditional US allies free-riding on American security and exploiting US generosity, regarding them as leeches on the American economy. And he views NATO not as a mutual defence pact but as a burdensome arrangement where the US foots the bill for ungrateful allies. The fraying transatlantic alliance appears headed towards a fundamental change.

However, Trump’s critics unfairly accuse him of inflicting damage on a “rules-based international order” and thereby emboldening other nations to also disregard international norms.

Did his predecessor, Joe Biden, respect a rules-based order? The Biden administration’s contrasting responses to the wars in Gaza and Ukraine prompted cries of hypocrisy. And while ratcheting up sanctions on military-ruled Myanmar and creating a deepening humanitarian crisis there, the Biden administration reportedly played a role in toppling the governments of Imran Khan in Pakistan and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh.

Did the Biden administration respect international rules or law when it used human rights promotion as a geopolitical tool to bring pressure on countries that it targeted, including through US government-funded organisations? On occasion, human rights concerns were raised as leverage even against a friendly state like India, the world’s largest democracy.

We need a truly rules-based international order, not the pretence of a rules-based order. The present rules have been laid down by the West, not by the international community. When it suits their interests, Western countries have repeatedly violated the rules that they have set, including by invading countries, extraterritorially extending domestic laws to the international realm, imposing unilateral sanctions, weaponising finance, and bypassing the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Trump is just more open than the other or previous Western leaders in his contempt for international rules. He has weaponised tariffs and flirted with territorial expansion—from acquiring Greenland, taking over the Panama Canal and even calling the US-Canada border “an artificial line of separation”. He is unapologetically defining America not just as a global power but as an entitled hegemon.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES

The question whether Trump’s blitz of policy actions paints him as a <disruptor> or <reformer> of the international system is a loaded one. Trump’s critics would classify him as a disruptor, largely because his foreign policy tends to upend both norms and established alliances while injecting unpredictability and even upheaval in global diplomacy.

The critics would cite his withdrawal from, or scepticism of, multilateral institutions; his transactional diplomacy; and his disruption of cooperative economic norms through the imposition of unilateral tariffs. In their eyes, such moves do not aim to “fix” the international system from within but rather to reshape it—or sidestep it—on American terms.

However, it can also be argued that Trump is a reformer—though an unconventional one—who sees the international system as outdated or skewed against US interests. For example, Trump’s push for allies to contribute more to their own defence (especially in NATO) taps into longstanding US frustrations. His aggressive posture on trade seeks to correct decades of imbalances that have harmed American industries, with manufacturing outsourced to China and others.

Going by Trump’s intended long-term objectives, an argument can be made that he is attempting reform, even if it were to destabilise existing structures. And by emphasising national sovereignty over international norms, he is trying to force the international system into a more US-centred shape.

Trump’s approach to international geopolitics and geo-economics may be polarising but it raises a fundamental question: Can his effort to remake the world yield some positive results—not just for the US but for the wider world?

For instance, his economic agenda might not only bolster American economic resilience by strengthening US domestic industries and reducing reliance on foreign imports, but also help contain China’s accumulation of economic and military power. That, in turn, would likely contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific, a region where China’s aggressive expansionism is undermining the power equilibrium.

Globally, his administration’s focus on recalibrating trade relationships has been seen as an effort to modernise trade agreements and address imbalances. Additionally, his push for increased defence spending among NATO allies could lead to a more equitable sharing of security responsibilities. To be sure, such potential positives may come with significant trade-offs.

Still, there are certain areas where Trump’s strategy—if executed with consistency and proactive diplomacy—could yield benefits not just for the US but possibly for the broader global order.

Consider, for example, Trump’s thrust on rebalancing trade relationships, including negotiating new trade agreements or renegotiating existing ones to help secure better terms for the American economy and make America a manufacturing powerhouse again. For the US, this push could lead to fairer trade conditions, particularly in terms of intellectual property, tariffs and subsidies. This will help create incentives for reshoring manufacturing, thereby creating domestic jobs.

But this push on rebalancing trade relationships—a reaction to decades of offshoring and job losses in key US sectors—will have significant global impacts, yielding perhaps some potential positives. Trump’s methods may be combative but they are drawing attention to longstanding imbalances—especially with China—that other nations, including India, have also faced but were reluctant to confront.

More fundamentally, Trump has forced a recalibration of globalisation. For example, by forcing conversations around fairer trade, Trump has helped shift global discourse from “free trade at any cost” to “strategic and fair trade”. Furthermore, Trump’s thrust on rebalancing trade relationships might drive the global trading system towards more equitable norms.

Or consider Trump’s defence burden-sharing call to NATO and US allies. His tough talk on NATO spending has jolted some allies into increasing their defence budgets, especially those below the 2 per cent GDP target. This is likely to foster greater military self-reliance among European allies, allowing the US to shift attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific, a region that will shape the new global order.

As US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has put it, Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” so that the US prioritises “deterring war with China in the Pacific.” The White House’s blunt message is that Europe, reliant on the US for its security, must shape up before many of the more than 100,000 American troops stationed there begin to be shipped out for likely deployment in the Indo-Pacific.

Europe’s realisation that it cannot indefinitely rely on the US for its security is likely to strengthen EU-led defence efforts, encouraging a more autonomous yet cooperative NATO. A more balanced transatlantic security architecture might make Europe not only more resilient and credible in deterring the threat it perceives from Russia but also boost its geopolitical weight globally.

Trump, meanwhile, is shaking up global institutions, whose relevance for today’s world has declined in the absence of tangible reforms. If reforms do occur due to the Trump-induced “shock”, multilateral institutions could emerge more effective, trusted and capable of dealing with 21^st-century challenges.

Trump’s critiques of organisations like the UN, WHO and WTO—while often harsh—have highlighted inefficiencies and political biases. Constructive US-led pressure might spur much-needed reform or modernisation and encourage international organisations, many of which were established after World War II, to be more transparent and accountable.

Trump’s emphasis on increased domestic oil and gas production also carries a global impact, delivering a potential positive for major energy-importing economies like Japan and India. He wants the US oil and gas industry to “drill, baby, drill” in pursuit of his strategy to achieve US energy independence. But this push, coupled with his tariffs—while carrying significant economic and strategic implications for the US—is also driving down international oil prices.

Trump’s focus on US energy dominance (via deregulation and fossil fuel production) is likely to mean greater US leverage in global energy markets. Increased US supply will help stabilise global oil prices and give Western allies more options beyond OPEC or Russian supply.

Ironically, Trump’s policies, by pushing down international oil prices, are likely to slow US investment in drilling this year. With US crude oil prices down more than 20 per cent since Trump’s second term began, it is becoming unprofitable for many American companies to boost production, especially as concerns grow over a recessionary slowdown.

However, Trump’s most profound (but least talked-about) move is to achieve US strategic decoupling from China. It signals a fundamental reorientation in American policy that could, if evolved steadily, help reshape the global order in ways that might be beneficial not just for the US but also for the wider world.

The Trump administration is beginning to take a tough approach towards China, America’s main challenger at the global level. Despite its deepening economic woes, China continues to flex its muscles, including conducting provocative military drills off Taiwan, Australia and Vietnam recently and propping up a terrorism-exporting Pakistan against India. China’s military standoff with India since 2020 has still not been fully defused.

America’s strategy in Asia for more than a century sought a stable balance of power to prevent the rise of any hegemon. Yet successive US presidents, from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, actively aided the rise of China, hoping that its emergence would be peaceful and that it would cooperate with America to address common challenges and mutual interests. Even after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the US, instead of sustaining trade sanctions against China, decided to integrate the country into global institutions.

It was Trump who, in his first term, ended the 45-year, China-friendly US approach. He launched a trade war with tariffs on Chinese goods; restricted Chinese tech firms like Huawei and ZTE from American markets; pushed allies to scrutinise Chinese investment and influence (for example, 5G infrastructure); and highlighted China’s unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft and state subsidies.

Now, in his second term, Trump is seeking to give teeth to his strategy to rein in China’s expansionist rise. A recent Trump-signed memorandum on America’s investment policy was more about the China threat than about anything else.

The Trump administration is also seeking to restrict allies’ ability to sign trade agreements with China, “a non-market economy”, without full consultations with Washington. Some 23 years after China joined the WTO with the help of then US President Bill Clinton, Washington still refuses to recognise that country as a market economy given the distortion caused by its rampant state subsidies.

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in Trump’s first term, already has an article that requires a USMCA party to give the other two signatories 30 days’ notice before signing a deal with a non-market economy. It also permits the US or other partners to withdraw from the trilateral North American pact within six months of one of them inking a deal with a non-market economy. But now Trump is seeking to further tighten this restriction, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney appears willing to accept Beijing’s offer to negotiate a bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA) with Ottawa.

The US is seeking to use its trade prowess to negotiate or revise trade deals with various countries in ways that could help isolate China. “Everyone is coming to the table, and basically, China is surrounded,” according to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

Another example is the Trump administration’s effort to impede China’s AI advances by blocking advanced chip exports to it. The crackdown is on billions of dollars of exports of processors from American companies such as Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices, which have facilitated major Chinese advances in AI. The Chinese AI startup DeepSeek apparently used US chips to create powerful AI models.

Trump’s policies, meanwhile, are accelerating a reassessment of US dependence on China in critical sectors, from pharmaceuticals to rare earths. And by highlighting the tech rivalry with China, Trump is seeking to boost US and allied investment in domestic semiconductor production and AI.

Such actions hold significant international implications, including spurring a healthier, more competitive global tech ecosystem. Even greater US supply chain resilience and reinvigoration of American industries will mean broader impacts.

Trump’s decoupling, in fact, is serving as a wake-up call for other countries, many of which are realising how reliant they are on China—not just for consumer goods but critical items like medical supplies and semiconductors. Trump’s actions are jolting supply chains towards greater diversification. Indeed, his tough stance has given cover to Australia, India, the European Union (EU) and others to assert their own red lines with China, thereby setting in motion a process to establish a more balanced global playing field.

CAN INDIA BENEFIT?

Trump’s approach to reshaping international geopolitics and geo-economics could engender significant changes, some of which would be beneficial to India’s interests. While his methods have been controversial, some potential positive outcomes should not be discounted.

Trump has forced global conversations about trade imbalances and intellectual property theft and about the imperative to diversify supply chains away from reliance on single countries in order to enhance economic resilience and reduce vulnerabilities. By insisting on a more equitable distribution of defence costs and responsibilities, he is compelling a recalibration of US alliances, while seeking new allies like India that, as independent military powers, are not a burden on America.

By focusing on bilateral relationships, as opposed to multilateral frameworks, Trump allows for more direct and tailored agreements that better serve individual national interests. The trade deals Washington is currently negotiating with India and other key economies illustrate the focus on bilateral arrangements.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s more confrontational stance towards Beijing’s territorial claims and economic practices has forced a reassessment of China’s role in the international system. This is a potentially positive development for India. So also is the Trump-initiated focus on national sovereignty in international relations, which could give nations more flexibility to address their specific security needs.

A transactional approach to international relations might create pragmatic partnerships based on shared interests rather than ideological alignment. And the emphasis on energy independence could stabilise global energy markets if it leads to increased oil and gas production in the US.

A major beneficiary of the Trump-triggered lower international oil prices is India, the world’s third-largest primary energy consumer after China and the US, and the largest source of global oil demand growth. India is a highly attractive market for a US administration that is committed to increasing domestic oil and gas production and boosting energy exports.

Trump’s approach often breaks with diplomatic norms but his policies or moves are sparking debates on key questions of relevance to India. Should any country depend so heavily on a geopolitical rival like China, the world’s largest autocracy? Is it healthy for Europe to outsource its defence to the US indefinitely? Can globalisation be retooled to benefit middle-class workers, not just multinationals? And can trade be tied to environmental sustainability?

India can learn from some of the Trump administration policies or actions. For example, India should be seeking a healthy economic interdependence with China, not perpetuating a one-sided economic dependence. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has run a huge trade deficit with China that it has partly offset by running a large trade surplus with the US. But with Trump intent on closing all of America’s bilateral trade deficits, India might finally resort to raising tariffs on imports from China.

Unlike other major Asian economies, India imports far more than it exports. India has a more domestically oriented economy that relies on domestic consumption, not exports, for its growth. Meanwhile, the rupee’s fall since late last year has increased India’s weekly import bill by billions of dollars. But the boost to export competitiveness from the rupee’s fall has been marginal because many Indian exports rely on imported inputs.

While Trump is determined to cut America’s trade deficit with the rest of the world, India has its own trade deficit to worry about. The only major economy with which India has a trade surplus is the US. America’s global trade deficit, at $1.2 trillion, is the world’s largest, but it amounts to less than 4 per cent of its economy. By contrast, India—dependent heavily on energy and arms imports—runs a global trade deficit worth about 10 per cent of its economy.

Trump’s move to cut waste, fraud and corruption by downsizing the federal bureaucracy has set up an example for India to emulate. India’s red tape is proverbial. India’s excessive bureaucracy and bureaucratic processes significantly hinder progress and efficiency while promoting waste and corruption.

It is notable that the MAGA (Make America Great Again) and MAHA (Make America Healthy Again) movements have converged within the Trump administration. US Health Secretary and MAHA guru, Robert F Kennedy Jr, is getting food manufacturers to remove artificial dyes from their products as he seeks to reform the food industry which, by selling ultra-processed foods and employing petroleum-based food colourings, has made Americans obese and contributed to major diseases, from diabetes to heart ailments. India faces similar health challenges. But who will launch a ‘Make India Healthy Again’ movement?

Chinese President Xi JinpingDonald Trumpglobal tradeJoe BidenSuper Economiestrade tariffUS-China