Divided Over Gaza

REFRESH. REFRESH. REFRESH. The news in Israel changes by the minute. Blink, and you have missed something important—only for it to be replaced moments later by another breaking update. In this small country of 10 million people, staying informed means constantly refreshing your browser. Most people are waiting for the release of the 50 hostages still in Gaza. The most painful headlines are those marked ‘Allowed for Publication’—a phrase that usually means a soldier has died in Gaza. These announcements are often accompanied by a photograph of a 19-year-old boy who could easily be one of my son’s friends. Our hearts break each time.

Israeli soldiers are not distant figures—they are our sons and daughters. As the war drags on and more lives are lost, a growing cry echoes across the country: Enough—Stop the War.

On July 11, 2025, the New York Times (NYT) published an article titled ‘How Netanyahu Prolonged the War in Gaza to Stay in Power’. It alleged that during negotiations with Hamas, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu introduced new demands, with his primary objective being to preserve his political position—even when the military leadership sup­ported moving forward with an agreement. In response, Netanyahu’s office dismissed the NYT report as defamatory and politically motivated.

Supporting the NYT accusations were interviews with former members of Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency) who were involved in the negotiations with Hamas, and they revealed that a deal could have been reached if not for Netanyahu’s interference. On the other hand, White House officials support­ed Netanyahu and claimed that it was Hamas—not Israel—that undermined the negotiations by introducing unrealistic demands. Others claim that Netanyahu wishes to prolong the war and postpone the court hearings and legal proceedings against him.

Regardless of the ceasefire negotiations, Netanyahu’s coalition government collapsed last week—but not because of his far-right allies, Smotrich and Ben Gvir, who had been pressuring him to continue the war and achieve a “Big Victory”. Instead, it was the Ultra-Orthodox parties that walked away. The Ultra-Orthodox parties claim that on their joining the coalition, Netanyahu had promised to pass legislation that would exempt Ultra-Orthodox boys from mandatory military service. In Israel, the law requires all citizens, both men and women, to enlist in the military at 18. While exemptions are granted in special cases, the majority are drafted. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are considered the “people’s army”, built on a model of compulsory service lasting two to three years. After com­pleting active duty, most soldiers join the reserves where they are called up for a few weeks each year, typically until the age of 40 or 50.

The Ultra-Orthodox community opposes military service for its members. Their official explanation is that they contribute to the security of the country through prayer—believing that their devotion ensures divine protection for the State of Israel. However, the unofficial reason is more pragmatic: once a young man is drafted, there is a significant chance he will leave the Ultra-Orthodox way of life and not return to the community. Preserving control over their followers—spiritually, socially, and economically—is a central concern. Power, in this context, also means money. Ultra-Orthodox political par­ties secure generous government funding for various social programmes by arguing that their constituents are engaged in full-time religious study and therefore cannot work to support their families. These subsidies include allowances for kindergartens, schools, and yeshivas—advanced institutions where Ultra-Orthodox boys study Jewish texts. Within the community, yeshiva study is a mark of spiritual achievement and social status. In many Ultra-Orthodox households, it is the women who earn the primary income, and they often see it as a privilege that their husbands are devoted to religious study. However, a growing problem is that many Ultra-Orthodox men neither attend yeshiva nor enter the workforce, and expect the country to support them.

The precedent for exempting Ultra-Orthodox men from military service was set by the first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. At the time, the decision seemed minor—only around 400 individuals requested exemptions to continue their religious studies. However, over the decades, the numbers have grown significantly. Today, there are approximately 90,000 Ultra-Orthodox men of recruitment age.

In a military facing increased demands for personnel—particularly in light of the ongoing war in Gaza and mounting tensions on Israel’s northern front—such a largescale exemption has become untenable. The IDF, in urgent need of manpower, can no longer justify allowing tens of thousands of eligible recruits to avoid service solely for yeshiva study. While the government was engaged in negotiations to secure draft exemptions for the Ultra-Orthodox, the IDF Chief of Staff issued additional call-up orders for reservists and announced an extension of mandatory service for combat soldiers. The inequality in bearing the national burden became stark. As thousands of secular and non-Orthodox Israelis continued to risk their lives and extend their service, an entire seg­ment of the population was seeking to remain exempt—deepening public frustration and widening social divides.

On the eve of Operation Rising Lion against Iran, the Ultra-Orthodox parties threatened to leave the government. Aware that a political crisis at such a critical moment could jeopardise the operation, Netanyahu was compelled to disclose the gravity of the situation. Only after understanding what was at stake, those parties withdrew their threat. However, once the operation was concluded, they renewed the demand for legislation that would formally exempt Ultra-Orthodox men from military service. This time, they pushed for a clear and unconditional law. In response, the opposi­tion, along with voices from within the coalition, firmly opposed such a law—insisting that if any legislation were passed, it must include mandatory recruitment quotas and penalties for draft evasion. MK Yuli Edelstein, head of the parliamentary defence committee and a senior member of Netanyahu’s Likud Party, refused to approve the terms demanded by the Ultra-Orthodox parties. He came under pressure from reservists and their spouses who viewed the proposed exemption as a direct affront to the principle of equal burden-sharing.

Since October 7, 2023, the Israeli army has been operating under

immense strain, with many reservists serving over 400 or even 500 days. These individuals have families, careers, and lives that have been put on hold. In Israel, when you are summoned for military service, including reserve duty, it is mandatory; refusal is not an option or you will be jailed. As a result, thousands have found themselves caught between national duty and personal sacrifice. In response to this growing burden, a grassroots protest movement—led primarily by the spouses of reservists, many of them women—has emerged. Their message is clear: while their partners are being called to serve for unrea­sonable lengths of time, the government is simultaneously considering granting exemptions to the Ultra-Orthodox.

This is the backdrop of the political fall­out. Seen as too resistant to Ultra-Orthodox demands, Edelstein is now expected to lose his job. He is being voted out of the prestigious parliamentary defence committee, signalling a decline in his influence within Likud. Elections in Israel are supposed to take place in early 2026, but the million-dollar question remains: Will Netanyahu survive politically till then? Currently, he holds only a narrow majority, making his position increasingly fragile. However, the Israeli par­liament has now entered its summer recess which will last until September, giving him a critical two-month window to negotiate an amicable solution with the Ultra-Orthodox parties and bring them back into his coalition.

Even outside the coalition, Ultra-Orthodox parties are unlikely to support a motion to dissolve the Knesset. They recognise that if new elections are called, opposition parties are expected to be even less accommodating of their demands. For them, Netanyahu may still be the least unfavourable option.

The opposition is currently weak and fragmented. There are five main parties in the centre-left bloc, not including the Arab parties. But instead of uniting to form a cohesive front against Netanyahu’s fragile coalition, each party is focused on proving that it alone is best positioned to lead and ultimately defeat him. This has significantly weakened the opposition’s ability to present a credible alternative or capitalise on the government’s vulnerability.

In recent weeks, numerous polls have been conducted to gauge public opinion on the most suitable candidate for Israel’s next prime minister. Naturally, the results vary depending on the news outlet conducting the poll. In one such survey, Naftali Bennett ranked as the leading candidate. Bennett, a former prime minister who briefly held office in 2021-22, comes from the rightwing camp. He recently launched a new party and now faces a tight deadline to compile a candidate list for the upcoming Knesset elections. However, his history of forming po­litical teams is troubled. Many individuals he previously brought into his party later turned on him. As the election nears, one of his biggest challenges will be to choose loyal and reliable candidates who will bolster his position, rather than repeat past mistakes.

On the far left of the political spectrum are the Arab parties, which face challenges similar to those of the broader centre-left bloc. Despite representing roughly 20 per cent of Israel’s popula­tion, these parties have failed to unite into a cohesive bloc that could meaningfully support the centre-left. Instead of merging into a single, influential party capable of amplifying the Arab voice in Israeli poli­tics, they remain fragmented, weakening their overall impact and political leverage.

In Israel, the political divide is no longer defined strictly by right and left, but rather by ‘Pro-Bibi’ and ‘Anti-Bibi’, referring to Netanyahu. Most of Israel’s mainstream media outlets are critical of Netanyahu, with the notable exception of Channel 14, a television station owned by one of his prominent supporters. One of the few media outlets taking a firm stand against Netanyahu and the continuation of the war in Gaza is the Ha’aretz newspaper. Unlike most other Israeli media, Ha’aretz consistently reports on the suffering of Gazans, offering coverage that aligns more closely with what is seen in international news. It often feels as though the rest of the Israeli media practises a form of self-censorship, avoiding stories that portray the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Meanwhile, a growing protest movement is beginning to take shape, calling for an end to the war. More and more people are coming to believe that Hamas cannot be defeated by military force alone—for every militant killed, others are swiftly recruit­ed. At this stage, a rising chorus insists that the solution must be diplomatic, not military. For now, the political landscape remains uncertain. Netanyahu’s government is hanging by a thread, the opposition is fragmented, and public frustration is growing. Ceasefire negotiations continue behind closed doors, leaving hostage families in a constant state of anxiety—caught in a cycle of hope and disappointment. Refresh. Refresh. Refresh.

coalition collapsedHa’aretzIsraelIsrael-Palestine conflictNetanyahuultra-orthodox