Water and Blood Cannot Flow Together

Operation Sindoor was a decisive Indian military and diplomatic campaign launched in May 2025 in response to a brutal cross-border terrorist attack in Pahalgam (Kashmir) that killed 26 civilians. India justified the operation as a defensive, pre-emptive strike against terrorism emanating from Pakistan – and allegedly backed by China – vowing that any future terror attack would be treated as an act of war. The conflict was brief but intense, involving Indian missile strikes deep into Pakistani territory and Pakistan’s attempted counterattacks.

Although active hostilities ceased within days, India emerged determined to address not only the immediate security threats but also broader strategic challenges.

India framed Operation Sindoor as a constrained yet resolute counter-terrorism measure aimed at neutralizing militant camps in Pakistan before they could strike again. The government stressed that the operation targeted nine high-value terrorist infrastructure sites – including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed hubs in Bahawalpur, Muridke, Muzaffarabad, Kotli, etc. – with “calibrated, precise, and strategically restrained” strikes. Care was taken to focus on terrorist targets and avoid civilian casualties, underscoring that the action was defensive in nature.

Prime Minister Modi, in a televised address, declared that terrorism will be met with decisive force and that “water and blood cannot flow together”, ruling out any dialogue or trade with Pakistan until cross-border terror ceases. To pre-empt international misgivings, New Delhi launched a proactive diplomatic blitz: seven multi-party parliamentary delegations fanned out to 33 global capitals to explain India’s position and present evidence of Pakistan’s terror sponsorship.

These delegations – comprising senior MPs across party lines – emphasized India’s zero-tolerance for terrorism and the united political consensus behind the operation. By engaging key countries (especially all UN Security Council members) directly, India sought to shape the narrative and ensure the global community viewed Operation Sindoor as a legitimate counter-terror action rather than unwarranted aggression.

Western and Northern Fronts – Pakistan and China: 

In Op Sindoor’s wake, India’s already fraught ties with Pakistan sank to a new low. Militarily, the strikes inflicted heavy damage – India destroyed multiple Pakistani radar stations and 11 military installations (air bases and depots) within hours, reportedly knocking out 20% of Pakistan’s air force infrastructure. This “shock and awe” offensive compelled Pakistan to opt for a ceasefire on May 10, 2025. Yet Islamabad’s covert support for proxy militants is unlikely to vanish; Indian officials warn that any future attack will be met even more forcefully.

A humiliated Pakistan faces internal and external headwinds: domestically, the civilian and military leadership came under fire for the intelligence failure and the subsequent drubbing; externally, Pakistan found scant sympathy for its position (with most nations endorsing India’s right to self-defense). Isolated and weakened, Islamabad has leaned harder on Beijing – its “all-weather” ally – for diplomatic and military succour. Indeed, within days of the ceasefire, Pakistan’s officials rushed to China, seeking political backing and possibly expedited arms deliveries.

China’s stance has been a critical factor shaping India’s security calculus on the northern frontier. Beijing tacitly backed Pakistan throughout the crisis, even as it publicly calls for “restraint.” Hours after India’s strikes, China’s Foreign Ministry pointedly labelled Operation Sindoor “regrettable”, refusing to acknowledge the terrorist provocation that precipitated it. This calibrated rebuke signalled Beijing’s priority: shielding its junior partner Pakistan over condemning terrorism. China’s reaction – expressing regret at India’s actions while staying silent on the Pahalgam massacre – drew sharp Indian criticism for its double standards.

Strategically, the episode underscores the growing two-front challenge India faces. Intelligence reports indicated some of the swarms of drones and missiles Pakistan deployed during the conflict were of Chinese origin (alongside Turkish-made UAVs). India had to remain alert to the possibility of Chinese military posturing on the Himalayan border while engaged in the west – though a direct northern flare-up was averted this time. In Beijing’s strategic calculus, Pakistan’s stability is key to keeping India bogged down in South Asia; conversely, Chinese weaponry’s poor performance against Indian defenses in this episode (e.g. Pakistani HQ-9 air defense batteries supplied by China were reportedly ineffective) was an embarrassment. In sum, Operation Sindoor has likely hardened China’s determination to bolster Pakistan and to keep strategic pressure on India’s northern frontier (e.g. continued PLA deployments along the Line of Actual Control) – a significant headwind for New Delhi’s security planners.

Eastern Flank and the Islamic World: 

India’s eastern borders (with Bangladesh and Myanmar) remained largely unaffected militarily by Operation Sindoor, but geopolitical ripple effects extend to the broader Islamic world. Pakistan attempted to rally Muslim-majority countries and forums (like the OIC) against India, casting the operation as an assault on a Muslim nation. This met with mixed results. Traditionally staunch allies such as Turkey and Azerbaijan strongly condemned India’s strikes “raising the risk of an all-out war” and decried civilian casualties.

Turkish President Erdoğan’s government, which harbours ideological affinity with Pakistan, chastised India’s “provocative steps” and even backed Islamabad’s call for an “investigation” into the Pahalgam attack (implicitly questioning India’s claims). Such rhetoric led New Delhi to issue sharp rejoinders; Indian diplomats privately warned Ankara against encouraging Pakistan’s revisionism, urging it instead to press Pakistan on dismantling terror camps.

By contrast, the Arab Gulf states – traditionally cautious about India-Pakistan disputes – largely supported India’s position. The UAE and Saudi Arabia both denounced the Pahalgam terror attack and affirmed India’s right to self-defense, reflecting the Gulf’s deepening strategic ties with New Delhi. Even Qatar (often aligned with broader Islamic causes) chose to emphasize that terrorism is unacceptable and acknowledged India’s actions, while diplomatically urging de-escalation. Notably, Iran’s President personally called PM Modi to offer condolences and discuss regional counterterror cooperation. These responses illustrate a shift in the Islamic world’s diplomatic landscape: economic interests and counterterror pragmatism with India are, for many, outweighing religious solidarity with Pakistan. Maintaining goodwill with key Muslim-majority partners while countering Pakistan’s propaganda remains a soft-power challenge going forward.

Relations with the West: 

India has thus far succeeded in garnering broad understanding from Western powers, but not without caveats. The United States, under President Donald Trump (as per this scenario), firmly backed India – “India has a sovereign right to combat terrorism” the U.S. President stated, endorsing Operation Sindoor’s legitimacy. (Senior U.S. officials did quietly emphasize the importance of both sides avoiding further escalation, given the nuclear stakes.)

Across the Atlantic, major European nations echoed support: France’s President Emmanuel Macron offered “strong solidarity” and vowed to “continue the fight against terrorism wherever necessary,” effectively legitimizing India’s counter-strike. The UK’s Foreign Minister condemned the terror attack and noted “India has every reason to be outraged”, with former PM Rishi Sunak adding that no democracy should tolerate such terrorism. The EU collectively stated that every nation has the right to protect its citizens from terror.

These affirmations suggest that Western governments, viewing India as a crucial partner, largely sided with New Delhi’s narrative of a limited, necessity-driven operation. However, Western support is not unconditional: there were subtle reminders about humanitarian impact. For instance, when reports (amplified by Pakistani sources) emerged of civilian casualties – at least 31 people, including a child, were killed in India’s strikes, according to Pakistani officials – Western diplomats privately pressed India to conclude operations swiftly and avoid broader war.

Going forward, a key headwind will be maintaining this goodwill. India’s democratic image and adherence to international norms will influence the degree to which Western nations continue to diplomatically support India in forums like the UN. Nonetheless, Operation Sindoor’s outcome – effectively dismantling terror hubs while averting a full-fledged war – has bolstered India’s credibility with many Western policymakers as a responsible power that can act tough against terror yet remain measured.

Economic and Strategic Transformation: 

India’s resolve in Operation Sindoor coincides with its long-term aspiration to transform into a developed nation by 2047 – the centenary of independence. Prime Minister Modi has explicitly declared this goal, and policymakers have charted ambitious parallel agendas to make India a top-tier economic and military power.

As of mid-2025, India is on the verge of becoming the world’s third-largest economy, buoyed by two decades of rapid growth and a GDP that PwC projects could surpass Japan and Germany before 2030. Indeed, by some measures (such as purchasing power parity), India already ranks third globally. This economic rise provides essential heft for India’s strategic plans, but it also comes with vulnerabilities that Operation Sindoor has thrown into sharp relief.

To achieve “developed country” status by 2047, India must sustain high growth and undertake major structural reforms. The government’s blueprint focuses on transitioning from an agrarian, informal economy to one led by manufacturing, services, and technology. Massive investments in infrastructure, education, and digital innovation are underway.

Heightened military tensions risk diverting budgetary resources from development to defense. Additionally, regional instability can deter foreign investment and tourism – for example, the Pahalgam attack and subsequent skirmishes prompted temporary travel advisories and a short-lived dip in market confidence.

Encouragingly for New Delhi, the swift resolution of the conflict and global support for its counter-terror stance mean investor sentiment has largely held firm. India’s economy remains one of the fastest-growing, projected to expand around 6%+ annually, which if maintained, keeps the 2047 developed-nation target within reach.

Building a Robust Military-Industrial Base: 

A central pillar of India’s strategic transformation is the drive for military self-reliance – reducing dependence on foreign arms and becoming a defense exporter. Operation Sindoor, in fact, became a showcase for Made-in-India weaponry, giving this goal a significant boost. During the campaign, India deployed indigenous systems like the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and Akash surface-to-air defense missiles to great effect. Indian forces intercepted Pakistani drone and missile attacks using locally developed D4 anti-drone systems, allowing very few enemy projectiles through.

These successes were highlighted by PM Modi, who lauded that “the credibility of our made-in-India weapons was firmly established” on the battlefield. Indeed, by neutralizing swarms of Turkish/Chinese-made drones and striking targets with precision munitions, Indian technology proved its mettle against top-end threats. This vindication is likely to accelerate India’s military-industrial ambitions. Already, defense production had been rising – India’s defense exports hit a record ₹23,600 crore ($2.8 B) in 2024–25, marking a 12% jump from the previous year.

The government’s Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) initiative is pushing for even bigger milestones, aiming for ₹3 lakh crore in defense manufacturing by 2029. Key projects include indigenous fighter aircraft (the Tejas and upcoming AMCA), new warships and submarines, and joint ventures for engines and high-tech components. The headwinds here involve technological and financial hurdles – absorbing advanced technologies and ramping up production capacity will require sustained investment and often foreign partnerships.

Moreover, while Operation Sindoor demonstrated indigenous capabilities, it also exposed gaps that India is racing to fill (for instance, the need for more sophisticated UAVs and surveillance systems, where imports are still needed). Balancing rapid military modernization with fiscal prudence will be crucial; nonetheless, the operation’s outcome has strengthened domestic political will to invest in defense R&D and infrastructure, on the premise that strategic autonomy is worth the price.

Energy Security and Infrastructure Resilience: 

Another transformational goal for India is to secure its growing economy’s energy needs while safeguarding critical infrastructure from disruptions. India is the world’s third-largest energy consumer, and its dependence on imported oil and gas has long been seen as a strategic vulnerability. The government has articulated plans to achieve energy self-reliance through a multi-pronged approach: expanding renewable energy (targeting 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030), increasing domestic coal and oil production marginally, and investing in nuclear power (with a bold plan for 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047).

Equally important is diversifying import sources – a strategy that paid dividends recently when India could buffer global oil price shocks by buying discounted crude from Russia, the Middle East, etc. Operation Sindoor underscores the importance of energy security: during the conflict, India temporarily put the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and warned of revisiting trade ties, signalling it is unafraid to leverage economic tools.

Conversely, a protracted conflict could have threatened energy transit routes or critical infrastructure (for example, Pakistan could attempt to target refineries or power grids). Thus, India is doubling down on critical infrastructure resilience. The country’s power grid operators and nuclear plant operators were on high alert during the crisis amid fears of Pakistani cyber-attacks or sabotage attempts. Cybersecurity, in particular, has emerged as a vital component of infrastructure defense: officials reported a spike in Pakistani hacker activity probing Indian government and financial networks in the hours after the operation.

Experts warned that “there’s a high risk of cyber-attacks on India’s digital infrastructure” and urged immediate hardening of systems. India has since issued advisories to banks, power utilities, and telecom providers to fortify their cyber defenses, and ramped up staffing at its CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team). Additionally, the military is investing in redundancy and protection for critical assets – e.g. dispersing space communication nodes, shielding power grids, and installing anti-drone systems around vital facilities. These moves, while costly, are seen as non-negotiable to ensure that economic growth is not derailed by hybrid warfare tactics.

In sum, India’s march toward developed-country status is intimately tied to creating a security architecture (military, energy, cyber) that can withstand external shocks. Operation Sindoor, by highlighting both strengths (indigenous defense tech) and vulnerabilities (cyber and drone threats), has injected urgency into this aspect of India’s 2047 vision.

Ideological and Soft Power Headwinds:

Beyond the tangible military and economic spheres, India faces a complex battle of narratives on the global stage. In the 21st century, international influence is often wielded through “soft power” levers – and for India, a key headwind is the portrayal of its domestic politics and society in global indices and discourse.

Critics and rival states increasingly weaponize issues like democracy, human rights, press freedom, and minority rights to challenge India’s moral standing, especially as India grows in stature. Following Operation Sindoor, New Delhi anticipates an intensification of this ideological contest: successful as the operation was, detractors may seek to delegitimize India’s actions by painting the government as authoritarian or intolerant, thereby undercutting the credibility of its security decisions.

Global indices often paint a grim picture of India’s socio-political conditions. In the 2025 World Happiness Report, for instance, India ranked 118th – far below many smaller or poorer nations.

Global Indices as a Narrative Tool: 

A slew of international indices in recent years have cast India in a negative light on metrics of democracy, freedom, corruption, gender equity, and happiness. Indian policymakers note that these rankings, produced by Western think-tanks or NGOs, are frequently cited in diplomatic forums and media to benchmark India’s governance. In many cases, India’s rankings have declined despite its economic progress. For example, Freedom House – the U.S.-based democracy watchdog – downgraded India from “Free” to “Partly Free” in 2021 and has kept it there. In its 2024 report, Freedom House scored India only 66 out of 100 on aggregate freedom (with sharp criticism of alleged discrimination against minorities, curbs on journalists and NGOs, and abuse of state institutions for political ends).

The latest 2025 Freedom House score for India slipped further to 63/100, reflecting continued concern over civil liberties. Likewise, press freedom rankings have raised alarms: Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2024 placed India at 159th out of 180 countries, an “unacceptable” ranking for the world’s largest democracy. (India’s press freedom score has steadily worsened from 140th in 2014 to 159th – and was 161st the year prior.)

On corruption, India’s standing is mediocre: Transparency International’s 2023 index put India at 93rd of 180 (score 39/100), indicating persistent perceptions of graft in the public sector. The Global Gender Gap index (WEF) 2023 ranked India 127th of 146, highlighting large disparities in women’s economic and political participation. And as the image above shows, India fares poorly even on metrics like citizen happiness – ranking 118th globally in 2025, below several less developed nations.

Indian officials contend that such indices are not merely benign research – rather, they function as soft power instruments that shape international narratives and can be leveraged to pressure governments. There is a growing feeling in New Delhi’s strategic circles that a concerted narrative is being crafted to portray India as backsliding on liberal values, in turn undermining its diplomatic capital.

For instance, Western legislators or media often cite these indices to question India’s suitability for leadership roles (say, a permanent UNSC seat) or to demand concessions (“reform your domestic policies if you want closer ties”). During the Operation Sindoor episode, India’s detractors (including Pakistan) eagerly pointed to India’s low rankings on freedom and human rights to argue that its actions in Kashmir or against terrorists were actually covers for oppressing minorities.

While most governments did not buy this argument in the face of clear provocation, the narrative battle continues in international civil society. Human rights organizations and some Western commentators amplified concerns about India’s communications blackout in parts of Kashmir during the conflict and past instances of political imprisonment, attempting to erode sympathy for India. This poses a real headwind: even as India defends itself against external threats, it must also defend its global image against what it sees as biased or hypocritical critiques.

The Soros Factor and Western NGO Influence: 

A significant element in India’s soft power tussle is the role of Western-funded advocacy networks, notably those associated with billionaire philanthropist George Soros and his Open Society Foundations (OSF). The BJP-led government has increasingly portrayed Soros’s “open vs. closed society” framework as a veneer for meddling in sovereign nations’ politics – and views itself as a prime target. Soros has openly criticized the Modi government, even suggesting in early 2023 that controversies like the Adani corporate scandal could trigger a “democratic revival” against Modi.

Such statements were perceived in New Delhi as calls for regime change. Top Indian officials consequently launched rhetorical counterattacks: External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar famously labelled Soros “an old, rich, opinionated…dangerous person” for seeking to shape India’s democratic processes. Likewise, Cabinet Minister Smriti Irani warned that Soros and affiliated outfits have “ill intentions” and are financing narratives to destabilize India.

These accusations are not without context. Investigations revealed that OSF and U.S. entities have funded various organizations that churn out reports critical of India. For example, the OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project) – which published exposés on the Pegasus spyware issue and allegations of corruption in the Adani Group – received funding from OSF and the U.S. State Department. The Indian government views such reports, which garnered global headlines, as part of a concerted effort to tarnish its reputation via the “open society” advocacy network.

Similarly, many of the democracy and rights indices mentioned earlier rely on data or testimony from local NGOs, some of which have foreign funding. The Modi government has tightened the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) to restrict foreign-funded NGOs, arguing this is necessary to block “political agendas under the garb of human rights”. High-profile organizations like Amnesty International’s India chapter have shut down operations after such funding crackdowns, sparking further international criticism – a cycle that feeds the very indices and narratives India disputes.

From India’s perspective, there is a clear continuity in the pressure mechanisms: Soros’s conceptual divide of “open societies” (aligned with liberal Western norms) vs “closed societies” is now echoed in some Western governmental stances. Western diplomats often frame global geopolitics as an ideological contest of democracies vs autocracies. While India is a democracy, it finds itself occasionally lumped into the “problematic” category due to these narrative battles. For instance, the U.S. Congress and European Parliament have seen bills/resolutions citing religious freedom or press freedom concerns in India – these can be traced indirectly to the influence of advocacy groups and indices that Soros and similar actors support.

The risk for India is that such narratives could translate into tangible diplomatic consequences: conditionalities in trade deals, reduced tech cooperation, or exclusion from sensitive partnerships on grounds of values. Already, India has had to engage in extensive public diplomacy – for example, sending members of Parliament to Gulf countries to counter Pakistan’s portrayal of India as anti-Islam, or briefing foreign journalists to rebut claims made by NGOs.

This is effectively a “second front” India must manage: the battle to ensure its own story (of being the world’s largest democracy improving lives and combating terror) is not drowned out by a chorus focusing only on its shortcomings. The government’s strategy includes highlighting India’s vibrant elections, its Covid vaccine outreach, development programs, and constitutional checks, to argue that India is an “open society” by any reasonable measure, albeit one that will not tolerate terrorism or secessionism.

Still, navigating this ideological minefield is a long-term challenge – India will need to show improvements on those very indices (or convincingly discredit them) to blunt their impact. In summary, as India’s hard power grows, so does the scrutiny of its soft power credentials, and managing global perceptions has become an essential part of its statecraft in the post-Sindoor world.

Multilateral Dynamics and India’s Global Role:

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, India’s engagement with multilateral institutions and coalitions has entered a delicate phase. The operation’s diplomatic handling demonstrated India’s ability to rally support, but it also highlighted the persistent constraints – particularly China’s veto and the geopolitical fault lines in forums where India seeks greater influence. How India frames its security operations and its narrative of national transformation will significantly affect its standing in bodies like the UN, G20, BRICS, and Quad, among others. Will India face diplomatic isolation for its assertiveness, or gain support as a responsible global actor combatting terrorism? Thus far, evidence leans toward the latter, but challenges loom.

Anticipating Pakistan’s outcry, India moved quickly to shape the UN response to the crisis. Thanks to its outreach to all UNSC members, the UNSC’s reaction was muted – there was no resolution condemning India. In fact, a non-permanent member (Panama) openly recognized India’s strikes as “legitimate efforts to counter terrorism”. The only critical voices in the UNSC were China (and to an extent its ally Russia, though Moscow was more neutral). China reportedly pushed for an emergency UNSC session. A closed-door consultation was held (at Beijing’s insistence), but it ended with no consensus statement – Western members blocked any censure of India, while China prevented any censure of Pakistan.

The UN Secretary-General called for restraint but also explicitly condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, aligning with India on the principle that terrorism is unjustifiable. Moreover, India deftly played offense on the diplomatic stage: at the UN, Indian envoys not only defended Operation Sindoor but also “called out Pakistan’s disinformation” on issues like the Indus Waters Treaty and highlighted Pakistan’s long record of sponsoring cross-border terror.

One notable moment came when India rebuffed a U.S. offer to mediate Kashmir – at the UN India asserted that the only pending issue is Pakistan vacating Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, rejecting any third-party role. This firm stance resonated with India’s supporters and signalled its confidence. Looking ahead, India’s push for a permanent UNSC seat (as part of broader UN reforms) could gain momentum if it continues to be seen as a net security provider. However, China’s opposition remains a hurdle – Beijing’s thinly veiled partiality during this crisis (calling India’s action regrettable but ignoring the terror trigger) has sharpened India’s argument that the UNSC’s credibility is hurt by P5 vetoes shielding terror sponsors.

India may leverage this to rally support among the General Assembly for terrorism-related norms or reform. The headwind here is clear: as long as China wields a veto, it can stymie institutional outcomes favouring India. Consequently, India will focus on cultivating a coalition of like-minded states within the UN to isolate Pakistan on terror issues (recently, India co-chaired a UN Global Counter-Terrorism Committee meeting emphasizing “zero tolerance” for cross-border terror, which gained broad assent). Maintaining this diplomatic support will depend on India upholding its image as a responsible democracy – which, as discussed, ties back to the soft power battle.

G20 and Global Economic Governance: 

In the G20, India’s stature has been on the rise, especially after its successful presidency in 2023 where New Delhi showcased itself as the voice of the Global South. Security issues like Operation Sindoor are not the G20’s remit per se, but they influence the diplomatic climate. Notably, none of the G7 powers in the G20 criticized India over the strikes; instead, many partnered with India to ensure development and counter-terror remained on the agenda. India’s narrative of being a mature democracy that handles its internal/external security while contributing to global goods played well.

During its G20 presidency, India had inserted strong language condemning terrorism in all forms, which in hindsight provided moral backing for its later actions. Going forward, India’s ability to achieve developed-country status by 2047 – making it possibly the world’s third-largest economy within this decade – means it will have an even bigger voice in global economic discussions.

The headwind to watch is whether geopolitical tensions (with China or fallout from any future Pakistan standoff) could hamper cooperation in forums like G20/IMF/WTO where consensus is needed. So far, India has adeptly balanced its alliances – working with Western nations on many issues while not alienating Russia or China on economic matters. But if another security crisis erupts, there’s a risk of diplomatic trade-offs: for example, Western patience could wear thin if conflicts recur frequently, potentially affecting negotiations (such as trade deals or technology partnerships) that India seeks with the EU or US. Conversely, a strong stance against terror enhances India’s standing among partners fed up with extremism. The broad support for Operation Sindoor indicates India is not isolated; if anything, it has more clout as a result of demonstrating that it can act decisively yet responsibly.

BRICS and the SCO: 

India’s membership in China-led groupings like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – now expanding) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) presents a mixed picture of support and strain. In BRICS, which primarily focuses on economic and developmental issues, Operation Sindoor was not formally discussed. However, the underlying India-China rift can cast a shadow. China’s and India’s leaders maintained a frosty distance at the BRICS summit following the conflict, though they cooperated on agreed agenda items.

Russia’s role is interesting – Moscow, a BRICS member, has close strategic ties with India and did express “deep concern” about the Indo-Pak escalation while stopping short of condemning India. Russia values both India and China and often tries to bridge gaps; in private, Russian officials acknowledged India’s security concerns even as they urged dialogue.

With the addition of new BRICS members in 2024 (like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, among others), India has more friendly voices in the bloc who supported it during Sindoor. This could dilute Chinese dominance in BRICS and prevent any anti-India posturing in the forum. The SCO, which includes India, Pakistan, China, and Central Asian states, is ostensibly about security cooperation – ironically, it became a venue for awkward encounters. After Sindoor, India used the SCO platform to pointedly raise the issue of terrorism emanating from Pakistan (without naming it outright, as SCO protocols frown on lateralization) and to push for stronger collective action against terror groups.

China and Pakistan were not receptive, and SCO statements remained anodyne. The headwind in SCO is that Pakistan, backed by China, will continue to thwart any meaningful SCO joint action that validates India’s stance. Nonetheless, India’s participation in such groups is part of its multi-alignment strategy; it won’t walk away, because being inside allows it to counter narratives and prevent adverse outcomes (for example, India blocked Pakistan’s attempt to insert Kashmir references in SCO documents). The net effect is that India must work with coalitions of both friends and rivals, requiring deft diplomacy to maintain support for its positions while containing the influence of adversaries in those settings.

Quad and Other Alliances: 

If one outcome of Operation Sindoor is to make India more cognizant of its adversaries’ alignment (i.e., Pakistan firmly in China’s camp), it also underscores the value of India’s partnerships with other major powers. The Quad – comprising India, the US, Japan, and Australia – is primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific and countering Chinese hegemonic moves. While the Quad doesn’t involve itself with South Asian crises directly, the trust and strategic interoperability built within the Quad likely benefited India during the Sindoor episode.

The U.S. and Japan, for instance, shared real-time intelligence with India when Pakistan’s missile launches were detected, according to media reports (though officially undisclosed). Japan’s defense minister openly condemned the terror attack and showed “unwavering solidarity” with India, reflecting the growing security bond. Australia, too, quietly supported India’s right to act. This tacit backing from the Quad members would be a tailwind for India in any future confrontation – it ensures that India will not face alone any concerted diplomatic assault from the West.

However, to keep this support strong, India will need to demonstrate continued commitment to the values the Quad espouses, including a free, open, rules-based order. Any significant departure in India’s domestic governance (e.g. perceived democratic erosion) could create discomfort in these partnerships. For now, though, India’s standing in the Quad and similar groupings (like the emerging I2U2 with Israel/UAE/US, or its deepening ties with Europe via trade talks) appears enhanced by the fact that it took on terrorists forcefully – aligning with the global narrative against terrorism. It’s worth noting that in parallel, India has maintained ties with Russia and others (through BRICS/SCO) – this balance, if managed well, means India can avoid over-reliance on any one bloc and reduce chances of isolation.

Avoiding Diplomatic Isolation: 

Ultimately, the degree of diplomatic isolation or support India faces will hinge on how it balances hard power actions with soft power narratives. Operation Sindoor was framed expertly as a counter-terror operation that any sovereign nation is entitled to undertake, and thus it garnered widespread international backing. Nations from Israel to Maldives, all condemned the terror attack and supported India’s pursuit of the perpetrators.

This global solidarity is a strategic asset that India must preserve. To do so, India is likely to continue investing in diplomatic capital: sending envoys, leveraging its diaspora to influence foreign opinion, and taking leadership roles in multilateral initiatives (for example, championing a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN, which India has long proposed).

India’s narrative of its own transformation – as a country lifting millions from poverty, digitizing its economy, and contributing to global public goods (like vaccines, disaster relief, peacekeeping) – will be emphasized to counter any attempts to sideline it over political concerns. There is also a realization in New Delhi that taking care of internal issues is now geopolitically imperative. This means addressing legitimate grievances (such as communal tensions or media freedom) so as not to give fodder to adversaries. In the ideal scenario, India’s rise to developed-nation status by 2047 will be accompanied by improvements in governance indices, blunting one set of headwinds.

However, if India were perceived as abandoning democratic principles or if future security operations were mishandled (e.g., causing mass civilian harm or escalating into war), the support could quickly wane. So far, Operation Sindoor is seen as a strategic success that balanced firmness and restraint – “legitimate and proportionate,” as many global leaders described it.

This has boosted India’s credibility in forums like the G20 and UN. The headwinds ahead will involve navigating a complex geopolitical landscape where India’s rise is not universally welcomed (China in particular will try to check India’s influence). Yet, India’s post-Sindoor posture – vigilant on security, assertive in diplomacy, and aspirational in development – positions it as a consequential power. The onus is on India to convert this stature into lasting influence, by continuing to act as a responsible stakeholder even as it unapologetically secures its interests. In conclusion, Operation Sindoor was a watershed that tested India on multiple fronts; the coming years will reveal if India can surmount the attendant headwinds and firmly take its place as a leading power by its 100th anniversary of independence.

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