A Turning Point in Qingdao

ON JUNE 26, China hosted the 22nd Defence Ministers’ Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Qingdao. The meeting discussed current global and regional geopolitical trends. It explored additional and alternative strategies to strengthen defence and security cooperation among the grouping, which comprises nine member states, three observer states, and 14 dialogue partners.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh, in his address, emphasised the importance of establishing a safe, secure, and stable SCO region, underscoring that peace and prosperity cannot coexist with terrorism. Those who sponsor, nurture, and exploit terrorism for their narrow and selfish interests face the consequences. Without explicitly naming Pakistan, he noted that some countries utilise cross-border terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, increasing the trust deficit among member nations.

Ironically, while the SCO Charter explicitly includes “combating terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations” as one of the grouping’s primary goals, the meeting laid bare the complex dynamics of SCO, with disagreements on terrorism dominating the forum. Reinforcing India’s commitment to fighting global terrorism, the Indian defence minister declined to sign the joint declaration, citing the omission of terrorism and regional security. He called for stronger language against terrorism, especially following the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam attack where 26 Indian tourists were killed based on their religious identity by The Resistance Front, a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a United Nations-designated terrorist organisation. India’s firm stance and objection to the joint statement, which aligned with the Pakistani narrative on Balochistan rather than with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, served to remind the member countries of the fundamental aim of SCO’s counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, it demonstrated New Delhi’s zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism and revealed Beijing’s regional ambitions to target India through this forum.

India’s firm position illustrates New Delhi’s capacity to pursue an independent strategic foreign policy focused on national interests, particularly significant in the current fragile multipolar global landscape. Similarly, in 2023, Delhi had declined to endorse a paragraph on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) because its flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which involves Chinese investments exceeding $62 billion, infringes on India’s sovereignty and integrity in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. However, the summit also highlighted China’s increasing influence in the SCO region, as most member countries, apart from India, have supported and engaged with China on BRI, strengthening and advancing Beijing’s interests.

In 1996, Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan established the ‘Shanghai Five’ to resolve border disputes through confidence-building measures, signing the 1997 Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces. China sought Russia’s assistance in negotiations over border issues with neighbouring Central Asian countries. After the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in September 1996, regional threats from Afghan-based terror groups increased, necessitating a joint approach. By July 1998, the Shanghai Five aimed to counter “separatism, extremism, and terrorism”, as outlined in Article 1 of the SCO Charter. At the 2001 SCO summit, the Af-Pak region was described as the “cradle of terrorism, extremism, and separatism,” with a continued emphasis on strengthening and rebuilding the counterterrorism network among SCO member states. Between 2001 and 2024, these nations signed multiple agreements and issued joint communiqués to address terrorism threats. SCO’s counterterrorism efforts were formalised and strengthened through an executive committee of the Regional Anti- Terror Structure (RATS), according to the SCO Charter. RATS trains security forces from SCO member states in counterterrorism operations, conducts drills and search operations, and maintains a database for information sharing with member countries and other international organisations. However, Beijing has obstructed Delhi’s attempts to improve communication on counterterrorism, as only Russian and Mandarin are used to maintain the terror-related database, despite India advocating for using English as one of the primary languages at SCO.

India, a strong advocate for anti-terrorism efforts within the SCO region, has emphasised the issue of state-sponsored terrorism. Nevertheless, these initiatives have seen limited success against Pakistan-based terrorist groups operating in Kashmir, primarily due to China’s covert support of Islamabad on regional and international platforms. Beijing views Pakistan-backed terror groups as crucial for security and geostrategic reasons, not only to protect its BRI and CPEC investments but also to maintain internal security on Xinjiang’s volatile northwestern frontier. After the February 16, 2019 attack in Pulwama by the Masood Azhar-led Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which resulted in over 40 security personnel being killed, Beijing maintained a technical hold at the UN Security Council on Azhar until May 2019. Beijing’s veiled backing of Pakistan’s terrorism against India has undermined SCO’s credibility and limited its capacity to speak in a unified voice against increasing terrorism in its member countries, considering the numerous terror attacks in Iran, Russia, and India over the past three years.

China has used SCO as a colonial tool to strengthen its hegemonic interests in member countries since its inception. Russia supported India’s SCO membership to counterbalance China and prevent the organisation from falling under Beijing’s influence. India joined SCO as a full member in 2017, aiming to directly address regional geopolitical, economic, strategic, and security challenges. However, Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine allowed Beijing to exploit SCO to leverage its strategic and geo-economic interests, thereby expanding its network of allies and increasing its regional influence. For example, Beijing has strengthened its strategic interests in Central Asian countries, founding members of SCO, on security issues to build a strong basis for a Pax Sinica in Eurasia. China established a military base in the Murghob district of Tajikistan, near the China-Afghanistan border, and has conducted numerous joint military exercises with Central Asian nations, either bilaterally or trilaterally, under the SCO framework.

Additionally, China has launched programmes to train Central Asian armies, supplied military technology assistance, and provided equipment. China has also begun to dominate SCO’s defence equipment market, which some countries utilise in terror activities against India. Most of the terror groups in Jammu & Kashmir are using Chinese customised equipment, similar to what Pakistani troops use, including highly encrypted telecom devices and Chinese encrypted messaging platforms.

Beijing’s dominance in this key regional forum has made SCO reluctant to counter the rising threat of terrorism. It has also prompted countries like India and Iran to carry out pre-emptive actions and raids against terrorists and their infrastructure in neighbouring nations. These measures are now viewed as essential for protecting citizens from terrorism. Additionally, Pakistan’s covert backing of state-sponsored terrorism has increased instability in the SCO region, making it more prone to conflicts and wars.

India’s refusal to endorse the SCO joint declaration and its unwavering stance on terrorism and sovereignty present a significant shift in its multilateral engagement strategy which seeks to prioritise its principled stand on terrorism and sovereignty. By challenging SCO’s silence on state-sponsored terrorism and its implicit endorsement of BRI projects violating Indian sovereignty, New Delhi has exposed the structural and political contradictions within SCO. However, this assertiveness also reflects the limitations of existing regional institutions, such as SCO, in addressing core security concerns when dominated by divergent strategic priorities and self-interest.

Defence MinisterIndia-China relationsIslamic radicalisationRajnath SinghShanghai Cooperation Organisationterrorism