Rajnath is right, Pak nukes must be monitored

When defence minister Rajnath Singh asked if an “irresponsible and rogue” nation like Pakistan be allowed to retain its nuclear weapons and whether the arsenal be placed under the custody of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) he was not merely making a rhetorical point.

Singh’s comments during an address to troops at the Badami Bagh cantonment at Srinagar on May 17 needs serious reflection, not the least by western nations, non-proliferation experts and political commentators who have failed to understand the need to make Pakistan accountable for its nukes.

Despite a mountain of evidence of Pakistan’s atomic weapons programme being built by stealth and theft from inception and its unenviable record as a proliferator who illicitly provided N knowhow to Iran, North Korea and Libya, Islamabad’s nuclear pile is neither subject to international scrutiny and safeguards or subject to any credible doctrine about its use.

Tellingly labelled a nuclear “Walmart,” Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear sales have been public knowledge ever since United Nations inspectors found a strong resemblance between Iran’s centrifuges and Pakistani designs. Trace particles of enriched Uranium connected the machines to the Pakistani programme. It transpired the transfer of technology goes back to the 1990s.

In the case of North Korea, there was a third link in the chain – China. The nuclear tech transfers followed North Korea sharing Chinese-origin Nodong missile technology with Pakistan leading to the development of missiles like Ghauri. Once the evidence began to pour in disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr A Q Khan confessed on television on February 4, 2004, to errors in judgement and accepted that the reported proliferations happened at his behest.

Some time after, Pakistan’s ruler at the time Gen Pervez Musharraf “pardoned” Dr Khan who was then placed under house arrest. In a later interview Musharraf, who’s ability to spout half-truths and self-serving lies would challenge an army of fact checkers, told an interviewer that the revelations were the most embarrassing moment of his tenure. He claimed to have “saved” Dr Khan and insisted he was confined to his residence in the interests of safety.

In Musharraf’s telling, it was all Dr Khan’s doing. “I was shown files with signatures and stamps of Khan Research Laboratories,” he said. Asked how did decades of nuclear smuggling happen under the eye of the Pakistan military, Musharraf blithely offered that nuclear technology is stored on computers, papers and in minds. So, Khan shipped centrifuge parts, designs and other stuff in chartered flights – in the case of North Korea till as late as 2002 – without the military getting a whiff.

The explanation would not convince a 5-year-old, but has been accepted by accommodating commentators who ponder insufficient evidence about just how many in Pakistan knew what was happening. If indeed the black market functioned without detection it is cause for grave alarm about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. If, as is much more probable, the nuclear sales were not the handiwork of Dr Khan and a half dozen scientists detained with him, Pakistan has been let off lightly.

The regularity and nonchalance with which Pakistani elites speak of nuclear weapons leads to western experts and commentators talk of “working” with the country and introduces an equivalence with India. This ignores New Delhi’s non-proliferation record and the fundamental difference that India’s civil and strategic programmes are under the control of democratically elected governments. Pakistan’s civilian governments may talk of nuclear deterrence but have no clue about the arsenal. It is the Pakistan army alone that is responsible for nuclear weapons and its record of deceit and subterfuge is not reassuring.

In the Pakistan Army playbook, the armed forces, the jihadi groups its nurtures and nuclear weapons are a “triad” that offers deterrence against India. One by one, these concepts have frayed. Operation Sindoor launched by India on May 7 showed jihadi camps are no longer “safe havens” and can be hit by missiles and drones without Indian forces having to cross the line of control or the international border.

Brandishing nuclear weapons may not work as India has told international interlocutors that it will not hold back if Pakistan escalates a conflict. And lastly, the Pakistan military’s chief rationale of being a bulwark against India is wearing thin. The Pakistani public opinion, fed on propaganda about the country’s “inherent” superiority over its neighbour, is happy to accept accounts of Indian jets being shot down with any evidence. But it is a fact that things did not go well for Pakistan.

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