Going after the Radicals

On July 15, the Supreme Court turned down a plea for interim bail moved by an accused in the Elgar Parishad case in connection with a meeting organised in Pune on December 31, 2017 which was linked to the Bhima-Koregaon violence that occurred on the outskirts of the city the next day on January 1. The rioting resulted in the death of one person and widespread arson. The organisers of the Pune event were accused by investigators of deliberately making provocative speeches and distributing Maoist material that led to heightened tensions and the clash the next day. The event purportedly equated Hindutva politics with the upper-caste “hegemony” of Peshwas, raking social divides that inflamed sentiment spitting Dalits against their alleged upper-caste oppressors by drawing on a battle fought at Koregaon in 1818. Rejecting the bail petition, the apex court refused to overturn an October 2022 order of the high court that found merit in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) case of a larger conspiracy scripted by the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI(Maoist), in the Elgar Parishad and the Bhima-Koregaon violence.

The Elgar Parishad investiga­tion that began after the violence in 2018 led to the arrests in June 2018 of several leading activists alleged to have links with Maoists, and thereafter more arrests followed in August. The probe continued with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-Shiv Sena alliance assum­ing office in late 2014, signalling political change in Maharashtra. The police and NIA investigations revealed a concerted effort to incite violence and disaffection against the Union government and a communication that discussed the possibility of targeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a roadshow. Since then the case has dragged on in court as defen­dants challenged the forensic evidence and raised a battery of legal objections to their arrest and incarceration. The investi­gation has held the accused to be members or sympathisers of the banned CPI(Maoist) who, while not wielding guns like their compatriots in the jungles of Bastar and Gadchiroli, are part of subversive activities defined as waging war against the state. The defendants accuse the government of targeting dissent and ideological opponents. At the heart of the matter is whether ‘urban Naxals’ is a bogey or a valid description of overground members and supporters who are part of the Maoist ecosystem that seeks the overthrow of the Indian state through violent revolution.

On July 11, Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis sought to answer some of these questions by tabling the Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024, that specifically aims to define “Urban Naxal” activities and make individuals and organisations liable for legal action. The menace of Naxalism, he said, is not confined to remote forested areas but increasing in urban areas through the activities of Naxal frontal organisations that provide support by way of logistics, safe houses and recruitment. Existing laws are inadequate to tackle the prob­lem, Fadnavis admitted, referring to the loopholes and ambiguities in legislation that prevent law enforcement from acting against Maoist front organisations and supporters who unfurl human rights, social and cultural banners. In some ways, legislation, such as the Maharashtra Bill, makes it clear to anti-government and pro- Maoist sympathisers just how far they can go. The Bill is not in itself unique as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana have enacted similar laws against Naxalism. The Maharashtra Bill is in keeping with the advice of the Union home ministry to enact suitable legislation, which was reflected in Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s comments at a high-level security review in Raipur in January 2024 soon after BJP returned to office in Chhattis­garh. He urged security forces to tackle the Maoist ecosystem, iden­tifying urban Naxals and choking their finances. Shah’s promise of better coordination between Central and state anti-Naxal operations has seen a sharp in­crease in proactive action against Maoist camps and the deaths of dozens of extremist cadres and leaders in Chhattisgarh. The Maharashtra legislation is part of the Modi government’s strat­egy to crack down on Maoist supply lines and restrict their public activity that is, according to police and intelligence agencies, thinly disguised as political dissent.

The Maharashtra legislation will mean the organisation of events like the Elgar Parishad and their use for disseminating Maoist propaganda will fall foul of the proposed law. The indoc­trination of extremist ideologies, often through the instruments of academia, civil society and religious organisations, presents a tougher challenge to governments as the evidence can be circum­stantial and a matter of interpretation rather than in the form of murder or assault weapons and stolen goods in more usual forms of crime. According to government data, there has been a decline of 52 per cent in leftwing insurgent violence and 69 per cent in deaths between 2014 and 2023 as compared to 2005-14. In order to prevent or act against events like the Elgar Parishad meeting that set the stage for inflammatory speeches linked by the police to the violence at Bhima-Koregaon, the Maharashtra Bill states that individuals and organisations who “indulge or propagate acts of violence, vandalism or other acts generating fear and apprehen­sion in the public” will be deemed to have committed an unlawful activity. Section 2(f) has seven sub-clauses that spell out offences under the Bill whereby committing an act or use of words spoken or written, and also by way of signs of visual representation, can amount to unlawful activity set out under the sub-clauses. Actions that constitute a danger or menace to public order, which inter­fere with the administration of the law, are designed to overawe public servants by criminal force, encourage the use of firearms and explosives, “encourage or preach” violation of the law, and collect money and goods for illegal activities amount to unlawful activities. Section 2(g) specifies an unlawful organisation as one which indulges in or in pursuance of its objectives abets, assists, aids or encourages, directly or indirectly, through any “medium, devices or otherwise”, any unlawful activity.

The Bill cannot be faulted on its details even as critics say its impress is too sweeping. It sets out in minutiae how property and goods, including livestock, are to be either preserved or disposed of. It underlines the powers of the advisory board that will confirm a decision to declare an organisation unlawful as being the same as a civil court’s; which means the board can summon and enforce attendance of a witness, examine the person under oath, receive evidence on affidavits, requisition public records, and order the discovery of documents which a witness or respondent must reveal if such are in their possession. The processes set out provide a hearing for individuals and organisations that face action under the Bill which states that, normally, the decision of the board will be awaited to give effect to an order. In case the government deems designating an organisation as unlawful on an urgent basis, the same will be submitted in writing and be subject to final ratifica­tion by the board. The review procedures provide for the filing of petitions before the high court as also against any order of forfei­ture. The object behind the provisions of the 13-page Bill is to close, to the extent possible, loopholes and technicalities that result in the organisers or planners of incidents that provoke or result in vio­lence escape the clutches of the law. Academics sympathetic to the Naxalite cause have used their perch in universities to propagate radical ideology and acted as conduits between leftist guerrillas and resource mobilisers. Often enough, outfits labelled as human rights and legal aid cells provide a cover for illegal activities. It is routine to see the accused in Maoist-related cases being represented by influential activist lawyers who use every legal device to present a powerful defence of their clients. They have developed expertise in detecting technical defects in police work to win reprieves for Maoist cadres. The Maharashtra Bill sets out stringent guidelines for law enforcement that should reduce shoddiness in investiga­tions and recording of evidence and cases that result in courts ruing about investigative agencies.

The legal nets that Maoist-affected states are devising reflect the larger concern of the Centre about radicalisation and the need to devise means to counter the spread of violent ideologies. There is a political confluence between leftist groups, including those wedded to violence, and Islamists as evident in agitations against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), mobilisation over Palestine, or opposition to the Modi government’s decisions like the abrogation of Article 370. Both the Left and Islamists are driven by a view of the state as an oppressive and unjust entity. This sentiment is sharpened by their opposition to BJP and Hindu­tva. The differences in the rationales driving the two are subsumed under a shared goal of prioritising identities and separateness over nationalism which is dismissed as jingoistic and majoritarian. The subject has been examined by commentators who point out that the relationship between the Left and Islamists is not just tactical. “It is integral to a way of thinking about the world that has come to dominate the social sciences in the western academia. It contests the moral and political foundations of the contempo­rary western state and has been adapted by Islamists for their own purposes,” argues John Jenkins, a former British diplomat and scholar, in an article for Policy Exchange, a leading UK think-tank. The dissemination of radical ideas through organisations such as the Islamic Research Foundation of Islamic preacher Zakir Naik, currently wanted by Indian law enforcement, has been a cause of intense concern. One of the perpetrators of the July 2016 Dhaka bombing said he was influenced by Naik’s YouTube channel. Naik fled India soon after the terror attack. While Naik is a prominent example of radicalisation and its dangers, the challenge is repli­cated at multiple levels and the Centre is engaged in discussions that began before the recent Lok Sabha polls and now likely to gather pace.

Colonel (retired) DPK Pillay, research fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA) has, in an extensive study of radicalisation and the need to counter it through multiple approaches in addition to regular law enforce­ment, notes: “Radicalisation is a multifaceted matter and cannot be defined uniformly in one definition that fits all. Radicalisation in religion is the process of directly or indirectly motivating youths to participate in activities that can terrorise the significant identified as ‘others’. This is based on religious teachings and grievances nurtured by ideologies and preachers. Radicalisation is not usually an event, rather it is a process in which individuals are drawn into terrorist-related activity.” The current efforts in government are directed at arriving at a clear legal definition of what constitutes radicalisation that can help courts and law enforcement. While debated in the context of Islamist organisations, the ap­proach can be applied to any religious or political ideology. “Radicalisation leading to terrorism is a serious threat. Terror groups like ISIS have used radical indoctrination to recruit youth, particu­larly in Kerala. Added to the possibility of radical organisations staging violent acts is the possibil­ity of a lone wolf being inspired to undertake an act of terror,” Pillay told Open. The approach to countering radicalisation includes the use of softer options like community outreach, de-radicalisation, inter-faith dialogue and use of popular mediums like visual arts and Bollywood to create bridges between communities, prevent stereotyping and ghetto mindsets.

The conversation on Naxalism and radicalisation is inevitably daubed with political colours. Given its rightwing credentials, the Maharashtra government is much more prepared to con­sider laws like the Special Public Security Bill than the previous Congress-NCP government in whose tenure the Elgar Parishad event had occurred. It can also be argued that the organisers of the event were emboldened by what they saw as the reluctance of the parties in office to crack down on ultra-Left activism and step up operations against Maoist guerrillas. The question has often boiled down to contending claims: Are urban Naxals a rightwing myth or an integral part of the Maoist ecosystem? The evidence supports the view that urban Naxals are a dangerous reality and there is a need for laws against ideologies that corrode social unity and promote violence.

Bhima-Koregaon violenceDevendra FadnavisMaharashtra lawNaxalismradicalsviolent ideologies