Pakistan’s think-tanks and diaspora are reshaping global research and posing a diplomatic challenge to India
(Illustration: Saurabh Singh)
AT A TIME when India has sent seven outreach delegations—comprising lawmakers and experts—to 33 countries to strengthen its case against cross-border terrorism in the aftermath of a limited war with Pakistan following the Pahalgam carnage, what stands out is Islamabad’s concerted long-term effort to advance its narrative on Kashmir and its tensions with India through multiple channels, including universities and think-tanks, in addition to diplomatic avenues.
Pakistan is currently a rotating member of the UN Security Council and will remain so until December 31, 2026—ample time to advance its anti-India claims. This underscores the urgency and ambition behind India’s diplomatic offensive.
A deeper glance at how Pakistan operates through overseas universities reveals that think-tanks funded by Islamabad have been active for far too long, particularly within research institutions across the world, often by financing scholars through their tutors in what appears to be a quid pro quo for promoting pro-Pakistan arguments for international consumption.
Before we turn our attention to the prominent figures advocating for the Pakistani cause on the global stage, let us first examine the institutions, each claiming to be an independent think-tank, which play a central role in sustaining the Kashmir issue and perpetuating the Pakistani version of events.
For instance, the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), headquartered at Evacuee Trust Complex, Sir Agha Khan Road, Islamabad, claims to be an independent think-tank. According to its website, “IPRI is one of the oldest non-partisan think-tanks covering all facets of national security, including international relations and law, strategic studies, governance and public policy, and economic security in Pakistan.” However, established in 1999, IPRI is affiliated with the National Security Division (NSD) of the government of Pakistan.
IPRI’s president is Lt General (Retired) Majid Ehsan, described on the institute’s site as “a retired three-star general of the Pakistan Army with over 35 years of distinguished service, including senior leadership roles such as Commander 4 Corps.” He previously served as president of the National Defence University and Inspector General of Arms at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.
He holds multiple advanced degrees in Defence and Strategic Studies from Pakistan, Egypt and Malaysia.
His hardline stance is evident in tweets following India’s attacks on terror camps on May 6–7. On May 8, he wrote: “India’s response to the Pahalgam incident, absent credible evidence, reflects a dangerous trend of escalation without accountability. Pakistan reserves the right to self-defence and rejects the weaponisation of narratives.” Another tweet stated: “India attacked Pakistan on the night of May 6/7 and as a result of the timely response of our forces, six fighter jets, including Rafale and several posts and headquarters on the Line of Control were destroyed. India is now spreading terrorism in Pakistan through drones. Pakistan will now give a measured and painful response.”
Other key figures associated with IPRI’s initiative include Brigadier (Retired) Dr Raashid Wali Janjua, director (Research & Analysis), and Brigadier (Retired) Naveed Ali.
People close to the matter reveal that various accomplished academics are often enticed by IPRI and similar organisations with promises of funding for their research scholars. Other Pakistan-based institutions with government links include the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) and the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), both operating under Pakistan’s foreign ministry. The IRS was founded by Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram, a former three-star general who served as deputy administrator of Martial Law under President Yahya Khan.
Notably, one research project on minorities in India at Deakin University’s Melbourne Burwood Campus was sponsored by IPRI. The institute offered Seema Khan, an associate research fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Education’s School of Humanities and Social Sciences, $126,462 for a project titled ‘Vulnerabilities of Religious Minorities in Shining India’, as listed on the University’s website.
Several scholars based across the UK, US and Canada interviewed by Open say that the number of senior scholars identified as ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ opting for financial assistance from groups like IPRI is rising. These trends complicate efforts to counter Pakistani narratives on Kashmir and Indo-Pak hostilities. These doctoral students spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of jeopardising their relationships in the academic fraternity. Often, it is not the research scholars who are at fault, but senior academics who readily accept the funds, they state.
A US-based researcher studying Kashmir, who asked not to be named because he is not authorised to speak to the media, shares, “My inquiries about research on Kashmir and minorities in India—and anything to do with India—have thrown up interesting results. The foremost is that, in Pakistan, organisations like IPRI, supported by the military intelligence establishment, are investing significant resources into studying the status of minorities in India rather than addressing such issues within Pakistan itself.” The person adds, “This situation highlights the state of affairs and awareness in the nation, where external actors and certain individuals, motivated by financial interests, seem to benefit—often at the expense of addressing critical issues related to national security.”
Here is where—a UK-based scholar of global politics says— backdoor diplomacy through the academic route works. Worse, he claims, is that many institutions are short of funds and are thrilled to accept funding without actually checking the backgrounds of such think-tanks. Or they don’t care. “Researchers on South Asia,” a US-based PhD student says, “whether from India or Pakistan, are often short of funds while living away from their homes and families, and so they stay silent and and say goodbye to their liberal credentials and embrace such think-tanks, knowing they are going to manipulate their findings to suit an agenda.” He adds, “Then there are those who feign leftist or liberal leanings to gain acceptability as scholars, while accepting help from institutions like IPRI, ISSI, IRS, among others. They are all doing a disservice to academic research by allowing themselves to be taken for a ride by institutions with vested interests who pay them expecting something in return.”
“Anyone who has to counter Pakistani narratives will also have to contend with such discourses in academia,” says a senior academic from the UK.
Meanwhile, some of the researchers surveyed by Open argue that while there are sane voices within the Pakistani diaspora—especially the Mirpuri diaspora who originate from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—the majority, including those in universities and associated with them, harbour resentment against India and are at the forefront of launching campaign after campaign against New Delhi in the name of protecting their Kashmiri identity. Strangely, some of the pro-Pakistan voices among them, despite flaunting leftist and Marxist credentials, wholeheartedly endorse the Pakistani army’s views.
True, during a war, hostile reactions do come to the fore, with even the most liberal and peacenik individuals adopting an aggressive and hardline nationalist stance. Even by those standards, the comments of Pakistan-origin Ammar Ali Jan—member of the left-wing Haqooq-e-Khalq Party and a well-known historian—are an exception, underlining that narrative builders for Pakistan cut across ideological lines.
Although he has posted strong criticism of Pakistan’s rulers and the army in the past, his silence on the day the Pahalgam massacre took place—and his strong words against India—are proof that Indian outreach teams won’t find much common ground with the left in Pakistan, who project themselves as opponents of terror outfits and the Pakistani army.
Here are some of Jan’s comments on X regarding the limited war with India: “Today, Pakistan has successfully defended its legitimate sovereignty and territorial integrity against repeated Indian aggression. It is clear Modi’s plans to become a regional hegemon have been buried by the PAF. It is time to de-escalate, negotiate and move towards durable peace.” Another of his tweets: “Love and respect for the officers of the PAF who are the only force directly challenging the threat of Hindutva-Zionist fascism in South Asia. History will owe a debt to these men and women for confronting the Goliath of our times.” And this: “Enough is enough! Pakistan retaliates to the continued aggression of the fascist regime in India by launching Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsus. Multiple sites targeted, including in Gujarat, the home state of PM Modi. The primary focus of attacks are military bases inside India.”
Among those who are highly vocal and articulate critics of India—and who have a large following among the Pakistani diaspora across political lines and in US policy circles—are Ghulam Nabi Fai and Muzzammil Ayyub Thakur, among others.
In the interregnum between the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 and the Indian strikes of May 6–7, Fai appeared at Germantown Center, Maryland, DC, to argue that the Kashmir dispute has an international dimension because it has the sanctity of the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions. His contention was that the unresolved conflict over Kashmir threatens international peace and security. Meanwhile, an Indian court had on May 1 declared Fai, chairman of the DC-based World Forum for Peace & Justice, a “proclaimed offender” in a case filed under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
Such posturing by the likes of Fai poses a challenge to Indian diplomats and outreach delegations, especially in a country like the US, where, besides a long-standing affinity for an old ally, there is also a kind of intellectual and diplomatic saturation over Kashmir, and where efforts abound to rehyphenate India and Pakistan.
Some of the arguments pro-Pakistan influencers and academics, who often operate in concert, have successfully pushed include the claim that India failed to offer proof to Pakistan—or the rest of the world—of Pakistani involvement in the Pahalgam attack before striking terror camps inside that country, thus escalating tensions before a ceasefire was announced four days later. Another projection is that India is behaving like Israel and treating Pakistan like Gaza because of its economic superiority. They also portray the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty as an inhumane step and a mark of the ruling party’s muscular nationalism.
For his part, the UK-based Muzzammil Ayyub Thakur—whose late father was reportedly linked to funnelling ISI funds to Kashmir and who is president of the London-based World Kashmir Freedom Movement—recently told TRT World that the source of the current India-Pakistan fighting is the Kashmir dispute and that “the solution to this is always going to be giving the right to self-determination to the people of Indian-occupied Kashmir.”
It is notable that these ‘activists’ do not have the same solidarity and enthusiasm for the Kashmiris in the larger Kashmir, which includes Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan, and so on.
Such opinion leaders, with deep connections to the Pakistani army and think-tanks, have revived the old terminology of Kashmir as “Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK)”, contributing further to anti-India rhetoric at a time when New Delhi is making an all-out effort to gain support against terrorism—one of the tactics Pakistan had perfected in its arsenal against India, along with a cocktail of insurgency and proxy wars.
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