An Indian Space Odyssey

A CARTOON IN The New York Times soon after India’s successful Mangalyaan mission that sent an orbiter to Mars in 2014 sparked outrage and much comment. The depiction of an Indian farmer in turban and dhoti with a cow in tow knocking at the doors of an “elite space club” to the consternation of suited, wine-sipping members was condemned as racist and pejorative. Any allu­sion that India was an ‘interloper’ and a pretender to an exalted status even as many of its citizens, exemplified by the farmer, remained backward, was a conceited notion. The fact was that India had been a member of the space club for decades, launch­ing increasingly sophisticated rockets and satellites. Yet, seen another way, the fits of apoplexy in a ‘members only’ black-tie establishment over letting in a dhoti-kurta clad ‘dehati (rustic)’ did have its humorous aspect. If India was punching above its weight, it was doing so with a merry disregard for what others felt its rightful station in the global order ought to be.

It is no small irony that the 58-para India-US joint statement following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s discussions with President Joe Biden last month had pathbreaking references to cooperation in atomic energy and space that would have been to imagine even a decade ago. In a first, it was decided that India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) will contribute $140 million to the US Fermi National Laboratory for the development of a proton accelerator. This would be part of the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility, which the statement said was the “first and largest” international research facility in the US. The two sides welcomed the work on the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) in India. The quantum of India’s contribution is not the issue. After the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, DAE and its constituents were cast beyond the pale, as they were earlier when India conducted its first test in 1971. India was subjected to an unrelenting technology denial regime.

Things began to change towards the latter part of the Vajpayee government’s tenure, which ceded office in 2004. The India-US nuclear deal concluded by the successor Manmohan Singh government and the US-assisted waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was a turning point. Participating in a high-level science and technology project makes DAE a valued partner—a far cry from being blacklisted. The references to space cooperation are even more encouraging. “President Biden and Prime Minister Modi set a course to reach new frontiers across all sectors of space cooperation,” the statement said. The “strategic framework” to be developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis­tration (NASA) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) for human space flight to culminate with a mission to the International Space Station (ISS) is promising and ambitious. The promise of commercial collaboration between the Indian and US private sectors across the “entire value chain” will dismantle export controls and facilitate technology transfer. In­dia’s decision to sign the Artemis Accords is a big step towards synchronising joint exploration of space.

The successful launch of Chandrayaan-3 on July 14 sym­bolises the vast advancement in India’s space capabilities and a rapid expansion of its frontiers, not the least by way of entry of private participation, which goes much beyond being ‘vendors’ and contractual suppliers. Just as in defence, private firms, and importantly startups, are fuelling innovation and developing expertise in processes critical to ISRO’s missions. The cooperation between the US Department of Defense’s Space Force and an Indian startup 114 AI is not a flash in the pan. Just as sending an orbiter to Mars was a breakthrough moment, the setting down of the Vikram lander at the Moon’s South Pole on August 23 will be a big step forward. It will propel India into an even more rarified space club (only the US, the former Soviet Union, and China have landed on the Moon) and prove its ability to develop and operate a lander and rover through remote control, which is no mean feat considering India’s space programme is almost completely aatmanirbhar (in­digenous). The lander’s ability to hover, process, and alter its landing path is an improvement over the failed machine that crashed some 12km from its intended touchdown spot in 2019. The Indian technology will be tested next month, but ISRO chairperson S Somanath has expressed confidence that the lander can analyse and adjust to several more parameters than its less successful predecessor.

Landing a machine on the Moon is not an abstract proposi­tion. It is not, as early critics of the space programme suggested, a vanity project. Space and remote sensing technology have a direct bearing on disaster mitigation and even urban planning. The cutting-edge technology involved in precise manoeuvres in response to instructions conveyed from more than 380,000km away has other uses as well. The space-defence ecosystem keeps India at the forefront of areas of technology to which only a handful of nations have access. It also creates jobs and wealth, besides opening the doors to international partnerships. On the strategic side, it helps India build capacity to counter China’s aggressive space plans that include jamming satellites and disrupting terrestrial systems. There is little doubt that China treats space as a military domain and its secretive programmes, such as a little-known recoverable space plane, need careful monitoring. Having achieved distinction in launching missions that include the deployment of satellites manufactured by other nations, India needs to move up the value chain. The India Space Policy 2023 does that, not the least by significantly reducing ISRO’s monopoly over the space programme.

The policy calls for the participation of the private sector in all areas, including space and ground assets. Public and private sector providers of services, such as communication, remote-sensing, and data services, would have the option to procure from any source, public or private. The private sector was invited to use satellite-based remote sensing data and applica­tions in India or outside. In short, the private sector has been invited to become an equal partner in research, innovation, and technology development. Keen to establish a regulatory structure for India’s space development, the policy proposes IN-SPACe that will “…Promote industry clusters, zones, manu­facturing hubs, incubation centres, accelerators, and technical centres…work with industry—both national and overseas—to promote identified space activities and establish India as a preferred service provider for global requirements of products and services in the space sector.” The policy outlines a vaulting ambition, an unshackling of orthodoxies, and a rejection of bureaucratic thinking that has limited India’s prospects.

During the rocky and difficult negotiations that marked the India-US nuclear deal, leading Democrat John Kerry (later secretary of state) called on then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during a visit to India in 2008. The US was heading for elections and Kerry had a word of advice. It would be best, he said, if the deal was concluded soon. A change of guard in Wash­ington was in the air and Democrats, he hinted, would not be as enthusiastically supportive of the deal as George Bush. Indeed, when Indian diplomats met Senator Barack Obama as part of their outreach, they found him sceptical of the nuclear deal. Yet, it is Biden, another Democrat who served as Obama’s vice presi­dent, who has forged a new compact with India. By definition, elite clubs are exclusive. Sometimes, you have to barge in.

About The Author

Rajeev Deshpande

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