Unveiling India’s PDEI Strategy

The India-Pakistan bashup is not just a tale of two states, but also of two countries within each state.

Just as there is one part of the subcontinent that still believes, even lives, in a pre-Partition India, there is a part of Pakistan that detests and disallows lasting peace with India. This is the sad irony of history tainted by ideology.

This ideology we must call out, however reluctantly, as jihadi. Such a deduction is inevitable because it is emblazoned as the motto of the Pakistani army: “Iman, Taqwa, Jihad-fi-Sabilillah.” Let us not forget that the original motto, “Ittehad, Yaqeen, Tanzeem,” did not have jihad in it.

Yes, there are many Indias and many Pakistans, but when it comes to the future of the relationship between these two uneasy neighbours, the operative split, I dare say schizophrenia, is between these two parts, states within states.

A largely peace-desiring India, which extends to a significant portion of the Pakistani civilian population, and war-mongering, anti-Hindu, and stubbornly anti-India consitutency within Pakistan. The latter, spearheaded by the army, is made up of both regular soldiers in uniform and irregulars, indoctrinated and armed, in native garb.

This split in Pakistan’s fractured mentality is reduplicated across all sections of its society. When it comes to its social schism and chasm, we might sum it up figuratively: whisky-sipping generals and madrasa-brainwashed cannon fodder. Some would go a step farther. The elite, using religious fanaticism, to get an impecunious and desperate underclass to do its dirty work.

But for how long? What is the way forward after “Operation Sindoor”?

A credible action plan is offered by Lt Gen P Ravi Shankar (retd). In one of his YouTube videos, “A Hammer & Anvil Approach Towards The Pak Army,” (tinyurl.com/44665n5d) on May 5, 2025, followed up in subsequent presentations, he cite his thesis: “You can’t defeat the Pakistan army on the military front. You can defeat them politically.”

This proposition rests on a fundamental spilt in the Pakistani state, on the lines of the other ruptures that I have outlined above. As the good general puts it: “We know in Pakistan there are two issues, the centre of power and the centre of governance. The Pakistani state is the centre of governance. The Pakistani army is the centre of power.” Though we may have defeated Pakistan in every single armed conflict, whether in 1947-1948, 1965, 1971, or 1999, we were not able destroy their centre of power, the Pakistani army.

Why? Because “with every war, the centre of power called the Pakistan army has strengthened itself,” says Gen Ravi Shankar. Whether it wins or loses, every military encounter with India only reinforces the hold of the Pakistani army on its people. It is, indeed, their only raison d’etre and the justification for their continued stranglehold.”

This vicious cycle, played out repeatedly, exposes a bitter truth: Pakistan isn’t a nation with an army; it’s an army with a nation. The military controls hugely important economic vectors including real estate, agriculture, steel, and cement. It even dictates domestic and foreign policy.

No wonder, the Pakistan army has a knack for turning military defeats into propaganda victories. No matter how badly they’re hit, they weave a tale of fake news that keeps them at the heart of Pakistan’s fractured identity. The irony is bitter: every military operation, however precise, ends up reinforcing their indispensability in a nation on the brink.

To defeat this rogue institution, India must fight smarter using the PDEI formula—politics, diplomacy, economics, and information warfare or infofare. In such a comprehensive strategy, which India has already commenced implementing, water will, of course, play a key role. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is a great move.

When it comes to politics, the abrogation of Article 370 was, undoubtedly, the masterstroke that caused the most heartburn in Pakistan. As to what happens within its own borders, Pakistan is a tinderbox. All that India needs to do is provide the proverbial spark. The army is increasingly unpopular. Whether it is Baloch separatism or unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, India needs merely to amplify the cracks.

On the diplomatic front, Indian delegations are fanning out across the world to present India’s point of view. The next front is the information war or infofare, where we might be lagging behind, but must catch up. But India’s rising global stature, our economy, the fifth largest in the world and still rising, our voice loud and clear, whether in the G20 and BRICS, and worldwide heft in the developing world, place us at a significant advantage over our adversary. At the United Nations and in world capitals of the developed world, India, by exposing Pakistan’s terror links, is isolating the adversary.

Economically, Pakistan is gasping. Buried in debt and reliant on IMF bailouts, it can’t afford the military’s lavish spending. The army resorts to its own brand of legit or shady business, with tentacles in every profitable activity, not excluding drugs trafficking and smuggling out Pakistan’s natural resources. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which grey-listed Pakistan before, should be lobbied to probe terror financing again. Banning `2,000 notes, reducing the influx of fake currency, and banning exports to Pakistan are also working in India’s favour.

Operation Sindoor obliterated nine terror camps in Bahawalpur, Muridke, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. One high-value target, which caught the attention of the world, was Abdul Rauf Azhar, the murderer of US Jewish journalist, Daniel Pearl.

India also hit key airfields, disabling Pakistan’s air defence systems in key attacks. Some say that nuclear facilities in Kirana Hills near Sargodha and Nur Khan near Rawalpindi were also struck, bringing in the US to broker a ceasefire. Even if this isn’t borne out by facts, the very fact that Pakistan resorted to nuclear “al Taqiyya” proves that it was in dire straits.

What next for India? To crush the Pakistani army won’t be easy but tightening the coils of the python through a comprehensive PDEI strategy might produce better—and more enduring—results.

As to those who still harbour dreams of pre-Partition India, they might do better if they pin their hopes on a post-Pakistan subcontinent instead.

2025 India-Pakistan warIndia-PakistanOperation SindoorPahalgam