Pakistan mainstreams jihad as its military strategy

On April 22, terrorists opened fire on a group of tourists in the Baisaran Valley area of Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, killing at least 26 people (25 Indian nationals and one Nepalese) and injuring 17. Video footage from survivors showed scenes of carnage at the scenic meadow.

It was the deadliest attack on civilians in India in nearly two decades, evoking painful memories of past massacres. The Resistance Front (TRF) – a shadowy outfit linked to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) – claimed responsibility for the massacre, saying it was opposed to the settling of tens of thousands of “outsiders” in Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370.

Indian intelligence agencies immediately began probing cross-border involvement, noting that the attack coincided with a high-profile visit to India by U.S. Vice President JD Vance. The incident has inflamed already tense relations between India and Pakistan and raised new concerns about regional stability.

Key geopolitical factors – ranging from recent belligerent statements by Pakistan’s military leadership, the enduring role of Pakistan-backed terrorist groups, and shifting dynamics in neighbouring Bangladesh – all form the backdrop to this terror attack.

Pakistan’s Military Leadership Reaffirms Islamist Ideology and the “Jugular Vein” of Kashmir

Just days before the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan’s top military leadership struck a defiant ideological tone that India views as inflammatory. On April 16, General Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, delivered a speech in Islamabad, vehemently defending Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic ideological state founded on the two-nation theory.

Munir reminded his audience that Pakistan was created because “we were different from the Hindus in every possible aspect of life…our religion is different, our customs are different…we are two nations, we are not one nation”. He told overseas Pakistanis that they must never forget this founding narrative, asserting that Pakistan’s people “belong to a ‘superior ideology and culture’” rooted in Islam.

A centrepiece of General Munir’s remarks was the status of Kashmir. He pointedly described Kashmir as “Pakistan’s jugular vein”, vowing that this status “will endure”. “Our stance is absolutely clear, it was our jugular vein, it will be our jugular vein. We will not forget it. We will not leave our Kashmiri brothers in their heroic struggle,” Munir declared.

Such language harks back to Pakistani founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s description of Kashmir as vitally important to Pakistan. In the same speech, General Munir pledged that Pakistan would never abandon its claim over Kashmir or its support for the Kashmiri cause. He framed the Kashmir dispute in religious-ideological terms, casting it as a continuation of the two-nation theory that partitioned India and Pakistan in 1947.

Notably, he delivered these remarks while defending Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic state and celebrating the “sacrifices of our forefathers” for the country’s creation.Pakistan’s military, by positioning itself as the guardian of the nation’s Islamic ideology, effectively reinforced its longstanding narrative that retaining Kashmir (a Muslim-majority region) is a religious and existential imperative for Pakistan.

Indian observers viewed Munir’s rhetoric as provocative and troubling. The open invocation of the two-nation theory – which India rejects, and which was discredited in 1971 when Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan – and the “jugular vein” comment were seen as official encouragement of a hardline, Islamist stance on Kashmir.

Just as ominously, General Munir’s speech lauded the ongoing “heroic struggle” in Kashmir, which India interprets as condoning the activities of terrorist groups backed by the Pakistani military. Coming from Pakistan’s army chief (widely considered the most powerful figure in Pakistan), these statements signalled a hawkish posture. Indian analysts noted with concern that Pakistan’s military leadership was effectively legitimising jihadist sentiments regarding Kashmir on the world stage. Indeed, India’s intelligence agencies have assessed that such high-level rhetoric may have “emboldened militant groups” to act.

The Role of Pakistan-Based Terror Groups in the Pahalgam Massacre

In the wake of the Pahalgam bloodshed, Indian authorities identified clear signs of involvement by Pakistan-backed jihadist organizations. The attack was quickly attributed to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its proxies. TRF, which claimed the attack, is believed to be a front for LeT and was banned by India as a terrorist outfit in 2023. Investigators revealed that six heavily armed attackers had crossed into Indian territory with the help of local collaborators to execute the assault. According to Indian intelligence reports, the terrorists conducted reconnaissance in early April – even scouting hotels frequented by tourists – before selecting their target. Crucially, at least two of the slain attackers were confirmed to be Pakistani nationals, underscoring the cross-border nature of the plot (as later announced by police, with rewards offered for information on the handlers).

The terrorists’ modus operandi demonstrated the Islamist extremist motives behind the attack. Survivors recounted that the gunmen forced Hindu victims to recite the Islamic kalma (declaration of faith) and shot dead those who could not. This chilling detail indicates the attackers were intent on targeting non-Muslim Indians, heightening the atrocity’s sectarian character. It echoed past massacres in Kashmir where Islamist terrorists deliberately singled out Hindu civilians. Indian officials argued that such brutality was the direct product of Pakistan’s patronage of jihadist groups. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, in particular, has a long record of carrying out deadly attacks on Indian soil – including the 2008 Mumbai attacks – under the guidance of Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency.

Indian security experts believe the timing and scale of the Pahalgam massacre were not coincidental. The attack occurred during U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India, mirroring how militants massacred civilians in Kashmir during President Bill Clinton’s 2000 trip.

“Those responsible for the attacks…will very soon feel a loud response,” warned Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, strongly implying Pakistani culpability. While stopping short of naming Pakistan, Indian officials and analysts were unequivocal behind closed doors that the perpetrators were linked to LeT and its sponsors in the Pakistani security establishment. Former Indian Army officers noted that the attack came just “days after Pakistan’s army chief” issued his Kashmir rallying cry, suggesting the militants may have been encouraged or even directed to strike while the iron was hot.Indeed, a senior Indian intelligence source pointed out that General Munir’s “jugular vein” speech could have served as a catalyst, emboldening a Lashkar proxy to stage a high-casualty attack as a message to both India and visiting U.S. dignitaries.

Pakistan-based jihadist leaders themselves appeared to celebrate or justify the Pahalgam killings. Less than a week before the massacre, an LeT handler in Pakistan-held Kashmir, known as Abu Musa, openly incited violence at a rally. “Jihad will continue, guns will rage and beheading will continue in Kashmir. India wants to change the demography of Kashmir by giving domicile certificates to non-locals,” Abu Musa declared to a gathering in Rawalakot on April 18.

Such statements align exactly with the message and tactics of the Pahalgam attackers (who targeted tourists amid claims of “demographic change”). This suggests coordination and shared objectives between the on-ground militants and their sponsors across the Line of Control. Indian officials have named a Pakistan-based LeT commander, Saifullah Kasuri (alias Khalid), as a key suspect who likely oversaw the plot.In New Delhi’s view, the Pahalgam atrocity was not an isolated incident, but part of a pattern of cross-border terrorism abetted by Pakistan – a violent tool of state policy that Islamabad has used for decades to bleed India.

Escalation of India–Pakistan Tensions After the Attack

The terror strike at Pahalgam sent Indo-Pakistani relations – already at a low ebb – into a rapid tailspin. Within 24 hours, New Delhi unleashed a slew of retaliatory diplomatic and economic measures against Pakistan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, upon cutting short a foreign trip and returning to India, delivered a fiery condemnation of Pakistan. “The time has come to raze whatever is left of the terror haven,” Modi said, in a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan. “The will of 140 crores [1.4 billion Indians] will break the back of the masters of terror,” he vowed.

India proceeded to shut its land border with Pakistan, expel several Pakistani diplomats, and downgrade diplomatic ties further. In an unprecedented step, the Indian government suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a 1960 water-sharing pact that had survived even the wars of the past. New Delhi framed these moves as necessary to punish Pakistan for its alleged role in the “heinous” attack and to pressure Islamabad to crack down on terrorist groups. India’s foreign ministry also summoned Pakistan’s senior diplomat to lodge a protest, and even blocked the official X (Twitter) social media account of the Pakistani government within India.

Pakistan, for its part, reacted with a mix of condemnation, denial, and counter-accusations. Senior officials in Islamabad “rebuked” India’s allegations and dismissed the Pahalgam incident as a “false flag operation” – implying India had staged the attack to defame Pakistan.

At an emergency meeting of Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the Pakistani side mulled responses to what it called India’s “unilateral and irresponsible actions” and “knee-jerk measures”. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry response tellingly stopped short of unequivocally condemning the attack as terrorism. This lukewarm response drew criticism in India as a tacit refusal to acknowledge the heinous nature of the act.

The Pakistani narrative of denial and deflection, however, “sidestepped Pakistan’s well-documented ties to terror groups,” as one report noted bluntly. Pakistani opposition figures also echoed the official line that India was reflexively blaming Pakistan without evidence. The exchange of accusations has sharply raised the temperature between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Analysts warn that a fragile ceasefire in Kashmir, in place since 2021, is now at grave risk. “That is the last thread that remains in an otherwise very skeletal relationship,” explained Happymon Jacob, professor of international studies at JNU, referring to the ceasefire – “if that gets ruptured, then all bets are off.” Indeed, since 2019, formal dialogue between India and Pakistan has been virtually frozen, and this incident further erodes any residual trust.

Both sides have strengthened military vigilance along the Line of Control. The Indian Army and Air Force were put on high alert. Fears of escalation prompted reactions from world capitals: the United States condemned the terror attack and at the same time urged restraint. U.S. President Donald Trump announced that America “stands strong with India against terrorism” and offered “full support”, but behind the scenes Washington also leaned on Islamabad to avoid any retaliatory spiral. China and Russia, while formally condemning the killing of tourists, have also quietly advocated de-escalation given the catastrophic risks of an India–Pakistan war.

For now, India’s punitive steps (travel bans, diplomatic isolation, water treaty suspension) are the primary form of retaliation – a bid to pressure Pakistan economically and diplomatically. Whether this will be effective or provoke Pakistan remains an open question, but the geopolitical fault line between India and Pakistan has widened in the aftermath of Pahalgam.

Bangladesh’s Shift: The Siliguri Corridor and a New Front in Regional Rivalry

An additional geopolitical factor weighing on India after the Pahalgam attack is the evolving situation in Bangladesh – and how it might alter the regional power balance to India’s disadvantage. In August 2024, Bangladesh underwent a major political upheaval: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a traditionally pro-India leader, was toppled amid mass protests and a coup-like scenario. In her place, an interim government headed by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus (the Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist) took charge.

This transition marked a dramatic reorientation of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Whereas Hasina had maintained cordial ties with New Delhi and balanced both India and China, the new regime in Dhaka has charted a different course – one that appears to tilt toward Beijing and adopt a more confrontational tone toward India. Yunus’s very first official visit abroad was to China in late March 2025, underscoring that the interim government “will not hesitate to lean towards China” as its lead economic and strategic partner. Multiple agreements on infrastructure, trade, and technical cooperation were signed during that trip, signalling an accelerated Bangladesh–China bonhomie.

It is in this context that remarks made by Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Yunus in Beijing have caused an uproar in India’s strategic circles. While addressing a business roundtable on March 28, 2025, Mr. Yunus highlighted the geographic vulnerability of India’s northeastern states in a way no Bangladeshi leader had done publicly before. He pointed out that the “Seven Sisters” of Northeast India are “a landlocked region – they have no way to reach the ocean. We [Bangladesh] are the only guardian of the ocean for all of this region. This opens up a huge possibility,” Yunus told his Chinese audience.

Essentially, Bangladesh’s interim leader was advertising his country’s pivotal location between India’s Northeast and the Bay of Bengal as an opportunity for China. He suggested that Chinese industries could use Bangladesh as a gateway to access markets and resources in Northeast India, Nepal, and Bhutan – areas cut off from the sea. In Yunus’s words, Bangladesh could be an extension of the Chinese economy’s reach, with the “ocean in our backyard” facilitating Beijing’s connectivity to the region.

These comments were unprecedented and, to Indian officials, provocative. By emphasizing India’s northeastern vulnerability and beckoning China to step in, Yunus appeared to be hinting at a scenario where China could gain influence in, or even leverage over, India’s strategic northeast. The implied reference was to the narrow Siliguri Corridor – often called the “Chicken’s Neck” – a roughly 20-km wide strip of Indian territory in West Bengal that is the sole land link between mainland India and the Northeast.

Any hostile presence or blockade around this corridor could effectively cut off India’s Northeast from the rest of the country. This corridor is flanked by Nepal and Bhutan to the north and Bangladesh to the south, and it lies not far from the Chinese border to the east (near Bhutan and the Indian state of Sikkim). Indian defense planners have long identified Siliguri as a choke-point: during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Chinese advances in the eastern sector exposed its fragility. The 2017 Doklam standoff (between China and India/Bhutan) also underscored how Chinese infrastructure-building in the vicinity could threaten the corridor.

Yunus’s blunt reference to this vulnerability – on a stage in China, no less – was received in India as a strategic red flag. Leaders from India’s Northeast reacted sharply. Assam’s Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma condemned the remarks as “offensive,” warning that they highlight the persistent “vulnerability” of India’s Chicken’s Neck region. He urged New Delhi to urgently develop more alternative road and rail links to the Northeast (including via Bangladesh itself, if possible) to reduce reliance on the Siliguri route.

Indian opposition figures also criticized the development: “The Bangladesh government’s approach is very dangerous for the safety of our Northeast,” said Congress spokespersonPawan Khera, accusing Bangladesh of “inviting China for a siege of India.” He noted bitterly that “the country for whose creation we played a major role [in 1971] is now busy trying to surround us.”

This war of words indicates a significant rift in India–Bangladesh relations. Where once Dhaka under Sheikh Hasina was a reliable partner to India (especially against Islamist militancy and in managing border issues), the post-Hasina leadership is viewed with suspicion in New Delhi. India has raised concerns about reports of rising radicalism and minority persecution in Bangladesh since the regime change – issues the new government in Dhaka has brusquely dismissed as internal matters.

Bangladesh’s officials, for their part, insist that Yunus’s statements were “made with honest intention” to foster regional connectivity, and that any “different interpretation” is unwarranted. A high representative of the Bangladeshi government explained that Yunus was simply urging Chinese investors to use Bangladesh’s seaports to reach broader markets, and his points have been “misinterpreted” by Indian media. Nevertheless, the strategic subtext of Yunus’s pitch – emphasizing Bangladesh’s control over India’s access to its Northeast – was not lost on observers.

Notably, some Indian analysts see Pakistan’s invisible hand in these developments. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Syed Ata Hasnain observes that ever since Hasina’s ouster, Pakistan’s influence has grown in Dhaka’s power circles – “Pakistan never left Dhaka…It remained embedded in Bangladesh” through various proxies, and is now “licking its lips” at the prospect of India’s Siliguri Corridor vulnerability being exploitable.

The new interim leader Yunus, though internationally regarded as a liberal, has aligned with elements hostile to India, possibly out of necessity to consolidate power after what one commentator called an “illegal change of government”. The result is a Dhaka-Beijing-Islamabad convergence of interests: Bangladesh gains Chinese investment and political backing; China gains a foothold to encircle India; and Pakistan gains the satisfaction of a “strategic nightmare” for India, with a friendly Bangladesh potentially squeezing India’s northeastern jugular in a crisis.

This shift in Bangladesh is a new geopolitical wrinkle that complicates India’s security calculus, especially coming at the same time as the flare-up over Kashmir. Indian strategists now worry about a two-front scenario – pressure in the west from Pakistan and in the east from a China-aligned Bangladesh (and by extension China itself). While Bangladesh has not threatened any hostile act, the mere rhetorical reference to cutting off the Northeast sets off alarm bells in New Delhi. It underscores how the broader South Asian strategic environment has become more unfavourable for India in the wake of domestic changes in its neighbourhood.

A Gathering Storm around India

The terrorist massacre in Pahalgam was not an isolated tragedy perpetrated by fringe extremists – it was the violent manifestation of sharpening geopolitical fault lines in South Asia. Pakistan’s military establishment, under General Asim Munir, has reverted to an ideological hard line that glorifies Islamist identity and treats Kashmir as a sacred battleground, encouraging proxy militants to intensify their “jihad” against India.

The Pahalgam attack bore all the hallmarks of this cross-border jihad: a Pakistan-linked group, motivated by Islamist and anti-India goals, striking civilians to send a bloody message. India’s outrage and swift reprisal measures reflect not only grief and anger, but a strategic decision to raise the costs for Pakistan through diplomatic isolation and economic pressure.

With both New Delhi and Islamabad doubling down on their narratives – India vowing to hunt down the terrorists “to the ends of the Earth” and Pakistan dismissing the incident as an Indian conspiracy – the space for dialogue has all but evaporated. International stakeholders fear that miscalculations by either side could lead to a broader military confrontation.

At the same time, shifts on India’s eastern flank are influencing the strategic calculus. Bangladesh’s new leadership has, wittingly or unwittingly, injected itself into the India–China–Pakistan equation with remarks that highlight India’s geographic vulnerabilities and seem to invite China’s deeper involvement in the region. From New Delhi’s perspective, this is seen as a betrayal by Dhaka and a worrying development that could embolden China and Pakistan.

Indeed, the convergence of a hostile Pakistan on the west and a China-leaning Bangladesh on the east raises the spectre of India being strategically encircled. Indian policymakers are now confronted not just with the immediate challenge of punishing the perpetrators of the Pahalgam atrocity, but also with long-term geopolitical headaches: keeping the Kashmir situation from spiralling out of control, shoring up the security of the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, and preventing further inimical alignment between its neighbours and China.

Ultimately, the Pahalgam terror attack and its aftermath underscore how deeply interconnected South Asia’s security dynamics are. Terrorist violence in Kashmir cannot be divorced from the grand strategic contests over national ideologies, regional influence, and great-power involvement. From India’s perspective, the attack validates India’s longstanding claims that Pakistan’s state apparatus (especially its army and intelligence) fuels terrorism as an instrument against India.

It also rings alarm bells about losing ground in the neighbourhood: India’s diplomatic clout will be tested to manage or counter the emerging Bangladesh-China-Pakistan nexus. New Delhi’s response, therefore, has been multi-pronged – militarily assertive, diplomatically aggressive, and geopolitically vigilant. As Prime Minister Modi declared in the wake of the massacre, India will “identify, track, and punish every terrorist” and break the resolve of those who shelter them.

Backed by international solidarity in condemning terrorism, India is likely to intensify both its counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir and its efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan. Simultaneously, recent events serve as a clarion call for India to reinforce its own strategic infrastructure – from military deployments in Kashmir to transportation links in the Northeast – to blunt any coercion by adversaries. The geopolitical currents behind the Pahalgam attack – Islamist terrorism abetted by Pakistan and shifting alliances in South Asia – will continue to influence how India navigates its national security in the volatile months and years ahead.

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