Why Indian Democracy Works

INDIAN DEMOCRACY presents a paradox of sorts.

Global observers of democracy—think-tanks ‘measuring’ democracy and Western governments— claim India’s democracy is in trouble. These institutions now openly say that India is, at best, an ‘electoral democracy’ and is more likely, an ‘autocracy’. In contrast, freely conducted surveys and—above all—elec­tions tell a very different story.

The latest Global Attitudes Survey conducted by Pew Re­search Center from February 7 to April 21, shows that 74 per cent Indians are satisfied with democracy. The sample size was 3,545 and “…includes an oversample of majority Mus­lim sub-districts, but the data is weighted to reflect the national population of India.” The sur­vey was carried out in a face-to-face mode. It is done every year in spring in different countries. In India, there was a break for four years (from 2020 to 2023) for which no data is available.

The results for India since 2017 are consistent: a majority of individuals surveyed have expressed satisfaction with the way democracy is work­ing in the country. The highest percentage was reported in the 2017 edition when 79 per cent of those surveyed expressed satisfaction while the lowest level was reported in 2018 when only 54 per cent said they were satisfied. The average of those saying they are satisfied over five years (2017, 2018, 2019, 2024, and 2025) is 70.8 per cent.

This is in sharp contrast with the global trend since 2021 when the median per­centage of those saying they are dissatisfied with democracy in their country has gone up from 52 per cent in 2021 to 64 per cent in 2025. Those reporting satisfaction with democracy stood at 35 per cent in 2025. These figures are for 12 high-in­come countries in the West, and Japan and South Korea in Asia.

Another interesting data point in the 2025 survey is the correlation between the percentage of respondents who say they are satisfied with democracy and the percentage who say that the current eco­nomic situation is good. The correlation is positive and high (0.74), with the highest being reported for India and the low­est for South Korea. It is inter­esting to note that the Reserve Bank of India’s Consumer Con­fidence Surveys (CCS) paint a more sombre picture. In June, the urban Current Situation Index (CSI) read 95.4. Any read­ing above 100 is considered to be in the positive territory. The rural CSI had a print of 100, a just positive print. The CSI measures perceptions of current economic conditions compared to the same period a year ago. In contrast, the Future Expectations Index (FEI), which records expectations for the year ahead, has been in the positive territory for a while now. In June, urban FEI stood at 123.4 and the rural version was at 126.2. This exudes optimism towards future economic prospects.

These results should surprise no one, except those who doubt the robustness of India’s democracy and have consistently claimed that it ceased to be one after 2014. The two widely used indices that ‘measure’ democracy— V-Dem and Freedom House— have consistently described India as less than a democracy for many years now. V-Dem has ‘downgraded’ India for a long time now. What explains this dichotomy between what Pew Research has found for years on end and what V-Dem and Freedom House claim every year?

The immediate answer is that Pew data has been col­lected using face-to-face ques­tionnaires while all democracy indices are based on coding by ‘experts’ or by inference using data. The latter procedures are subject to biases, something that no ‘expert’ will accept willingly. To be fair, the V-Dem methodology recognises that this is a problem and even has a procedure to iron out such biases. That these have proven to be ineffective is obvious. To give one example, Honduras and Nigeria, countries that have been ‘autocratic’ for much longer than India, have a better ranking in the 2025 V-Dem report. This is not because India has turned ‘autocratic’ in any visible manner but because the ‘expert coders’ have reached identical or very similar conclusions.

The problem was analysed last year by two scholars, Anne Meng and Andrew Little, in a well-known paper, the first one to carefully look at the prob­lem of ‘coder’ and ‘expert’ bias in ranking democracies. These scholars outlined a formal model of expert bias and its sources. The problems include open-ended/selectively observed variables and subjec­tive definitions/weights to different observations, among a number of other problems. These issues have been compounded in recent years by extensive media reporting on incidents that are alleg­edly ‘anti-democratic’. These incidents are noted by ‘experts’ whose opinions, in turn, are used by the media to classify these allegedly anti-democratic events, as signals of democratic erosion. Over time, this gets coded into measurements and rankings, marking a country as “non-democratic,” “autocratic” or any other expression that is in vogue.

In India, the problem is acute to the point of being severe. Consider the case of the ongo­ing revision of electoral rolls in Bihar under the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). The exercise has been reported extensively in the Indian press.

But in a handful of newspapers, there is a campaign against the Election Commission of India (ECI) for undertaking the revision process. One expert has even gone to the Supreme Court challenging the SIR. This expert, after approach­ing the court, has penned an opinion against the SIR. Soon enough, this will be coded into democracy indices as a data point marking the deteriora­tion of democracy in India. In all likelihood, this will be coded as a “voter suppression” event.

In reality, election authorities everywhere are obligated to ask voters for proof of citi­zenship or re-verification of citizenship in case electoral rolls are old or are outdated. But in India, this elementary pro­cess has been described as an assault on democracy. ‘Experts’ and journalists are complicit in wilfully misrepresenting this process as anti-democratic. To that extent, India is an extreme outlier when it comes to biases among experts outlined by Meng and Little.

For the better part of the 20th century, political scien­tists and sociologists wondered how democracy could emerge and thrive in a poor country like India. In an early (1959) and famous analysis of condi­tions for democracy, political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset argued that countries that were wealthier, industri­alised, had an educated popula­tion and were urbanised were more likely to be democratic. For almost its entire history as an independent country, India systematically violated these conditions. Lipset would revisit these themes again in 1993 and he noted India in particular in this respect. There were many other studies that highlighted the “Indian exception”.

In the 21st century, how­ever, political scientists are almost unanimous that Indian democracy has broken down even as the level of political participation in the country has gone up manifold over 18 General Elections since Independence and the much bigger number of state and local elections. The latter are now discounted to the point of being considered a ‘ma­joritarian’ institution. These ‘analyses’ are a travesty. What strengthens Indian democracy are the beliefs of its citizens. The Pew survey records those beliefs without any ‘expert’ intermediation.

About The Author

Siddharth Singh

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