Yunus and the case of a “land locked” imagination

During his recent visit to China, Muhammad Yunus, the chief adviser to the interim government of Bangladesh made a series of controversial remarks. Among these, he said that India’s North-Eastern states are landlocked and that Bangladesh offered them the only access point to the sea, through the Bay of Bengal. He forgot to add that India and Bangladesh had operationalized the agreement for the use of Chittagong and Mongla ports in 2023, permitting ease of transport between India’s North-East and its other parts. It is interesting to note that Yunus chose not to mention that almost the entire stretch of Bangladesh’s land border lies with India.

While couched in geographic terms, the remarks were made in a political vein, as if this vital part of India existed on its own and as if Bangladesh could act in this region on its own. Predictably, the remarks did not go down well in India. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is yet to take note of Yunus’s remarks or respond to them.

India has had an unfortunate history of Bangladesh’s abetment of various insurgent groups in India’s North-East. At one time, key leaders of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) found shelter there. Other insurgent groups operating in troubled states also found hospitality in Dhaka. In fact, using these groups against India was part of Bangladesh’s foreign policy repertoire under different governments, reminiscent of the approach adopted by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab during insurgencies in those states.

Any mention of the North-East by a Bangladeshi politician, especially one who has come to power by dislodging a legitimately elected government is certain to be considered unwelcome.

Yunus made his remarks in China, a country with which India has a major boundary dispute. He expressed the desire to boost trade and economic relations between Bangladesh and China, offering Bangladesh’s access to the Bay of Bengal as a convenient trading option for the export of Chinese goods. There is no harm here: more trade is good for everyone. But there’s a catch. Bangladesh does not share a land border with China. Unless China begins manufacturing goods in Bangladesh—and not just assembling them from parts already made in China–the idea is likely to be stillborn. With rules of origin playing an important role in trade arrangements, it is unlikely that Bangladesh will gain anything. Similarly, Yunus’s desire to import electricity from power surplus countries like Nepal and Bhutan requires transmission through India. If Bangladesh thinks it can bypass India, then it is indulging in fantasy.

The contrast with India’s approach could not be more different. India has tried to increase connectivity with Bangladesh: there are railway and road transport links and there are land ports that dot different parts of the border between the two countries. Total bilateral trade between the two countries was $13.2 billion. It is interesting to note that bilateral trade between Bangladesh and China was $24 billion during the same period. But here’s the catch: Bangladesh’s trade deficit with India is much less than that with China.

TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP

But none of this matters for Yunus. His animus towards India, ever since Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power last August, has only grown by every passing month. Here’s a short list:

1)     Under Yunus’s watch, Hindus in Bangladesh have been persecuted very cruelly. In a recent answer to a question in Parliament, Minister for External Affairs, S Jaishankar, informed the Lok Sabha that there were 2,400 instances of atrocities against minorities in Bangladesh in 2024. Another 72 incidents have been reported this year. In the ordinary course of events, events in any country are a matter of concern for that country alone. But in this case, the assaults on Hindus are a proxy for India in the hands of crazed Islamist zealots in Bangladesh who have been given an open hand by Yunus.

2)     Bangladesh’s birth was a direct response to the reign of terror at the hands of its overlords in West Pakistan (Bangladesh, back then, was East Pakistan). That painful and sordid episode of history needs no recounting. But one of the first things that Yunus did was to encourage greater military and intelligence ties with Pakistan. Pakistan, frustrated at India “not talking” to it, has always wanted to create trouble in India’s Eastern flank and has lapped this opportunity. India has noticed this and needless to say, this is considered an unfriendly move.

3)     India’s ties with Bangladesh, of all the countries in “South Asia”, were premised on solid economic relations. Yunus wants to cut this umbilical cord. A number of steps have been taken in this respect, including violating contracts to supply electricity to Bangladesh by an Indian conglomerate. It is another matter that Bangladesh’s economic condition is not exactly in the pink of health. It had to approach the IMF for help and in 2023 it received approval for a $3.3 billion package to tide over economic problems that began in the wake of the Covid19 pandemic. Once hailed as the next miracle economy, political instability and economic mismanagement have left it in a difficult spot. Yunus is yet to figure out what to do next. All he is doing is to destroy Bangladesh’s economic ties with India.

   A HANDMAID IN ALL BUT NAME

   Restoring bilateral ties will require more than meetings between leaders of the two countries. The relationship has frayed in all its key dimensions—economic and political—and the Yunus government is spoiling it further. The statement made in Beijing is one more step in that direction. As for India, it feels the onus is clearly on the Bangladeshi side to take corrective steps.

What should India do? The first step, as always, should be to explore diplomatic options to resolve irritants. But the sudden developments over the past seven months—including Bangladesh’s aggressive courting of Pakistan at the military level—indicates that diplomacy may not be an effective tool.

The second, more coercive, option is to use economic levers to persuade Yunus and his “government.” If Bangladesh can attempt to weaponize connectivity against India, there is much that India can do to reciprocate. Resort to such tactics is never the first choice for India: historically, India prefers diplomacy and political ties to solve problems. But there are situations where persuasion by normal means does not work. It is safe to say that relations with Bangladesh have reached that stage.

border liesethnic minorityHindusIndia-BangladeshIndia’s North-Eastern statesMuhammad Yunus