Making Peace in Manipur

WHEN PRIME MINISTER Narendra Modi rose in Rajya Sabha on July 3 to reply to the president’s address, he made it a point to mention the situa­tion in Manipur in his speech. It was, however, not the first time that he spoke about the state in the context of events there. He also highlighted the issue in his reply to the no-confidence motion in Lok Sabha on August 10, 2023. Behind Modi’s calculated public responses and the actions of his government lies an understanding of the situation in Manipur that is unlikely to be appreciated by the Opposition. The latter has a different purpose in its consistent demand that Modi “speak” on the issue. But as the events of the last 14-odd months show, Modi’s response has been carefully calibrated to ensure that statements made in New Delhi don’t inflame the situation in Imphal.

On July 3, the prime minister emphasised this point when he said, “To normalise the situation in Manipur, the government is constantly making efforts… We have to accept that incidents of violence in Manipur are constantly decreasing… Those elements who are trying to add fuel to fire in Manipur, I warn them to stop their actions. A time will come when Manipur will reject such people. Those who know the history of Manipur, those who know the sequence of events there, know that there is a long history of social conflict there. The mentality of that conflict is deeply rooted.” It was an accurate statement of fact and if one observes the sequence of events of the past year there, it also reflects the government’s approach to the problem.

The first thing to note about the situation in Manipur is the declining graph of violence in the state since May last year, when violence erupted suddenly. That unleashed a cycle of violence that led to 72 civilian deaths over the months. At the same time, 73 insurgents/terrorists were also killed, the majority being eliminated roughly at the same time as civilian casualties spiked. The exception being 18 insurgents/terrorists who were killed in December. This shows the security apparatus has continued to do its work. This year, until July 4—the last date for which reliable data is available—the graph of civilian casualties has continued to decline, with 24 deaths being reported since January. Viewed over a 24-year period—the time for which consistent data is available—2023 stands out as a year with a very high level of violence. The average number of deaths in this 24-year period is 42 and with the exception of the 2005 to 2009 period—an exceptionally violent time in Manipur—no year has seen such violence as in 2023. It was a unique, one-off year when ethnic violence caught the state and Central governments by surprise. They seem to have learnt their lesson and there is no letting down of the security presence.

Which leads to the second, and most important, issue: How will peace return to Manipur? Here, the prime minister and both governments—in Imphal and in New Delhi—know that there is no easy way out. The violence seen since 2023 is not the usual insurgency seen in the Northeast and even in Manipur, with its alphabet soup of insurgent groups warring with each other and the government. Had that been the case, the Centre would have adopted a different strategy. It would have called the Army and spread a counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency grid. In time, terrorists would have been hunted down and violence brought down to an acceptable level. The reality is that what is being seen in the state is an ethnic conflict between two different communi­ties who have pitched their demands to a level not amenable to negotiation, at least within a short time. There is a history to this violence as Modi said in his speech in Rajya Sabha.

The Kuki demand for a “separate administration”, one independent from Imphal, is a non-starter. For one, Kukis don’t live in one compact zone—they are spread out over differ­ent districts like Churachandpur and Kangpokpi among others—making it impossible to run such a jurisdic­tion coherently. For another, this solu­tion will only deepen the conflict and not resolve it: it will be unacceptable to Meiteis, the dominant community in the state. If anything, a division along these lines will only be a prelude to the dissolution of Manipur as a state: once a separate Kuki-dominated “administra­tion” is conceded, one can be sure the demand for a ‘Nagalim’ or Greater Nagaland—that includes portions of Senapati, Tamen­glong and Ukhrul districts—will arise again. This so-called ‘solution’ will drag a large part of the Northeast back into the fires of conflict from which it has barely emerged.

There is only way out: stamp out violence firmly, but carefully followed by a period of ‘doing nothing’. This might sound like a ‘non-strategy’, but it makes sense given Manipur’s complicated situation. Until the two communities, especially the Kukis, realise that maximalist demands won’t pay, there is no way of finding a solution. For that to happen, time is needed. But until that time arrives, it is of utmost importance that violence be brought down to a minimum.

Anyone who has followed events in the state knows that is exactly what the Centre and the state governments have attempted and have succeeded to an extent since last May. This has left a large number of people in the state, especially Kukis, unhappy. Even today, the leaders of the community—who have found a voice among India’s liberals, intellectuals and its media—continue to demand a “separate administration”. This is a demand that should not be acceded to and is unlikely to be.

This won’t be the first time when violence based on this sort of ‘separatism’ has been attempted. The last 30 years have seen repeated cycles of such violence but that demand went nowhere. Pick any random year in the 1990s and there is not a month when some incident of inter-ethnic violence has not occurred. In fact, it will be hard to find a violence-free month.

It is against this background that the Opposition’s repeated and insistent demands that the prime minister “do something” should be examined. The questioning of the prime minister can be turned on its head: What can a prime minister’s statement or even a visit to that trouble-torn state do? It may lead to a lowering of violence for some time, say a few weeks or even a month, but given the nature of this conflict, it is certain to pick up again. At that point, the Opposition would get a chance to say what they have always wanted to say: the prime minister has failed. Instead, the prime minister did not take that bait. Union Home Minister Amit Shah spent some time in the state last year and the minister of state (MoS) for home affairs made repeated visits. These were practical visits to bolster administrative requirements and situ­ational assessments. The Opposition has to do what it has to do: try and gain mileage. The task of the government is tougher: to ensure the integrity of Manipur—something essential for the integrity of India—and to protect the lives of innocent civilians. It is taking Manipur out of that minefield even if the progress has been slow and painful. That, however, is to be expected given the complex ethnic conflict there. It is interesting to note that while the Opposition roundly criticises the prime minister—which is its right—it has not put one concrete suggestion to solve the eth­nic problem there except for saying the prime minister should go to Manipur. Perhaps it knows that there is no magic wand that can fix that broken state. Everything else is political posturing.

Churachandpurethnic violenceGreater NagalandKangpokpiKukisManipurMeiteis