India Under Attack

SHUTTERED WINDOWS and empty streets marked Kashmir on April 23, a day after a group of terrorists affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) emerged from the forest next to a scenic meadow at Baisaran near Pahalgam and shot dead male tourists in cold blood after asking for their religious identities. In one instance, the terrorists con­cluded that a victim did not look like a Mus­lim and shot him. The cries of women who pleaded in vain for the lives of husbands and male relatives rang out long after the assassins melted away into the woods. Terrified tour­ists who ran helter-skelter were rescued by Indian security forces, who sought to assure the panicked victims that they were now in the safe hands of the Indian Army.

The popular sentiment in the Kashmir Valley is often an interplay of resentment against the Indian mainland, sympathy for separatism, as also a desire for the benefits of normalcy. On Tuesday (April 22) evening, as bodies arrived in Pahalgam and distraught and bereaved relatives gave vent to their grief, a dark mood descended on the town. Local tourist and hotel operators felt overwhelmed as it was only hours earlier that families and friends had set out for Baisaran. Their world was sundered in minutes and women and children were left grappling with sudden loss. The brutality of the violence was numbing, overshadowing everything else at least momentarily, polarising discussions on identity and statehood. The black front pages of leading Kash­miri newspapers reflected genuine revulsion even as lodges and hotels emptied in hours and the tourist boom collapsed like a pricked bubble.

The ruthlessness of the attack was chilling. As details of the precise manner by which male non-Muslim victims were identified and the deliberation with which women were spared emerged, the full import of the attack began to sink in. The target was located at some distance from the Line of Control (LoC) and although accessible only on foot or on horseback, it was just 5km from Pahalgam, which is a tourism nerve centre. The decision to strike deep in the interior was a political signal intended to convey that LeT and its mentors retain a deadly punch and the operation indicated local support. The likely objectives included, said a for­mer Army officer familiar with the region, a desire to tell the local audience that Pakistan has not given up on imposing its will on the Kashmir Valley. At an international level, it was a reminder that the Kashmir issue is not “settled” and Pakistan is not willing to accept being marginalised by India, which has de-prioritised relations with Islamabad.

The timing of the terror strike, days after Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir’s bellicose speech stating that differences between Hindus and Muslims are irreconcilable and reiterating the populist chant about Kashmir being Pakistan’s “jugular vein”, is significant though the plot would have been in the making for a while. It was also intended to coincide with the visit of US Vice President JD Vance. The Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) control terrorist actions in Jammu & Kashmir and provocation aims to undercut the Indian govern­ment’s claim that terrorist violence is down and that burgeoning tourism is the best evidence of normalcy.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave voice to India’s response unequivocally when he spoke at a rally in Madhubani in Bihar on April 24. Choosing with deliberation to speak in English so that the international audience received the message clearly, he said, “From the soil of Bihar, I say to the whole world, India will identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers. We will pursue them to the ends of the Earth. India’s spirit will never be broken by terrorism. Terrorism will not go unpunished. Every effort will be made to ensure justice is done. The entire nation is firm in this resolve. Everyone who believes in humanity is with us. I thank the people of various countries and their leaders who have stood with us in this time.” The die is cast and it is only a matter of when, rather than if, with re­gard to India’s retaliation, which is likely to be pointed but severe. Modi cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia on April 22 and Home Minister Amit Shah rushed to Srinagar. A day later, on the evening of April 23, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met and took the first set of decisions against Pakistan. The CCS decided to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), 1960 and close the Integrated Check Post at Attari after re­viewing the security situation. Pakistani nationals will not be allowed to travel to India under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES). Current SVES visas is­sued to Pakistani nationals are deemed cancelled. Defence, naval and air advisers in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi have a week to leave India. India will similarly withdraw advisers from the Indi­an High Commission in Islamabad. Over­all strength of the high commissions will be 30, down from the present 55, by May 1.

Although brokered by the World Bank and despite clauses for the involvement of “neutral” experts to resolve disputes, the IWT is essentially a bi­lateral arrangement and India’s restraint even in times of war and heightened tensions is the reason it has worked so far. Now India would be free to carry out works that can range from short diver­sions, run of river projects, canal works for freight transport, and even small dams. This is not a simple matter for Pakistan which is reeling under water and power shortages. Cities like Karachi are already facing heat conditions and a persistent water crisis has worsened, aided by civic mismanagement.

Modi’s declaration that the guilty will not go unpunished, seconded forcefully by Shah and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, is a clear indication that military options will be discussed. This will require careful consideration as a knee-jerk response may not deliver required results. The air space over Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) was buzzing with activity following the Pahal­gam attack and going by the post-Pulwama experience in 2019, military were deployed on the ground in a manner intended to reduce India’s choices. As things stand, air-launched missiles and bombs against specific military or LeT targets are viable options. The presence of Rafales makes it possible to launch missiles with­out crossing the LoC or the International Border (IB). The scale of the attack is such that the Indian response will be substantial, irrespective of the timing.

The killing of unsuspecting tourists at a time when Vance and his family were in India was a throwback to the 2001 targeted killing of 35 Sikhs in Chittisinghpura village, also in Anantnag district, on the eve of then US President Bill Clinton’s visit. Meant to discredit the Vajpayee government, the atrocity was unable to derail a reset in India-US ties after the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests had cast a shadow on bilateral relations. In fact, on his way out, Clinton had spent just a few hours in Islamabad while in India he had addressed Parliament and spoken of his role in getting Pakistan to step back from the LoC during the 1999 Kargil War. This time, President Donald Trump lost no time in speaking to Prime Minister Modi, offering his full support. “PM Modi, and the incredible people of India, have our full support and sympathies,” he said. On Wednesday, April 23, Shah paid homage to the dead, met mourning relatives and took a chopper ride to the Baisaran meadow, a decision intended to demonstrate resolve as much as it was a first-hand inspection of the scene of the crime. Modi’s immediate travel plans within the country were put on hold. Offering condolences to those who lost their near ones, Modi, in a statement on X, said: “Those behind this heinous act will be brought to justice… they will not be spared! Their evil agenda will never succeed. Our resolve to fight terrorism is unshakable and it will get even stronger.” Shah returned from Srinagar after under­taking a detailed assessment of the manhunt for the Lashkar gang and assessing the security situation in the Valley and Jammu.

THE SKETCHES OF three of the assailants were released and two of the five terrorists involved were said to be locals. The operation to track down the killer squad is ongoing and there is a possibility of more terrorists, who might have remained in the forest, keeping an eye open for security forces. The local element is particularly worrying as it indicates a simmering resentment even as recruitment to terrorist ranks is down. Though political parties like Mehbooba Mufti’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) supported the shutdown against the killings, their divisive and grievance-laden politics only serves to sharpen feelings of alienation and separateness. Having seen its proxies like the Hurriyat leaders being marginalised and the hawala networks funding terror neutralised, Pakistan has been looking for means to revive violence in the Valley. The Pahalgam attack, it feels, might provide the purchase it seeks. Though the Pakistani government has denied any involvement, it is doubtful the civilian leadership would have known much about the army and ISI plans. Even after the Uri and Pulwama attacks, India had taken its time to verify the identities of the attackers and assess options to strike back. The Mumbai 26/11 attacks saw the CCS consider air strikes but uncertainty about dealing with a likely escalation saw plans for military action shelved. In any case, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, going by contemporary ac­counts and people familiar with discussions in the CCS, was not inclined to use military options. In the wake of the 2001 Lash­kar-Jaish attack on Parliament, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had ordered a military mobilisation, Operation Para­kram, but hostilities did not actually break out. After months of border deployment, Vajpayee visited Islamabad in early 2004 and talks with then Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf yielded a joint statement whereby Pakistan committed not to let territory under its control be used for anti-India activities. The as­surances were repeatedly violated and a brief thaw that followed when the Vajpayee government lost the 2004 General Election and Singh became prime minister as leader of the United Progres­sive Alliance (UPA) evaporated with 26/11.

After the Modi government took office, retaliatory options were refined. The process began with the successful cross-border strike in Myanmar against NSCN-K insurgents in June 2015. At the time voices in Islamabad warned against attempts to use similar options against Pakistan but the September 2016 Jaish attack on the Indian Army camp at Uri, which led to the deaths of 19 soldiers, altered the calculus. Though cross-LoC strikes had been carried out in the past, they were fairly shallow and not acknowledged. The “surgical strikes” carried out under cover of darkness in the early hours of Sep­tember 28, 2016 went far deeper and hit multiple terrorist launch pads in PoK. Although Pakistan denied anything had happened, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Army announced the strikes the next day and envoys of several countries were briefed by the foreign secretary.

THE SUICIDE BOMBING of a convoy carrying Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans in Pulwama on Febru­ary 14, 2019 resulted in the death of 40 troopers. Addressing a rally in Rajasthan a few days later, Modi had promised the terror­ist attack would be avenged. The air raid on the Lashkar training camp at Balakot in PoK on February 26 was a stunning response, killing dozens of jihadists and providing the Pakistan army a lot to mull over. In both instances, Pakistan denied that any damage was done. It claimed the surgical strikes did not happen, although local police affirmed that dozens of bodies had been removed, and denied that the Balakot operation did not cause casualties. Yet, Pakistan restricted access to the Balakot site for one-and-a-half months and then conducted a carefully curated tour for foreign media.

The Pakistani deep state has myriad layers and counts on its proxies to remind the world, and the US in particular, that it can­not be ignored. Undercutting India’s global standing and hurting Modi’s image as a strong leader are part of its calculations. The military, despite a relative decline in its influence and standing with the US, can still call on some old favours while reminding the American security establishment of its capacity to destabilise the region. Yet its plans have not worked well lately as the euphoria over the Taliban’s return in Afghanistan did not last long. Just as the Pakistan army thought it would regain “strategic depth”, it found the Taliban unwilling to be a junior, compliant partner. Not just that, there were border clashes and attacks by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within Pakistan increased. The Pakistan army was humiliated by the hijacking of a train and killing of its personnel by Baloch militants. Time and again, the generals in Rawalpindi have demonstrated that they can miscalculate, perhaps swayed by their ability to script a major terrorist attack in India. They might also believe that fractious political debates over issues such as the Waqf reform and polarisation in J&K over the abrogation of Article 370 give them the opportunity to stir troubled waters.

The surgical strikes and the Balakot air raid altered the reac­tive matrix of India’s operations but the deadly game of cat-and mouse continues to evolve. The weaknesses in security exposed by the attacks indicate the need for a fresh appraisal of operations that provide primacy to a unit like the Rashtriya Rifles which has considerable experience of the region and whose commanders are well versed with the terrain and the people. Old-fashioned hu­man intelligence never goes out of fashion and ears on the ground remain the best way to pick up warnings. There is a need, feel some experts, for a relook at the coordination between special forces, J&K police anti-terror squads, National Security Guards (NSG), and regular Army units. Lapses that led to the tragedy at Pahalgam need thorough examination. Despite heated rhetoric over the Waqf Bill, violence has been limited to West Bengal and there has been no discernible adverse international reaction, in­cluding from Islamic countries.

The Pahalgam attack has resulted in widespread condemna­tion. The truth is that Pakistan has been steadily losing traction in the one arena that matters the most to its elites—India’s domestic politics. Most people will find it hard to recall who Pakistan’s cur­rent high commissioner to India is, a far cry from the media space previous occupants of the purple-domed building that houses the high commission in Delhi’s diplomatic enclave enjoyed. There has been no incentive for India to change its state of disengage­ment with Pakistan despite attempts by Islamabad to renew dia­logue or even bilateral cricket matches. Pahalgam puts Pakistan back on the agenda, although the story may not end in quite the way General Munir might have intended.

India-Pakistan relationsIndian touristsKashmirPahalgamPakistan’s army chief Asim MunirTerror attackstourists killed