Return to the Deterrence Doctrine

RUSSIAN LEADER Nikita Khrushchev’s shoe-banging at the United Nations in 1960 when he vigorously countered the Philippine delegate’s criticism of the Soviet Union for turning East Europe into a vast client state is the stuff of Cold War legend. The story endures even though the UN’s video record shows Khruschev agitatedly waving his arm with no shoe in sight. The pugnacious Russian, whose denunciation of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin sent shockwaves through the socialist world, averted a showdown over the Cuban Missile Crisis and eventu­ally worked out a nuclear thaw with the US. Khruschev’s long tenure at the top offers evidence of how boastful claims and angry outbursts, calibrated or otherwise, might work in certain circumstances. There are, of course, limits to such tactics as bellicose behaviour and brash comments may alarm an adversary and accelerate a costly arms race.

Is the Russian decision to revise its nuclear doctrine lowering the threshold for NATO nations and Ukraine, by stating that an attack by a non-nuclear weapons state with the backing of a nuclear power will amount to a “joint attack”, a Khruschev moment? The revision came after US President Joe Biden permit­ted Ukraine to use American long-range missiles to hit targets inside Russia but did not appear to stir Washington. A White House statement to Reuters said there was no surprise in the Russian decision and that this had been in the works for weeks. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, an ally of Russian leader Vladimir Putin, did not mince words though, stating NATO missile strikes could be considered an attack by the bloc and result in the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against Kyiv and key NATO facilities, wher­ever located. The last bit intended to indicate US targets are included.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence, developed with contributions from stellar minds like Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger, proved remarkably durable through the Cold War despite the US and Soviet Union waging proxy wars across the globe in places like Nicaragua, Angola, Vietnam and Afghanistan, to name a few. Despite some close calls, the two superpowers did not test one another’s tolerance beyond a point, making deterrence a valuable principle, though it rested on a calculus of fear and retribution, rather than trust and transparency. The realisation that neither could wipe out the nuclear capabilities of the rival in one fell blow made second strike a powerful deterrent. As American generals after World War II put it, it was almost impossible to strike down all components of an incoming nuclear attack once it was airborne. The answer lay in the ability to inflict massive retaliation to ensure the other side never punched the launch buttons. The stability of deterrence became evident as hot wars and non-conventional ones too were waged under a nuclear umbrella.

The Russian response is alarming. Declaring a nuclear ally of a non-nuclear state as complicit in an attack on its soil will open a Pandora’s box. Are there learnings for India? There is, in the immediate context, no call to consider changes in India’s no-first use policy. India and China have not exchanged nuclear threats and while Pakistan has rattled the sabre in the past and can do so again, it has little to gain by such conduct

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There were lessons for ‘lesser’ nuclear powers too, ones that were not openly nuclear weapons states. During the Kargil War, Pakistan deliberately fired nuclear-capable missiles, conveying an unsubtle message of the risks of escalation as the war in the Himalayas became intense and India began gaining ground. As things turned out, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was clear that no front other than the Line of Control (LoC) would be opened even as Indian troops paid a heavy price clamber­ing up steep hills to dislodge heavily armed Pakistani regulars. The restraint paid off with then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledging India’s diplomatic and military strategy, telling External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, “You did not put a foot wrong.” But at the same time, the intensely fought Kargil War told Indian military planners and the political executive that a hot war can indeed be waged despite both sides being nuclear pow­ers. Years later, the Modi government pushed the envelope, carrying out surgical strikes on terror launchpads across the LoC in 2016 and bombing a Lashkar terror camp in Balakot in Pakistan in 2019, effectively calling Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. The Indian government’s threat to launch missile attacks if Indian Air Force pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman was not returned unharmed from Pakistani captivity was another instance of a threat being delivered credibly.

Yet, in recent years, the deterrence doctrine has frayed. “The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence stands eroded. It does seem the US is not shy of poking a nuclear adversary. This is a new and grave situation with unpredictable consequences and should be a source of global concern,” B Venkatesh Varma, who served as Indian ambassador to Russia, told Open. The use of long-range missiles by Ukraine might seem an act of desperation, but this will be a charitable explanation. Russia has lost thousands of soldiers, but after 1,000 days of warfare, Ukraine is a shattered nation. A country born just 33 years ago has lost a large swathe of its eastern territory, has seen its middle class flee in panic and is buried under billions of dollars in debt. Its actions raise the ques­tion whether its leadership is waging someone else’s war. Recent report of public resentment may not be straws in the wind. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s purge of his regime has been presented as an effort to achieve better cohesion but several decisions were clearly political. The Russian response is also alarming. Declaring a nuclear ally of a non-nuclear state as complicit in an attack on its soil will open a Pandora’s box. Russia backs the Syrian regime and would the US see an attack on its assets in similar light? Oddly enough, the two oldest nuclear powers are destabilising deterrence.

Are there learnings for India? There is, in the immediate context, no call to consider changes in India’s no-first use policy. India and China have not exchanged nuclear threats and while Pakistan has rattled the sabre in the past and can do so again, it has little to gain by such conduct. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains ambig­uous, not ruling out first use, and despite the assertions of some Pakistani scholars that the nuclear strategy has become more granular, there are no clear thresholds. This fits with the Pakistan military’s view, iterated in its “green book”, that nuclear weapons are part of a triad, with the armed forces and jihadist groups

being the other two components. The triad is seen as an effective counter to India, providing for nuclear deterrence and the deni­ability of the actions of jihadists active in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India. As of now, the generals in Rawalpindi have kept the levels of violence in J&K below a threshold, crossing which might provide justification for a stronger Indian reaction.

In a recent announcement, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center said it has set up a bipartisan taskforce on nuclear proliferation and US national security in the backdrop of grow­ing nuclear threats. The panel’s mandate is to assess “prolifera­tion threats” but its key task could be to chart a response to the challenges posed by Russia and China. It is unclear if the US strategic community has fully grasped the wear and tear in the deterrence doctrine and more clarity may emerge after President-elect Donald Trump assumes office. Khruschev’s shoe is off the foot, but the question is if it will actually drop.

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Rajeev Deshpande

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