
Bangladesh’s relationship with India has never been static. Shaped by ideology, history and political survival, successive Prime Ministers have swung between deep strategic partnership and deliberate distancing.
Every relationship between the top brass of the two countries has followed a near-predictable cycle. When the Awami League (AL) was in power, ties with India tend to be warmer, rooted in the shared legacy of the 1971 Liberation War. When the BNP or military-backed governments are in power, Bangladesh purportedly leans toward China and Pakistan as strategic counterweights.
On March 19, 1972, PM Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indian PM Indira Gandhi signed the 25-Year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace. Rooted in India's military support during the Liberation War, the treaty emphasised mutual trust, secularism and economic cooperation. Indian troops withdrew promptly at Mujib's request.
A sharp pivot. Military-backed regimes, most notably under BNP founder Zia-ur-Rahman, moved away from India's orbit. They adopted a stronger Islamic identity, strengthened ties with Pakistan, and cultivated China as a strategic partner - reducing what they saw as excessive dependence on New Delhi.
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Hasina signed the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty in 1996 – a 30-year agreement on Farakka Barrage water flows that military regimes had left unresolved. It was pragmatic diplomacy focused on concrete bilateral issues.
Reportedly this was the most strained period in modern times.
India accused the BNP-Jamaat coalition of allowing Northeast Indian insurgent groups, including ULFA, to operate from Bangladeshi soil. Concerns over rising radicalisation added to the friction, and strategic trust between the two governments deteriorated sharply.
Hasina's zero-tolerance policy against terrorism led to the handover of wanted militants to Indian authorities and tighter border management. Bangladesh shifted from being a security concern to a reliable strategic partner for India during this period.
In June 2015, PMs Modi and Hasina ratified the Land Boundary Agreement, ending a 68-year-old border dispute. It facilitated the exchange of 162 enclaves, granting citizenship clarity to tens of thousands of people, and is widely regarded as one of South Asia's most significant diplomatic achievements.
Following large-scale student-led protests, Hasina resigned on August 5, 2024, and left for India. An interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus assumed power, and a period of diplomatic uncertainty followed.
Cautious and recalibrating. The Yunus administration has called for constructive ties with India while also deepening outreach toward China. The shift has revived concerns in New Delhi about a return to the distancing seen under previous non-AL governments.
Bangladesh shares over 4,000 kilometres of border with India, making the bilateral relationship structurally unavoidable. Trade, water-sharing, connectivity, and cross-border security are deeply intertwined.
According to regional trade data, India remains one of Bangladesh's largest trading partners - a reality no government in Dhaka can sidestep regardless of ideology.
India's early approach was ideologically driven - backing secular, AL-aligned governments. Over time, New Delhi shifted toward a more interest-based framework, prioritising trade corridors, energy cooperation, and counterterrorism outcomes.
India's engagement with Bangladesh today is less about ideological alignment and more about strategic and economic stability in its eastern neighbourhood.
(With inputs from yMedia)