China’s Marine Corps Overhaul: Is Beijing Preparing for Taiwan?

China’s marines are training for more than beach landings. From Taiwan scenarios to African bases, the PLA Navy Marine Corps is being reshaped into a fast, tech-heavy expeditionary force. What exactly are they preparing for and how?

What is the PLAN Marine Corps, and why does it matter now?

The People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) is China’s expeditionary amphibious force, broadly comparable to the US Marine Corps.

Estimated at roughly 30,000 personnel, it is the world’s second-largest marine corps.

Designed for rapid maritime deployment and crisis response, it is increasingly central to Beijing’s military planning as security competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific.

Why is the sea so central to China’s strategy?

Rear Admiral Zhu Chuansheng, commander of the PLANMC, framed it starkly: China’s primary security threats are at sea, the focal point of military struggle is at sea, and the expansion of national interests is also at sea.

That assessment elevates the marine corps from a niche amphibious unit to a frontline instrument of national power, tasked with operating across China’s maritime periphery and far seas.

Is Taiwan part of the equation?

Yes, both implicitly and explicitly. The Pentagon’s most recent assessment states that modernization and refinements to amphibious assault capabilities continue to indicate that a Taiwan invasion scenario remains a top consideration for the PLA. Zhu has also emphasized rapidly seizing and controlling target areas to deny time for reinforcements or intervention by “extra-regional powers” —language widely interpreted as referencing a Taiwan contingency.

What missions are Chinese marines being trained for?

Zhu outlined four major roles for the corps. The first is acting as an initial assault force, capable of breaching defenses, conducting multidimensional raids and seizing critical points in contested environments. The second involves capturing and controlling islands and reefs, especially in disputed maritime zones, through integrated amphibious operations backed by precision strikes. A third mission positions the corps as a tool of maritime deterrence, securing chokepoints, breaking blockades and conducting special operations close to adversary bases. Finally, Zhu described the marine corps as suited for overseas expeditionary missions, including evacuations, escort operations, armed rescue and limited punitive actions.

What does “island and reef control” actually mean in practice?

It implies the ability to seize or retake contested features and transform them into fortified strongpoints equipped with air defenses and sea-control fires. In strategic terms, this capability is relevant to disputes in the South China Sea, tensions near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Beijing’s claims over Taiwan. Amphibious integration and multidomain coordination are central to this approach.

How is the PLANMC modernising?

The restructuring of the corps into a more multidomain force began in 2017. By 2021, the induction of ZTQ-15 light tanks signaled a shift toward heavier, more versatile combat capability. Amphibious assets have expanded with four Type 075 landing helicopter dock ships already in service, while the forthcoming Type 076 vessel is expected to further strengthen force projection. China has also introduced specialized landing barges that allow commercial roll-on/roll-off vessels to offload equipment at sea, enhancing amphibious logistics in unconventional ways.

Is technology central to this evolution?

Very much so. Zhu emphasized the growing importance of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and distributed operations in high-end maritime warfare. He called for optimizing reconnaissance, command-and-control and strike “kill chains,” and for replacing personnel attrition with materiel attrition by leveraging unmanned systems and lower-cost methods to degrade high-value targets. Persistent cyber and electronic warfare capabilities—including jamming, deception and electromagnetic suppression—are also seen as critical to paralyzing adversaries.

Is China learning from the US Marine Corps?

Yes. Zhu referenced the USMC’s “Force Design 2030” as a model for accelerating equipment modernization and optimizing force structure. However, the stated objective is not simple imitation but adaptation—building a marine corps tailored to China’s maritime geography, strategic ambitions and potential conflict scenarios.

What about overseas operations and basing?

China already maintains a marine detachment in Djibouti and has secured access to facilities in Cambodia. The Pentagon has assessed that Beijing may be considering additional basing arrangements across multiple regions. Zhu’s concept envisions leveraging friendly nations, overseas support bases and even Chinese-invested commercial infrastructure to sustain forward presence and support expeditionary missions.

What challenges does the PLANMC face?

Despite rapid progress, structural challenges remain. Assessments cited in the report point to limited overseas operational experience among personnel, command-and-control complications across long distances, logistical and lift constraints, and the need to balance Taiwan contingencies with broader global ambitions. Training is becoming more realistic and large-scale, including simulations of Taiwan environments, but institutional and operational hurdles persist.

What’s the bigger picture?

Zhu indicated that the structure and capabilities of the marine corps are a constant concern of Chairman Xi Jinping. The strategic trajectory is clear: China is building a marine force designed to move quickly from sea to land, operate across domains and sustain presence far from home waters.

If a maritime crisis erupts—whether near Taiwan or on distant shores—Beijing intends to have a ready instrument of response. And that instrument is increasingly its marines.

(With inputs from ANI)