India Will Collapse Without Digital Sovereignty And Pax Indica: Lessons From Hormuz

By now it is clear that the Iran War (or West Asia War) has been a disaster to all concerned, including the principals as well as assorted passersby. The massive amounts spent by the US (at last count $25 billion) are at least articulated; the bill for the enormous infrastructural and human suffering inflicted on Gulf states, in the theatre of war, must be greater, by definition.

The collateral damages suffered by the rest of the world from the cessation of trade through the Straits of Hormuz will presumably run into the trillions of dollars. As one of the worst affected, India, which imports 90% of its hydrocarbons from the Gulf, not to mention other essential items such as urea (for fertilizer), sulfuric acid, helium, etc., is on track to take a massive hit. As an article in The Economic Times said, “India must brace for broad-based economic shock”.

Indian exports of up to $50 billion are also affected, especially agricultural products including perishable foodstuffs, but also gems and jewellery, electronics, textiles and garments. Some of this can be diverted via Oman and the UAE’s Fujairah port, but much of it passes through the Straits of Hormuz and is potentially blocked and/or stranded at sea.

The Hormuz closure is a body blow to India’s economy. What can and will India do about it? The Indian State has a habit of rising to the challenge only when there is a crisis, while vegetating otherwise. The 1991 economic crisis is a case in point; the sanctions following “The Buddha is smiling”, and the denial of cryogenic rocket engines and supercomputers are other examples where the nation rallied. So were covid vaccines. Necessity, they say, is the mother of invention.

Turning a threat into an opportunity

If I were to be an optimist, I could say that the current crisis is actually an opportunity. In fact, a major opportunity. My reading of the Iran War is that it is President Trump’s strategic tit-for-tat against China for denying him rare earths and cutting off soybean purchases. In return Trump decided to deny China access to oil by closing access to Venezuela and Iran. Whether this will work, or whether the G2 condominium (read ‘surrender’) will prevail, is unclear.

But that is, in a sense, background noise that needs to be managed. India needs to focus on its own issues, of which I see several as critical, and the solution in general is to become Atmanirbhar, self-reliant, and from that, to create an Anti-Fragile nation:

1. National security/defense

2. Food security

3. Energy security

4. Digital security/narrative control

5. Trade security

The first three do not need an explanation: they are obvious. Internal and external security are pre-requisites for any successful society. If India’s hard-won food security can be threatened by external threats, then there needs to be some deep introspection. Energy security means diversification, both of hydrocarbon sources, and of types of energy, including renewables, nuclear, biomass, coal-based, and so on.

Malign narratives and digital sovereignty

Narrative control is something that the Indian State has failed at so far; it is laughably easy to create hate speech against Indians and India (as has been demonstrated freely by any number of players, starting from the MAGA crowd, to Audrey Truschke to a”Cockroach Janata Party” and some nitwit Norwegian journalist in just the last fortnight) and there are no consequences to the culprits. It’s enough to make me pine for Lee Kuan Yew’s aggressive legal battles against the media.

It’s one thing if it were only a problem with foreigners, but with the massive spread of social media, and in particular generativeAI, it is becoming a serious domestic issue. Since India is an avid consumer of social media, and because generativeAI is trained on things like Wikipedia, X, Whatsapp and Google content, biased and motivated material becomes ensconced as The Truth. I have written about narrative warfare and manufacturing consent.

This used to be a one-way tsunami of (mis)-information by legacy media, but now there is also the opposite: the wholesale and free vacuuming-up of Indian data (whatever happened to “data is the new oil”?). The “Great Firewall of China” both kept out foreign BIg Tech applications and prevented their plundering Chinese data: is that the way to go?

Manufactured narratives are intended for regime change: all the color revolutions today are hatched with massive bot-farms funded by some combination of Deep State, CCP, ISI, Qatar etc. (for example the alleged Gen-Z uprisings that rocked Nepal, drove Sheikh Hasina out of Bangladesh). Thus muzzling malign narratives, and ensuring data security, are imperative.

Even Singapore is not immune: it had to block anti-India narratives that likely originated from Chinese sources.

A particularly striking example of narrative warfare is the virtual hate speech inducted into Wikipedia by deeply prejudiced anonymous editors. Ashley Rindsberg, who exposed the mighty New York Times’ biases in his book The Gray Lady Winked, provides many examples of this.

Of note to Indians and Hindus is his recent substack titled “Wikipedia’s India War” where he identifies just four editors as having created most of the content condemning the Hindu American Foundation (HAF) in ‘Wikivoice’, i.e. the allegedly neutral perspective of Wikipedia. They are, on the contrary, shown to be highly one-sided.

As Rindsberg mentions, Wikipedia being central to generativeAI, the damage is baked into the world-view of all AI applications. Truly Orwellian. Says Rindsberg: “four… anonymous accounts can have an enormous impact on what millions of people believe to be the truth.” “Over four years (2021-2025), editors systematically erased HAF’s identity as an American civil rights group, transforming its Wikipedia page into a heavily curated dossier of accusations.”

Trade, and how the Spice Route was far superior to the Silk Road

Finally, something that is becoming increasingly important: ensuring freedom of trade. This is more than just freedom of navigation, although I find it instructive that Emperor Rajendra Chola sent a huge fleet 1,001 years ago simply to open up the Straits of Malacca. India can make an active attempt to regain primacy in Indian Ocean trade, the whole Pax indica idea.

Here is another example of the power of narrative: we have been led to believe that the Silk Road to China was some major highway of commerce between ancient Rome and ancient China, but it was a term coined only in 1877 by the German Ferdinand von Richthofen. There was no highway. A large caravan might take six months, and with 500 camels traversing treacherous deserts and braving bandits, it might carry a maximum of 100 tons. That is puny.

In comparison, on the Spice Route, a single stitched ship from Muziris could carry 400 tons of ivory, pepper, silk, tigers and elephants; and the historian Strabo around 1 CE talks about fleets of 250 ships going from Alexandria to India on a six-week monsoon-powered journey. That is 100,000 tons of merchandise. No wonder Pliny the Elder complained that Rome’s treasuries were being emptied of gold by India.

Simple question: where are hoards of ancient Roman coins found in Asia? Answer: not along the Silk Road. The hoards are in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka.

Today, it is possible for India to aspire to port-led development of trade, especially with the major ports at Trivandrum (Vizhinjam), Maharashtra (Vadhavan), and Great Nicobar (Galathea Bay). The underlying ‘software’ of India’s millennia-old trade competency was a ‘multi-protocol switch’ as I pointed out, and today’s India Stack can replicate that. Then there is the need for a blue-water navy: muscle to provide security on the Hormuz to Malacca sea-lanes.

So there is a vision. How can India get there? This is where policy matters, as I discussed with policy expert Anuj Gupta. Policy, especially industrial policy, has had a bad reputation in certain circles because it was deemed to violate the virginal purity of classical capitalism. However, in a recent U-turn, even the World Bank admitted that industrial policy may not be all that bad, after all: the success of Japan, the Asian Tigers, and China can’t be ignored.

That leads to the question of why policy in India has produced mediocre outcomes, what is different now, and where the best use of policy might be.

Industrial Policy: What went wrong in the past?

There are many problems here. To begin with, the Soviet model, which Nehruvians swore by, was, in hindsight, a dead end. Second, there is the problem of governance: post-Independence bureaucrats have awkwardly borne the legacy of imperial hauteur and the needs of a developing society. Third, until recently, the bare necessities (food, electricity, road access) were not available to many citizens, and GDP growth was not their priority.

There is also the culture of jugaad: of clever ways in which you overcome constraints through frugal improvisation and seat-of-the-pants making-do. This is fine for one-off things (e.g. converting a tractor trailer into a makeshift transport vehicle because your truck broke down), but it does not make for efficient and replicable industrial products. As The Economic Times said recently, it is time to junk jugaad. Quality has to become ingrained in people’s minds.

The issue of governance is significant: the bureaucracy and the judiciary have both under-performed, politicians, as everywhere, have been venal. It is said that China’s growth can be attributed to the fact that its babus are engineers, and therefore with engineering ruthlessness move in straight lines. The US’ babus are lawyers, and India’s are humanities graduates. Well, engineers are not very good at second-order effects (eg. China’s lurch from one-child policy to demographic collapse), but a little bit of ruthlessness is probably good.

What is going reasonably well?

There are a few modest success stories: for example, in electronics manufacturing or assembly. The PLIs (and DLIs) have produced the desired effort, with clusters of excellence where global suppliers have also set up shop (as they did earlier for the automobile industry in, say, Sriperumpudur). The fact that a lot of iPhones in the US are now imported from India is laudable, even though it may be derided as “screwdriver jobs”. That’s where one starts the move up the value chain.

The current semiconductor policy is a big hope, especially after the landmark agreement by the Dutch firm ASML with Tata Electronics in Dholera, Gujarat. Given that ASML has a near-monopoly position in Deep Ultraviolet Lithography (DUV) this is a major boost to India’s chip ambitions. My recent conversation with AMD CTO Suraj Rengarajan went into India’s chances to realize its ambitions.

A recent announcement from Trivandrum-based fabless startup NetraSemi (a recipient of DLI) of the commercial availability of its edge AI chips is a landmark.

Next is the newly announced plan for energy security revolving around both coal gasification and intensive offshore exploration. These fall squarely into the Atmanirbhar category: India simply cannot afford to have its energy held hostage by distant nations. It also needs distinctly Indian innovation.

The Samudra Manthan initiative is also showing some promise. At least one out of three deep-water wells in the Andaman Sea (SriVijaya Puram-3) are reported to be showing the availability of natural gas, although it will take 5-10 years for this to be commercially available.

What should the future look like for India’s Industrial Policies?

This of course is the hard question. Here is my personal perspective, and I accept that reasonable people may disagree. I think three areas need to be focused on, and will pay large dividends.

1. Drones and swarming software

2. Social media and AI stack

3. Maritime Trade and Blue-Water Navy

I admit that these are not the only worthwhile industrial policies. Another is for copper, which would reverse the catastrophic effects of the closure of the Sterlite plant in Thoothukkudi, as the metal is an increasingly important component in electronics, data centers, etc., and far from being self-sufficient earlier, India now imports 50% of its needs. Another area of interest in quantum computing.

There are also failures from which the right lessons need to be learned. The policy for EV batteries has apparently failed: according to Swarajya magazine, India has not been able to escape from near-total dependence on imported Chinese batteries.

Drone swarms

I wrote recently that drones may well herald a step-change in warfare. For the moment, though, they are searching for their niche in offensive/defensive warfare. Drone hardware is already a well-trodden path with Chinese and other nations dominating it, although with IdeaForge, Paras, Garuda, IoTechworld Avigation etc., India is also making progress there. And India is indeed buying the hardware, $2 billion-worth, according to the Economic Times.

But I believe the real game is in drone swarms. AI-based control software (similar to HiveMind) that would allow an entire swarm to act autonomously, just like a murmuration of starlings, would be the gold standard to aim for. Such a self-managing swarm would be virtually impossible to defend against, and I think India should put in place a PLI to support it, leveraging software capability in the country.

Of course, drones are not just for military purposes, but also for commercial uses including things like logistics and agricultural use, such as precision delivery of fertilizer and pesticide to crops (as Garuda demonstrates). An Indian initiative that supports both drone hardware, and especially drone software, would be a potential winner.

Digital Sovereignty: Social media and AI stack

There is a raging battle over which part of the AI stack India needs to invest in. As an old Unix hand, I believe the foundational model is not where the differentiation is. In analogy with Linux (the open-source Unix variant that was popularized by Linus Torvalds and an army of volunteers), there is little value in re-writing the operating system, but one can differentiate by building on top of it, or by judiciously choosing certain modules of it.

Besides, the cost of building an entirely new foundational model would be astronomical and would consume the entire budget of IndiaAI Mission.

Thus, my personal opinion is that the foundational model (especially when, it is believed, there are more or less open-source models available for free, e.g. Llama, DeepSeek) is not where India should expend its precious R&D resources, but on the layers of the stack above it. It is the data that matters, as Larry Ellison apparently suggests too.

But there is the interesting counter-example of Sarvam AI which is producing its own sovereign model: multi-lingual and presumably otherwise tuned to Indian needs. The question is whether this can survive when hundreds of billions worth of capital investment are going to the US Big Tech companies and their Chinese rivals. The sad history of Koo, a Twitter rival, comes to mind. So does Arattai, a Whatsapp rival, whose popularity has waned. .

A well-thought-through industrial policy on generativeAI is therefore essential. The status quo ante is unsustainable; given the fact that Sarvam has also found it difficult to raise funds in the US, it is worth pondering whether a China-style massive subsidy is the answer. And where should it go, into foundational models or into the layers of the stack above it? The answer is “both”, but with priority to the latter.

Here is where I would prioritize investments, in order:

1. Vertical applications in specific domains: e.g. defense, healthcare, agriculture, governance (particularly in the judiciary and in ease of doing business in the bureaucracy)

2. Fine-tuning and customization: for the needs of the Indian context, e.g. multi-linguality under Bhashini

3. Compute infrastructure: GPUs, sovereign and protected indian datasets

4. Sovereign Small-Language Models such as Sarvam AI

As mentioned above, at the moment India’s data is being sucked up for free by US Big Tech. In addition, there is the real danger that Indic Knowledge Systems will be mined and digested, as has happened to yoga, pranayama, etc., which have been given Western analogs and nomenclature, as in Pilates, ‘coherent breathing’ etc.

These two problems are connected, and both need to be tackled in parallel. Social media is being weaponized against India, and this is magnified by the legacy media in a positive feedback loop. Three examples: one was the rage against Adani based on the dubious research of Hindenburg, which then went under; the second is Bloomberg’s reckless accusation about gold reserves being sold by the RBI, which they were forced to retract, but social media and Wikipedia will remember it; the third is the meteoric (media) rise of the Cockroach Janata Party.

Trade using major ports, Digital Public Infrastructure and a blue water navy

Using trade for competitive advantage is an age-old tactic. The trade tiffs between the US and China are examples of this: we are witnessing war by other means. Many nations are getting into this act, and India does have some advantages, partly based on geography. Maritime trade is likely to continue to be the key, which makes naval chokepoints the big story, but not the only story to watch out for.

The major aspects of maritime trade include infrastructure, the digital “multi-protocol switch”, and security. On the one hand, India is developing not only major container ports, and the road/rail links to get to them, and the industrial goods to ship out through them, but also a serious shipbuilding industry, which was one of India’s historical strengths. Then it used to be stitched wooden ships (teak beams lashed together with coconut rope). Now it’s modern steel ships.

There are the big, efficient new ports, which can now turn ships around with Singapore-like efficiency; the proposed third aircraft carrier group which will make it possible to patrol the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal at the time; the Air-Independent Propulsion diesel submarines and nuclear submarines that can monitor (and if necessary, deny) narrow straits; the sale of supersonic Brahmos cruise missiles to the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia (and Cyprus) that create ship-denial zones: all this is muscle.

And the final piece, the ‘software’ for trade, the “multi-protocol switch”. This last is complicated. Its value is underestimated by many. But this is what enables friction-less transactions between various unrelated parties. The India Stack and the Digital Public Infrastructure can be utilized to provide such a facility. But it is complex enough to need significant study as to what is possible, and how to roll it out.

Second-order effects

In closing, it is worth considering some of what the (unintended) consequences of these proposals may be. Let us note that the G2 has no interest in allowing India to grow and make it a G3. They will do everything in their power to kneecap India, by all means possible.

There is also a certain derision for India in some circles. Here is a generic western opinion on why China got rich, and India didn’t. Well, the author doesn’t consider the second-order effects of the wholesale destruction of Chinese civilization: that is a tradeoff Indians may not prefer for themselves. We all know how China’s well-intentioned One Child Policy turned into demographic collapse within a few years. Besides, as The Economist asks, “China is innovative. Its economy is a mess. Which will win out?”

This is why I think planning for these second-order effects is important. We tend to ignore them because they seem counterintuitive or unlikely, but Nassim Taleb has sensitized us to how low-probability Black Swan events can have grave consequences.

As an example, attempting digital sovereignty may have unwelcome side-effects: Big Tech have the first-mover advantage and network effects and there are increasing returns to scale. They will surely make it hard for a new player to break in. Besides, the large investments in data centers and GCCs that they are making in India would make it very difficult for them to be ejected with a “Great Indian Firewall”.

Even taxing their capture of Indian data will be complicated; not to mention that they have demonstrated that they can happily violate copyright laws with no consequence; therefore they will find ways to chew up and spit out Indian Knowledge Systems, and essentially re-colonize India. Digital colonialism is not a threat, it is a reality today, and it is a consequence of the relatively open Indian system.

In addition, there is a malign group, the “barbarians within” as Arnold Toynbee once put it, who are ready to sacrifice Indian sovereignty for a pittance.

Given all this, it will be very difficult to put in place serious measures to gain digital independence; and the narrative-peddling is likely to gain further momentum: just consider the caste allegations that have haunted BAPS in the US (despite the cases being dismissed by the US DoJ), the Cisco Systems case where, again, the case was dismissed, but the narrative continues, and the persistent efforts in various US states to turn caste into a weapon to bludgeon Indians.

Another sensitive issue is that of the multi-protocol switch for trade. While from an Indian point of view, it eases trade and harks back to a Golden Age of Indic maritime commerce, but that will be viewed elsewhere very differently, for instance by the US as an attempt to de-dollarize. The US has jealousy guarded – with very good reasons that we will not go into here – the dollar’s reserve currency status.

We have also seen what happened to those who attempt to hurt the dollar’s primacy: in 1985, the Plaza Accord devalued the dollar, and that was a body blow to Japan’s economy, which has not recovered its mojo to this day. Later, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi both had ideas about replacing the petro-dollar with, respectively, the Euro and a new pan-African gold-backed currency. We know what happened to them.

If the India Stack multi-protocol switch is perceived as an alternative to the US dollar, there may be grave consequences. Therefore, it should be conceived and deployed only as an adjunct to it and to the almighty SWIFT settlement system.

Conclusion

India is at a crossroads now. Even though the Hormuz closure is a serious problem, if it plays its cards right, adversity can be turned into opportunity across a variety of perspectives. The key is Atmanirbhar, self-reliance. If India can now implement a crash program of industrial policy, and at the same time overcome an ingrained Third-World tendency to cut corners, it can finally break free of the years of underperformance, what I called the Nehruvian Penalty in 2004.

It is possible, but there are caveats: unforeseen consequences. Hic sunt dracones. Here be dragons. Be afraid. Be very afraid.