The Day of the Global South

FROM AUGUST 31 TO SEPTEMBER 1,Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the 25th meeting of the Shang- hai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Heads of State Council in Tianjin, China. Against a backdrop of rising global tensions, including wars, conflicts, and escalating great power rivalries , and the unfolding economic storm that threatens to fracture global supply chains and trade following the tariff wars unleashed by US President Donald Trump, this SCO meeting was  attended byleaders from 20 nations and 10 international organisations, demonstrating a determined bid to protect multilateralism. What was unique was that this time, it was the Global South that led the global efforts to safeguard multilateralism.

India, a permanent SCO member since 2017, emphasised strengthening cooperation within the SCO on security, connec- tivity, and opportunities for the economic development of the whole Eurasian region. Prime Minister Modi also highlighted the threat of state-sponsored terrorism and urged member countries to take firm and decisive action against it without double stan- dards. The joint declaration of the SCO pointedly condemned the Islamabad-perpetrated Pahalgam terror attack, and Pakistan was also a signatory to the document as a permanent member. India’s priorities in SCO focus on protecting, promoting, and projecting its geostrategic, security, and geoeconomic interests in the Eur- asian region, grounded in centuries-old cultural, religious, and civilisational links. New Delhi’s presence at the SCO as a promi- nent member highlights its commitment to multilateralism. It emphasises its role in South-South cooperation, rooted in respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of nations worldwide.

Along with BRICS and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Orga- nization), the SCO was the third prominent multilateral forumes- tablished after the Cold War era. Formed initially as the Shanghai Five in 1996 to enhance cooperation on geopolitical, economic, and security issues, the group expanded when Uzbekistan joined in 2001, prompting a name change to SCO. In 2005, India, Paki- stan, and Iran gained observer status in the grouping, with India and Pakistan becoming full members by 2017. Russia supported India’s inclusion as a counterbalance to China and to prevent the forum from falling under Beijing’s hegemonic influence in Central Asia and surrounding regions. After joining this regional grouping, the Indian prime minister outlined Delhi’s priorities for improved connectivity at the Astana Summit, emphasising the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity ofmember states. India also highlighted the need for increased cooperation in combating terrorism, radicalisation, and tackling the illicit narcotics trade, codified in Article 1 of the SCO Charter since 1998. New Delhi has been a strong supporter of unified efforts on counterterrorism within the SCO region and has effectively high- lighted issues of state-sponsored terrorism. It firmly champions zero tolerance for terrorism, condemning double standards and stressing the need for SCO members to adopt a resolute anti-terror stance. India has called for joint action to eliminate terrorism threats in the region. In Tianjin, the prime minister reemphasised cross- border terrorism not only during the SCO discussions but also in his bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Consistently raising concerns about terrorism and state-sponsored acts led the SCO nations to criticise the Pahalgam terrorist attack by Pakistan, which is seen as a proxy state of Beijing against India.

Beijing exploited the SCO as a China-created, China-dominated, and China-led multilateral forum to pursue its parochial geostrategic, geoeconomic, and security interests in Eurasia. China leveraged its economic strength to exploit hydrocarbon resources through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), thereby violating the sovereign- ty and territorial integrity of member countries. For example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of BRI, plans to develop infrastructure in Pakistan with investments exceeding $62 billion. However, it infringes on India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). China is also becoming increasingly aggressive towards its CentralAsian neighbours. Its unprovoked aggression against India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) led to the June 2020 Galwan crisis.

In contrast, New Delhi-led connectivity projects, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar port, are consultative, transparent, reliable, and based on a strong civilisational connect. Most SCO countries, including Central Asian nations, have shown interest in the Chabahar port and explored bilateral options to join India-led strategic connec- tivity projects. The first India-Central Asia virtual summit in 2022 emphasised the Chabahar port in the INSTC. It also established a joint working group (JWG) to enhance regional connectivity and tradeviathisport.AttheSCOsummit,ModiproposedusingIran’s Chabahar Port as a reliable and respectful alternative to other regional corridors, without naming Gwadar Port, developed by China. The final declaration also endorsed the aim to enhance connectivity in line with international law under the UN Charter and the SCO Charter, which uphold territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Iran’s membership in the SCO has sparked worries that the organisation might be seen as an anti-Western bloc, especially amid ongoing geopolitical tensions. India, as a strong supporter of multilateralism and nonalignment, combined with its robust democratic credentials and a history of avoiding alliance guar- antees, suggests that the SCO is not against any country or bloc. India’s consistent commitment to upholding global peace and security in line with the UN Charter has ensured that the SCO platform remains focused on the socio-economic development of member states rather than becoming an anti-West alliance.

Delhi used the SCO forum to promote its geopolitical and strategic interests in Central Asia and to counter China’s grow- ing influence. As China attempts to undermine critical mineral

supply by limiting rare earth exports for clean energy and defence, India is work- ing towards establishing dependable, resilient, and diversified supply chains. It has also begun collaborating with Central Asian nations on rare earths and critical minerals. Central Asia, par- ticularly Kazakhstan, has over 5,000 rare earth deposits valued at more than $46 trillion. Similar to its intentions of backing India’s full membership of the

SCO, Moscow now wants India to balance China’s hegemonic dominance and belligerent pursuits within Eurasia, especially following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, given Delhi’s rising economic and political influence worldwide, many SCO countries, particularly in Central Asia, as well as Russia and even Iran, now see India as a trustworthy partner to counterbal- ance Beijing within the SCO.

India has used the SCO to strengthen its diplomatic ties and intellectual capital, and bring a progressive agenda on connectiv- ity, counterterrorism, and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the China-Pakistan axis has always used the SCO against India’s regional interests. Consequently, specific SCO priorities related to security and connectivity are witnessing more collaboration from some member countries through bilateral arrangements. This is why India’s priorities on terrorism and connectivity were thoughtfully emphasised in the final declaration of the Heads of State Council.