Time for India to assert itself as the subcontinent’s water leader

Indian rivers are not just streams of water; they are sacred lifelines. Hailed as symbols of creation, these rivers are believed to flow from the kamandalu of Lord Brahma. Most rivers in India bear feminine names—Ganga and Yamuna, for instance—reflecting cultural reverence and a sense of feminine vitality. In contrast, the Brahmaputra carries a masculine title, translating to “Son of Brahma” in Sanskrit. This adds a layer of cultural intrigue to its journey through the matrilineal communities of North-eastern India. The mighty river, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, supports agriculture, ecosystems, and hydropower in India.

While the Brahmaputra is steeped in spiritual significance, it has also become a site of modern geopolitical concern, as China’s proposed dams upstream have raised fears over water control. There is a need to unpack the assumptions underlying such anxieties, debunk the myth of a Chinese “water bomb,” and examine India’s strategic blueprint for securing its water future.

Geopolitical Context: A Himalayan Water Game

The absence of a comprehensive water-sharing treaty—unlike the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan—gives China a natural advantage as the upper riparian. A cryptic remark by Chinese counsellor Victor Zhikai Gao—“Don’t do unto others what you don’t want done to you”—was interpreted in light of India’s temporary suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty following the 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack. India’s assertiveness in reclaiming its water rights has rattled Pakistan, long accustomed to preferential access under the treaty.

China’s water diplomacy also serves strategic ends. While it provides Bangladesh with hydrological data free of charge, it charges India—perhaps to curry favour with Dhaka and enhance its regional influence. China’s multilateral water deals with Mekong countries stand in contrast to India’s bilateral approach, reflecting divergent diplomatic strategies.

Refuting the Brahmaputra Blockade Fallacy

Contrary to alarmist narratives, the Brahmaputra’s flow in India is largely monsoon-fed. Hydrological data cited by Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma indicates that China contributes only 30–35% of the river’s volume—via glacier melt and light rainfall in Tibet—while 65–70% is supplied by Indian monsoon rains and tributaries such as the Dibang, Lohit, and Teesta. At Tuting, near the Indo-China border, the river flows at 2,000–3,000 cubic metres per second, swelling to 15,000–20,000 cubic metres per second in Assam during the monsoon—underscoring India’s dominance over downstream volume.

According to the 2011 AQUASTAT Survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization, China contributes approximately 165 cubic kilometres of water annually to the Brahmaputra, compared to India’s 537 cubic kilometres. These figures make clear that India, not China, is the main hydrological contributor to the Brahmaputra and its downstream nations. This monsoon dependency renders the idea of China “stopping” the river highly improbable.

Though the Brahmaputra basin is often a focal point in hydro-diplomacy, the actual risk of conflict remains low. As Mark Giordano and Anya Wahal (2024) argue in their paper Hydro-diplomacy on the Brahmaputra (IJWRD), China’s actual contribution to the river’s total volume is minimal, and the Brahmaputra plays only a marginal role in India’s broader water security.

Damned by Design: Why China’s Great Bend Project Is Structurally Risky

China’s recent approval of a $137 billion dam in Medog County—near the Tibet-India border—aims to build a 60-gigawatt “Great Bend Dam,” touted as the world’s largest hydroelectric project, three times the size of the Three Gorges Dam. Plans for four additional dams on the Brahmaputra have heightened concerns in India and Bangladesh about potential water diversion or storage during periods of political volatility.

However, the river’s steep descent from the Tibetan Plateau into Arunachal Pradesh makes large-scale storage or diversion logistically and economically implausible. The Great Bend lies in a seismically active zone, raising additional safety concerns. China’s Foreign Ministry maintains that the dam is meant for hydropower, not diversion, and will not affect downstream flows. Past behaviour—such as withholding hydrological data during the 2018 Doklam standoff—indicates China’s preference for grey-zone tactics over overt aggression.

India’s Strategic Reaction: A Multi-Pronged Response

India can counter China’s upstream advantage through a layered strategy:

1. Hydro-Diplomacy

Initiating trilateral talks among India, China, and Bangladesh could help establish a regional framework for data sharing and water governance. Platforms like BIMSTEC could be instrumental in creating mechanisms for reciprocal access to verified hydrological data.

2. Infrastructure Initiatives

A proposed mega-dam at Yingkiong in Arunachal Pradesh could help manage floods and support power generation. Community-led initiatives like check dams and groundwater recharge systems can boost local resilience. A futuristic idea would be a “Brahmaputra Grid”—a decentralised network of micro-hydropower plants and interconnected reservoirs to buffer seasonal variability.

3. Technological Surveillance

Using ISRO satellites to monitor river flow in real time could reduce dependence on Chinese data. AI-powered analytics can improve flood forecasting and disaster preparedness. A dedicated Brahmaputra River Task Force—equipped with geospatial and cyber tools—can enhance surveillance and crisis response.

4. Ecological and Community Resilience

Preserving biodiversity in the Brahmaputra basin—home to unique ecosystems and species like the Gangetic dolphin—is vital. Expanding protected areas and supporting climate-resilient agriculture can strengthen ecological defences. Innovations such as floating farms and elevated settlements, backed by a Brahmaputra Resilience Fund, could mitigate risks.

5. Strategic Messaging

India should counter the Chinese narrative by highlighting the rain-fed character of the river, as noted by CM Sarma. Emphasising China’s environmental vulnerabilities—like seismic risks—can bolster India’s image as a responsible custodian of the basin.

A Call for Foresight Over Fear

The myth of a Chinese “Brahmaputra cut-off” distorts hydrological facts. India’s monsoon-fed dominance, coupled with strategic planning, renders the river virtually impervious to upstream manipulation. Rather than panic-driven dam-building, India must prioritise tech-enabled surveillance, ecological sustainability, and evidence-based diplomacy.

As Ruth Gamble of La Trobe Asia notes, India lags behind China in Himalayan ecological research—highlighting the need for urgent, focused study. Ultimately, the strength of the Brahmaputra lies in India’s own geography and civilisational heritage—assets that no upstream nation can obstruct.

The real question is not whether China can block the Brahmaputra—but whether India will seize the moment to assert itself as the subcontinent’s water leader, turning perceived threats into strategic advantage.

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