Branding and visibility: Lessons for VB-G RAM G from MGNREGA

The Central government’s reboot of the two-decade old rural employment scheme MGNREGA has triggered heated debates on many of the changes being introduced. However, what is notably absent from these discussions is any mention of a communications strategy which includes branding and visibility for the revamped and rebranded scheme.

Why is communications, branding and visibility important? Isn’t it enough if the scheme provides jobs to the rural unemployed, as it is envisaged to do, even if there is no clear communications strategy available to create awareness among the beneficiaries, and translate that awareness into demand?

To answer that question, we need to take a step back and look at the previous avatar of the Scheme, MGNREGA, and examine how strategic communications, branding, and visibility were approached, and what VBGRAMG can learn from those experiences.

The MGNREGA and absence of a communications strategy

When it was rolled out in 2006, the MGNREGA had no nationally articulated Information Education and Communication (IEC) strategy. An IEC strategy refers to a structured communications framework designed to inform, educate, and enable intended audiences to understand their rights, entitlements, and responsibilities, and to act upon them. A full seven years later, in 2013, a CAG performance audit report highlighted this glaring gap. It pointed out that awareness of beneficiary rights is a critical factor in the success of a demand-driven scheme like MGNREGA. Only 39 percent of MGNREGA beneficiaries were aware of the four major aspects of the scheme: the number of days of employment they were entitled to, the minimum wage rate, the prescribed wage payment schedule, and the quantum of work required to secure minimum wages.

The awareness regarding the number of days of employment to which people were entitled ranged from as low as 43 percent to 90 percent across different states. The inadequate Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) efforts lowered awareness levels and, in turn, limited beneficiaries’ ability to fully exercise their statutory entitlements, the CAG report stated. The report also pointed out that a majority of the states did not have an IEC strategy and recommended that IEC activities be stepped up to improve beneficiary awareness, and thereby, the demand.

In the absence of a nationally designed IEC strategy, the scheme’s guidelines had tasked the states with planning and implementing IEC activities, a process that was still on the runway. And it showed. By 2011-12, when the CAG report came out, the average wage cost, or wages paid, was rising, but the benefits to rural households were negated by the decline in employment provided per household. The CAG recognised that the lack of awareness was preventing the scheme from attaining its potential to alleviate poverty among the rural poor.

While there were not many studies at that point in time on its brand image, identity, or visibility, a study conducted by Prasar Bharti in 2009 to understand the impact of flagship schemes of the Government of India offered some insights. As per this study, only 47 percent of respondents could correctly identify the Scheme by its name, indicating gaps in branding and visibility as well.

MGNREGA’s IEC and branding strategy

Responding to CAG’s observation, MGNREGA rolled out its national IEC strategy in 2013, which was developed by the Ministry of Rural Development with technical support from the UNDP. The IEC strategy aimed to create awareness among rural people and other stakeholders, with a special focus on MGNREGA workers, about various aspects of the scheme, and to facilitate dissemination of the rights-based provisions of the Act so that workers know their right to demand wage employment and exercise this right by applying for such employment as per their need. Beyond raising awareness, the strategy sought to ensure that individuals convert awareness into action through interventions at the interpersonal level, including Social and Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC) activities at the grassroots level.

Crucially, the new strategy talked of branding and positioning of MGNREGA as a service. It emphasised that systematic branding of MGNREGA and positioning the Scheme as a safety net for the rural poor would ease demand generation activities at the field level. The strategy also highlighted the need for focused brand-building efforts at the grassroots, supported by a simple, easy-to-understand Indian brand name and an attractive logo.

The rural development ministry now required the states to nominate IEC nodal officers and prepare annual IEC action plans; social media platforms were activated; and monitoring meetings with the nodal officers ensured systematic implementation of these action plans. Documentation systems were integrated into the scheme’s website, which functioned as the operational backbone of the world’s largest rural livelihood programme.

However, operating without a guiding communications framework for seven years had already inflicted some damage to the Scheme’s branding and visibility. It importantly resulted in a hotchpotch of names for the scheme taking hold in the public narrative. By that time, it was variously known as “manrega,” “em-en-rega,” “NREGP,” “NREGS,” “MG-narega,” “narega,” “thozhilurappu” (in Kerala), or “Mahatma Gandhi NREGA,” reflecting fragmented recall and localised naming practices.

As the shock from the CAG report faded, the priority accorded to the IEC activities also declined, and communication efforts became largely confined to routine digital dissemination, particularly social media posts, with limited emphasis on sustained interpersonal communication, community-level engagement, or brand reinforcement through offline channels. One possible reason for the reduced focus on demand generation activities could be that higher demand for employment would have increased pressure on the programme’s finances and implementation capacities.

This clear lack of priority is evident in the academic response as well. Several national-level and other studies have examined the MGNREGA scheme, including its implementation, employment generated, fiscal performance and asset creation. However, apart from the Prasar Bharti study of 2009 and the CAG report of 2013, there appears to be no comparable national-level study that has systematically examined awareness levels or brand recall of MGNREGA among its beneficiaries.

The MGNREGA experience demonstrates that branding is not peripheral to rights-based schemes, but central to shaping demand, ownership, and access. The lack of a coherent IEC strategy and branding approach in the early years had clear implications for awareness and utilisation of the Scheme.

The opportunity named VBGRAMG

Now, the current reboot to VB-G RAM G offers a serendipitous opportunity to couple the new scheme to a compelling and effective communication and branding strategy. The branding needs to be socially acceptable, culturally resonant, linguistically adaptable, and institutionally neutral, while remaining consistent across regions and population groups. In India, with its wide diversity of cultures, people, and geographies, striking a balanced code between standardisation and localisation is inherently difficult. This is where the challenge lies.

Communications Strategy for VB-G RAM G

A sustainable and comprehensive communications strategy, which includes a branding strategy, is the need of the hour for VB-G RAM G. Unlike MGNREGA, this is the right opportunity to have such a strategy in place from the beginning itself. Sustainability is the key. The communications strategy should not only aim at increasing demand for the Scheme, but also empower communities to sustain the assets created at the community level and strengthen their sense of ownership.

The strategy needs to be futuristic and go beyond routine dissemination. Sustained interpersonal and community-level engagement should be prioritised to translate awareness into demand, reinforce trust in the system, and enable beneficiaries to navigate their entitlements within increasingly digital and transparent delivery mechanisms. An advocacy component should play a major role between the Government of India and the States, looking beyond demand generation alone and working towards sustaining an enabling environment for programme implementation.

MGNREGA had a strong mainstreaming component, where other departments were brought in and dovetailed with the Scheme, enabling MGNREGA interventions to contribute to the creation and maintenance of durable and productive assets. A similarly well-coordinated effort among multiple stakeholders, led by the Government of India and the States, will be critical for VB-G RAM G. Specialised human resources with the ability to strategise and implement demand-based communication interventions need to be brought in and closely work with policymakers and bureaucrats at all levels. Periodic review and measurement of communication outcomes should also be institutionalised, much like other programme performance indicators.

Branding Challenges and Choices for VB-G RAM G

The Bill that received the President’s assent was titled The Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin): VB-G RAM G Bill, 2025. A clear branding strategy needs to be integrated into the comprehensive communications strategy for the Scheme to ensure that the name of the Scheme remains uniform as it percolates across States and down to Gram Panchayats. The prevailing practice of translating the name of the Act into regional languages often results in multiple linguistic versions, leading to variations in recall and identity. There are successful examples in the country where a uniform name of the Schemes/Projects have been retained and consistently branded across geographies. VB-G RAM G can draw from such experiences to establish a single, recognisable brand among its target population.

Given India’s cultural and linguistic diversity, the logo of the Scheme will also need careful consideration. A national-level brand guide or logo usage manual, with clear guidance on colours, typography, symbol usage, translations, and co-branding norms, will be critical. Such guidance can help prevent ad-hoc adaptations and ensure consistency across states, districts, and communication channels, while still allowing limited contextual flexibility where required.

The branding strategy should not be treated as a standalone exercise, but as an integral component of the Scheme’s comprehensive communications strategy. This would require dedicated attention at both national and State levels, including clarity on roles, responsibilities, and approval mechanisms for branding and communications interventions and materials.

Equally important is the capacity building of national and State-level functionaries on the management of communications and branding activities. Officials responsible for awareness generation need to be oriented on brand principles, approved usage norms, and the linkage between branding, awareness generation, and demand. Periodic reviews of communications and branding activities can help assess consistency and effectiveness. The nomination of State IEC Officers, as practiced earlier, can provide institutional focus and accountability for managing communications and branding efforts.

Conducting periodic national-level impact studies on communication strategies, including branding will be essential. This would allow the programme to track communication outcomes alongside implementation metrics, and course-correct strategies in real time. It will be a test of this strategy as to how VB-G RAM G will be referred to and internalised across different regions, and how a sense of ownership of the scheme percolates to the grassroots.