The Arc of Terror

THERE IS NO doubt left that security forces have a major problem to deal with in the Jammu region. After the Rajouri-Poonch axis, which has seen multiple attacks on military personnel (and civilians) in the last two years, a group of highly trained terrorists believed to be behind these attacks seems to have now spread out, sending intelligence agencies into a tizzy. The biggest challenge the security forces are facing is that there is hardly any intelligence on this group, leaving them to grope in the dark on how to neutralise what is becoming an embarrassment.

On June 9, a group of three terrorists, believed to be an offshoot of the group active in Rajouri-Poonch, chose a carefully selected spot to target a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims in the Reasi area, killing nine and injuring several others. Using at least one sophisticated M4 assault rifle, they shot the driver in the head, killing him instantly. He lost control over the bus after which it tumbled into a gorge. But according to survivors, the terrorists kept firing at the bus for several minutes.

The attack took the security grid by surprise. A senior officer of Military Intelligence (MI) in the Army’s Northern Command said they had very “tiny” inputs about the presence of some “elements” about 20-25km away from Reasi. “But it was not tan­gible enough to be acted upon,” he said. The terrorists had chosen their target well. It also happened around the time Prime Minister Narendra Modi was to be sworn in for his third term. As police and other agencies struggled with getting any lead, another group of terrorists struck in a different part of Jammu, near its Internation­al Border (IB) with Pakistan. One of them was killed in the initial minutes, while a CRPF jawan died in the ensuing encounter. “This group seems to have infiltrated fresh from Bamiyal, close to the Ujh river, at the cusp of Jammu and Punjab,” said a senior police officer in Jammu. The terrorists appeared in a village, injuring a civilian. There are unconfirmed reports that the vehicles of two senior police officers rushing to the village where terrorists were spotted were also fired at. As the search and rescue operation was on, another group of terrorists appeared in the Bhaderwah area, firing at an Army post. A day later, two suspected terrorists were spotted in Rajouri. After this arc of incidents, the entire region is on high alert. There are inputs about possible suicide attacks on security installations from Kathua to Kishtwar.

Jammu has remained in the crosshairs of terrorist groups since insurgency began in the Kashmir Valley in 1989-90. In the early 1990s, it received an extraordinary boost. Groups of highly trained foreign mercenaries began crossing the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan, settling down in the upper reaches of the Pir Panjal mountain range in the Lower Himalayas. It was safe to be here since the Indian security forces had almost no presence on these heights. The men included veterans from Afghanistan who had fought the Russians and also those who had participated in Islamist wars in far-off places like Sudan. The men had a free run travelling, as they would, between Kashmir Valley and regions like Rajouri and Poonch, and Doda and Kishtwar, in Jammu. As a result, these areas could not remain unscathed when it came to terrorism.

The men mostly chose not to engage directly with the security forces but create terror by targeting Hindu civilians. As early as October 1991, a group of these jihadists kidnapped a French engineer, Silva Antonia, from the Dul Hasti hydroelec­tric project site in Kishtwar. In August 1993, terrorists struck at Sarthal in Kishtwar, killing 17 Hindus. Less than three years later, in another massacre, 16 Hindus were targeted. Between April 1998 and February 1999, more than 150 people of the Hindu minority were killed by terrorists in Poonch and Rajouri.

Fighting terrorism in these areas was a challenge for the government. Deploying troops in a difficult area like Doda was a daunting task. Spread over around 12,000sq km, the district had 651 villages, and troop deployment here in the mid-1990s was less than that in Baramulla district in Kashmir Valley. The terror attacks triggered an exodus similar to that from the Valley, from where 3,50,000 Pandits had to leave their homes. Thousands of people began to arrive in Doda and Kishtwar town from villages in the region’s upper reaches to live in temples and other such community-owned buildings. The Kargil War made matters worse as a significant amount of security cover, including Army battalions and Border Security Force (BSF) personnel, had to be withdrawn.

It took several years to flush out militants from the Jammu region. Twenty-five years later, Pakistan-based terrorist outfits have taken advantage of a similar situation to push a group of highly trained terrorists that most likely includes retired members of the Pakistan army’s Special Service Group (SSG). After the tension with China along the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley in 2020, a significant number of soldiers involved in counterinsurgency (CI) operations along the Poonch- Rajouri axis were moved there.

With their area of operations expanding, police and other agencies are finding it hard to get any tangible leads on their locations. A police source in Jammu said that the group seems to have local support. But since Jaish-e- Mohammed has superior training, its men know how to keep even their local guides in the dark.

“Such an attack is not possible without recce,” the MI official said of the Reasi attack. In other words, the group that targeted the bus would have had local guides or overground workers (OGWs) to help them (sources believe that the three terrorists may have been accompanied by one more person, most likely their local guide). What also helped terrorists is that there is minimal security deployment in the area as it has not seen any militant activity for a long time.

What is intriguing is that the group has effectively targeted civilians, Army and even an Air Force convoy with impunity. Several times the Army has sent Special Forces into the jungle hoping that some contact with the terrorist group might occur. “It is a very superior group, they know what they are doing,” said a senior Army officer.

In Rajouri, already security forces have started to train village defence committees (VDCs) again. After the attack in Kathua and terrorist sightings at other places, it is likely that this will pick up soon. These groups, comprising villagers, including ex-service­men, acted as a bulwark against terrorists through the 1990s and early 2000s. Of late, they have not received much attention, but with increased attacks in the Jammu region, this is set to change.

During a major operation launched by the Army in Poonch in 2003, codenamed Operation Sarp Vinash, to weed out terrorists who had infiltrated Indian territory, information supplied by a VDC led to the busting of a major militant hideout. Here, too, VDCs had to pay a heavy price. In Poonch in February 2001, 15 members of a VDC, all Muslim, were burnt to death by terrorists. In June 2004, another 10 (again, all Muslims) were gunned down by terrorists.

Terrorists would target family members of VDCs—largely Hindu—as well. In December 2000, four children of a VDC member, Gyan Singh, were killed by terrorists in the Mahore area of Jammu. Between 1996 and 2007, at least 128 VDC members were killed by terrorists.

The gravity of the situation can be gauged by the fact that despite counter-terrorism measures such as VDCs, many massa­cres of Hindus still took place. In June 1998, 25 Hindus who were a part of a marriage party were killed in Doda. In July that year, 16 others were killed in two villages. In July 1999, they stuck at Lihota, killing 15, but the bravery of VDCs prevented a bigger massacre. In Au­gust 2000, 11 Hindus were killed in Doda. In 2001 as well, the spate of killings continued, prompting the Centre to bring this entire region under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

In Poonch and Rajouri, the local Gujjar population was initially wary of taking up arms against militants. Though some of them acted as guides for militants trying to cross the LoC, they hardly harboured any anti-India senti­ment. Through the mid-90s, terror­ists perpetrated several massacres on the Hindu minority, including one during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore Bus Yatra in February 1998 in which 20 Hindus were killed in three incidents. But by 2001, there were several cases where ter­rorists of Pakistani origin, owing allegiance to groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, began to harass and intimidate Gujjars, especially their womenfolk. That was when several of them took up the government offer and joined VDCs.

In the changing scenario, it is clear that these attacks also seem to be aimed at driving a wedge between Hindus and Muslims and also between local communities and security forces. It has not helped matters that in December last year three civilians died allegedly in Army custody after they were rounded up in the aftermath of a terror attack that killed four soldiers. “We are groping in the dark right now. What happens if one such group comes out and targets a village or vehicles on the Jammu-Kashmir national highway?” asked the MI officer. “We will have to hunt them down—there is no other way to rule out this possibility.”

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