Modi 3.0 Faces the Dragon

IN THE JUMBLE of statistics contained in the government’s Economic Survey 2023-24, there was a tantalising proposition of greater economic engagement with China. The document suggested that inviting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Chinese companies could help India improve its participation in international sup­ply chains through exports. It held out two propositions: one in which we continue trading with China that results in an ever-widening trade deficit. The other is getting the optimal ratio between commerce with Beijing and Chinese investment, with the hope that India could address the trade deficit, leveraging the geopolitical trend of the West shifting away from its erstwhile partner. The Survey cited the case study of East Asian econo­mies like South Korea and Vietnam that have received a double bonanza of the US redirecting manufacturing from China, and these nations also getting large FDI flows from Beijing. However, the government was quick to reject speculation that there was an intent to loosen Chinese capital inflows, with Union Commerce and Industries Minister Piyush Goyal stating that there was no review of India’s stance on Chinese investments into the country. It has been four years that Indian and Chinese armies have been locked in a tense standoff, which has had a bearing on their larger relationship. The Indian government assesses that China’s bid to repeatedly change the status quo along the border through the use of force has “violated the basis” of relations between the two nations. Foreign Minister S Jaishankar termed the India-China relationship as “abnormal”. Thus, the government has pointed to the centrality of resolving the border impasse over economic and cultural engagement.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that there was a need to resolve the prolonged situation along the borders. China’s foreign ministry’s reaction to the Prime Minister’s statement was that India would work with China to keep building trust. However, words have not been matched by deeds

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In the run-up to the 2024 Indian General Election, there seemed to be a sliver of a thaw. Amidst the electioneering, China named Xu Feihong as its new ambassador in Delhi after a long hiatus, which gave rise to speculation that there could be a resolution to the standoff. In an interview to Newsweek, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that there was a need to resolve the pro­longed situation along the borders. China’s foreign ministry’s reaction to the prime minister’s statement was that India would work with China to keep building trust. However, words have not been matched by deeds, and China has used military coercion to send a signal to India ahead of the election. Reports have surfaced that China has deployed its state-of-the-art Chengdu J-20 stealth aircraft in Tibet, and reportedly conducted military exercises near eastern Ladakh in March 2024, less than a month before the first phase of voting. When the election results showed that Modi would form a government in a coalition, strategists began to debate the contours of Modi 3.0’s foreign policy, especially with respect to China. The concern was that domestic issues would consume Modi 3.0’s bandwidth, leaving less space for the robust foreign policy dealings witnessed in his previous two terms. But proving naysayers wrong, S Jaishankar is back in the saddle at the foreign office, and India’s resolve to combat China does not seem to have flagged. India is striding close to China’s red lines on Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea.

In fact, early on, Modi responded to Taiwan President Lai Ching Te’s congratulatory message upon his election win and even pledged to deepen economic and technology cooperation. China, which sees Taiwan as a break­away province, saw red and urged India to adhere to its commitment towards One China. This develop­ment comes at a time when China is seeking to isolate Taiwan; soon after Lai won the election, Nauru switched diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic, cutting off ties with Tai­wan. But undaunted, India-Taiwan dynamics are seeing an uptick. Under an agreement for labour mobility, the first set of Indian labourers will join the workforce in Taiwan by next year. The Tata Group and Taiwan’s Power­chip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation’s plan to set up a plant will commence production of chips by 2026. India bestowing the third-highest civilian award this year to Tai­wan tech major Foxconn’s Young Liu is testimony to the growing Indian- Taiwan technology cooperation.

India is backing efforts by the US to put the world’s focus back on Tibet by greenlighting the trip of a bipartisan US Congressional delegation to meet the Dalai Lama. The venue of the interaction was Dharamshala, which is considered to be the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Dispelling doubts that this was merely an outreach by US lawmakers, the Indian foreign ministry reaffirmed support for the Tibetan religious leader, stating that he was free to conduct his spiritual activities. The Biden administra­tion’s stance on Tibet follows the US passing new legislation that directed Beijing to re-engage with the Dalai Lama and elected Tibet­an nominees to resolve the standoff over Tibet’s future. The new law mandates that the US government coordinate multilateral efforts to effect a settlement on Tibet. The legislation also stipulates that the US should allocate funds for countering disinformation spread by the Communist Party of China regarding Tibetan culture, and religious institutions like the Dalai Lama.

The Indian position on Tibet has also undergone a change in the last decade. During Modi’s first inauguration in 2014, the political head of the Tibetan government-in-exile was in­vited along with heads of state from South Asian nations. The Dalai Lama was hosted at the Rashtrapati Bhavan by then-President Pranab Mukherjee in 2016. India has also deployed the Special Frontier Force, a unit comprising predominantly of Tibetans, in military operations against the People’s Liberation Army in 2020. For some time, there was a perception that China was waging a psychological war to get the upper hand as evi­denced by its renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh, and releasing a map depicting Indian territory within its territorial limits. Now, as a response to China’s map-fare strategy, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has advocated that Modi 3.0, too, rename places in Tibet. Modi 3.0 has also sought to make common cause with nations that have been at the receiving end of Chinese belligerence. India has backed the Philippines following the recent confrontation between Chinese and Filipino maritime security personnel in the South China Sea. Here, words are being fortified by deeds. India’s delivery of the BrahMos missiles to the Phil­ippines sends a signal to China that its bid to change the status quo— along the Line of Actual Control or the South China Sea—will not go unchallenged.

Delhi’s strategic community has cautioned that India is ceding ground to the US on Tibet. Some commenta­tors have advocated dialogue at the executive level with China, consid­ering its large economy and superior military capabilities. On the contrary, India-US cooperation on Tibet can serve to keep Beijing on tenterhooks as it has been unable to completely erase the Dalai Lama’s standing in the region. It stokes the Communist Party of China’s anxieties of a forgotten conflict in the late 1950s waged on the roof of the world when US intelligence trained Tibetans to operate behind enemy lines. This is also being reinforced by India deploying the Special Frontier Force against the People’s Liberation Army during the standoff that started in 2020. As for restarting political dialogue, interactions at the execu­tive level froze post-Galwan in 2020. Any opening to China will be viewed by it as a sign of weakness post the electoral verdict of 2024. Between 2014 and 2019, Modi has had 18 interactions with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In 2019, Modi hosted Xi in Tamil Nadu and desired to augment economic cooperation, but even before the ink dried, India’s peace moves were met with China trying to change the status quo unilaterally in Galwan, which resulted in the deaths of Indian soldiers. The question is whether Modi 3.0’s treading closer to what Beijing defines as its core inter­ests—Tibet, Taiwan, and the South China Sea—is bearing fruit. While it is too early to tell, there may be some visible strains.

First, China’s anxiety regarding Tibet springs from its inability to completely obliterate the Dalal Lama’s influence on the region. There have been efforts by China to exert greater control on organ­ised religion across China, particularly in Tibet. The Communist Party of China has sought to create a “politically reliable” religious class who bears affection for their nation and religion. Curiously around the Congressional delegation’s tour of Dharamshala, Xi Jinping visited a Tibetan Buddhist shrine in Xining, Qinghai’s provincial capital, where he reiterated his point about “creating a sense of community for the Chinese nation”, and “promotion of national unity”.

Second, the Indian and Chinese governments are discuss­ing ways to resolve the border standoff. Jaishankar has met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi twice in July—most recently, at the sidelines of the East Asia Summit, and previously, at the Shang­hai Cooperation Organisation summit—in which the border issue was discussed. On July 31, the 30th sitting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs took place with a delegation from Beijing visiting Delhi. The remit of top diplomats from both sides was to arrive at a solution to the pending friction points along the border and restore peace and tranquility. Lastly, when dealing with the Chinese, we must factor in their mindset. When asked about the impact of the French Revolution, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai retorted that it was too early to tell. In this way, India must avoid the affliction of short-term gains, and think long term in its ambition to take on the China challenge.

About The Author

Harsh V Pant

Kalpit A Mankikar

Kalpit A Mankikar is Fellow, China Studies, at ORF

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