From India with a Rebuke

BY NOW IT IS hard to count the number of times US President Donald Trump has claimed his personal intervention between India and Pakistan to halt the military ex­changes between them from May 7 to 10. (Grok estimates that Trump has said this 14 times till June 19). On May 10, Trump stated that the US had “mediated” between India and Pakistan and that led to a ceasefire. His Secretary of State Marco Rubio went on to say, “I am pleased to announce the governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to an im­mediate ceasefire and to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.”

Such claims have been rebutted by India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself pushed back against them in his address on May 12. At that time, the prime minister had said, “India’s stand is very clear… Terror and talks cannot go together… Terror and trade cannot go together…. Water and blood cannot flow together.”

This message, however, did not get through and on June 18, soon after the prime minister left Canada for Croatia, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri issued a terse broadcast about the conver­sation between Modi and US President Donald Trump.

Misri stated, “Prime Min­ister Modi clearly conveyed to President Trump that at no point during this entire sequence of events was there any discussion, at any level, on an India-US trade deal, or any proposal for a mediation by the US between India and Pakistan.” He added, “The discussion to cease military action took place directly between India and Pakistan through the existing channels of communica­tion between the two armed forces, and it was initiated at Pakistan’s request. Prime Minister Modi firmly stated that India does not and will never accept mediation. There is complete political consensus in India on this matter.”

This is probably the stron­gest—and most direct—mes­sage on the subject to be deliv­ered by India to the US. The fact that it was made public can only be read as a rebuke from the Indian side. For a partnership that was once touted the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century, this is a sharp nosedive. The word ‘scuttled’ comes to mind.

The reality, even before Misri’s statement, is that from a strong bipartisan consensus in the US in favour of India, there is now a weak bipartisan consensus against India in that country. In India, too, there is weariness against the US for its inability to understand India’s posi­tion on a number of issues. The relationship is in an uncharted territory. How did matters come to such a pass?

In the weeks since Trump first announced that he had intervened between the two countries and his meeting with Pakistan’s de facto ruler, its military chief Asim Munir on June 18, there has been plenty of speculation for the reasons behind the US presi­dent’s changing attitude to­wards India. This ranges from the Pakistanis buying crypto assets closely associated with Trump and his family; the need to secure bases on Iran’s eastern border, in Pakistan, in case of any eventuality in the days ahead. The former explanation may well be true and would be in line with the erratic behaviour for which Trump is well-known. It would also be myopic as it is not just the business interests of Trump and his family that are involved but also the relations of his country with India.

If it were just Trump and his wayward behaviour, these explanations could still be consumed, even if with a pinch of salt. That, however, is not the case. American be­haviour with respect to India has changed almost decisive­ly over the course of the last three years. Before Trump emboldened Pakistan, his predecessor abetted unrest in another zone of great concern to India: Bangladesh. The re­gime change there, followed by the mayhem in which Hindus were killed, was a signal to India: remain in your station. Other events, pe­ripheral to these geopolitical moves, were no less momen­tous. Key defence supplies that had been contracted by India—the F404 engines and the Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters—were delayed. The F404 engines, essential for India’s LCA Mark1A fighter jets were contracted in 2021 and the first engine was supplied this year. There is no timeframe for the delivery of F414 engines, needed for the LCA Mark2 planes.

The truth is that the US has concluded that India will not be an ‘ally’ in the usual sense of the word. Washing­ton is deeply uncomfortable with the Indian practice of an independent foreign policy. The turning point in the rela­tions between the two coun­tries can probably be dated to 2022 when India refused to condemn Russia in the wake of the Ukraine War.

Then there are deeper, long-term, reasons for America’s changing behav­iour towards India.

Back in 2011, Barry Posen—probably one of the most careful and realistic American scholars of inter­national relations—analysed the conditions under which “unipolarity”, the untram­melled exercise of power by the US, would come to an end or, at least, face erosion. Posen considered two different definitions of unipolarity: the US commanding more than 50 per cent of the resources available to the principal states of the global system and preventing the forma­tion of a rival coalition of countries. At that time (2011), Posen concluded that from both perspectives, the US was the “unipole” in the world. But he also foresaw challeng­es to American primacy.

Posen wrote, “It seems likely that coalitions of two will begin to give the US pause within the next two decades, a problem it has not faced since the end of the Cold War. This is mainly a result of the economic growth of China and India, and to a lesser extent the economic recovery of Russia and the growth of Brazil.” He further added, “It seems plausible, however, that the US will soon become concerned that China not find an ally among the other extant or emerging conse­quential powers: the EU, Japan, India, Russia, or Brazil.” (Posen’s essay can be found in International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, edited by G John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C Wohlforth). While it would be too much to say that the US feels ‘threatened’ by India—the idea is laughable—but it is a distinct possibility that the US wants to contain India. Its actions in the last three years give more than ample hints of that changed outlook. Trump’s behaviour is erratic but it is also congruent with America’s changed outlook towards India.

CanadaDonald TrumpG7 Summitgeopoliticsglobal economyNarendra Modi