The Resistance

IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF OPERATION Sindoor, as Indian military leaders ticked off the successes of India’s integrated air defence and the pin-point accuracy of land and air-launched attacks that struck terror camps and crippled Pakistan Air Force bases, war-gaming for the next confrontation was already in progress. Aware that no two battles are the same and that the Pakistan army, despite its claims to having won the May 7-10 encounter, would look to avenge the humiliation, the Indian security establishment examined future scenarios. How would Pakistan shore up its air defences? To what extent would its ‘allies’ go to prevent another humbling at the hands of India? And what did shift- ing alliances, including America’s sudden embrace of Pakistan, portend?

War games are a means to visualise various eventualities, even improbable ones. Not many would have thought the current downturn in India- US relations likely when Operation Sindoor ended with an emphatic win for Indian arms. And yet, in a matter of days, US President Donald Trump’s repeated claims that trade inducements and his mediation ended hostilities began to sour relations. In no time, India’s forceful rejection of Trump’s account and a deadlock in trade negotiations snowballed into a spiteful imposition of an additional 25 per cent penalty on India for purchase of Russian oil. The spurious argument that sought to blame India for “funding” Russia’s war against Ukraine was solely intended to punish India for not endorsing Trump’s Nobel ambitions. India’s security and strategic establishment clearly had its work cut out and it soon got down to considering future conflicts in an increasingly uncertain world.

While the assessment exercise, involving intelligence, military, domain experts and think- tanks, is still in progress, the exercise has revealed the need to revise the Operation Sindoor template. Next time, an India-Pakistan military showdown may involve a clash of ground personnel if India chooses to up the ante or Pakistan seeks to gain tactical advantages. Indian punitive actions, starting with the 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 air attack on Balakot, and the wider arc of attacks after the April 22 killing tourists in Pahalgam, demonstrate a steady escalation. The next time retaliation—or even pre-emptive action becomes necessary, India may consider a push across the border, one that it initiates or is a response to Pakistani aggression. There is also a possibility, that Pakistan’s “iron brother” China may extend help beyond the intelligence it offered during Operation Sindoor. Needling India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) could be a possibility, presenting a two-front scenario. A new and troubling piece of the puzzle is Pakistan’s return to America’s good books. Can Islamabad’s reported assistance in the US attacks on Iran lead to a more active American presence in Pakistan? Should that be the case, to what extent will it complicate Indian missile and air strikes? The targeting of bases in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Punjab and Sindh in May exposed Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth. But the possibility of American boots on the ground in Pakistan might present a different set of challenges.

It was in the backdrop of a major churn in international relations, with certitudes and doctrines being cast out of the window or being frantically reworked, that Prime Minister Narendra Modi left for Japan and China on August 29, visits that could well be among the most consequential of his tenure. The hour-and-40-minute ride on the Shinkansen (Bullet Train), from Tokyo to Sendai on the Pacific coast of Honshu, that Modi shared with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on August 30 summarised the visit’s strategic significance. The city, known for its retail, services and local IPA beer, is home to a specialised factory that makes tools used in the manufacture of semi-conductors run by Tokyo Electron Miyagi that is engaged in collaborations in India. “The joint visit by Modi and Ishiba underscored the shared vision of India and Japan to develop robust, resilient and trusted semi- conductor supply chains. PM Modi reaffirmed India’s readiness to work closely with Japan in this strategic domain,” the Indian statement said. The semiconductor plant in Sendai represents the cutting edge of India-Japan cooperation, a bridge transferring advanced manufacturing capabilities that India sorely lacks and are crucial for developing civilian and defence capabilities. A day earlier, Modi pointed to the significance of the partnership at the meeting of the India-Japan Economic Forum, saying that the deepening economic cooperation between “trusted friends” was particularly relevant in the context of the present turbulent global economic situation. He made a point more directly to a domestic audience on return to India when he reiterated his Independence Day address when he said India will stand up to policies of economic selfishness (aarthik swarth), a reference to Trump’s tariffs. In Japan, he outlined emerging cooperation in batteries, robotics, semiconductors, nuclear energy, artificial intelligence(AI),quantum computing, space and biotech that is essential to realising India’s ambitions of becoming a developed country. The references complement a resolve to ensure the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific where China is keen to stamp its hegemony.

The hedge in Japan was an exercise in balance of power strategies. In Tianjin, where a summit meeting of the Shanghai Co- operation Organisation (SCO) gained worldwide attention in the context of Trump’s attempts to coerce allies and opponents to fall in line on trade deals, Modi’s ride in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s limousine from the SCO summit to the venue of their bilateral talks was a masterclass in political signalling. The ride was all of 15 minutes but the leaders sat for another 30 minutes in the stationary car before stepping out. Putin’s offer to take Modi along was conveyed just as the Indian delegation was leaving the SCO summit venue. Modi waited for 10 minutes before Putin arrived in his limousine and soon after images of the ride were all over the internet. It was a political statement on Modi’s part, a demonstration that India is not going to either bend on tariffs or accept dictation on whom to be friends with. The ride showed India’s determination to retain its strategic autonomy and was a reminder that equity and reciprocity need to be the hallmark of discussions. Trump’s trade adviser Peter Navarro described the Xi-Putin-Modi huddle at Tianjin as “troublesome” and said it was a shame to see the leader of the biggest democracy in the world cosying up to the two biggest authoritarian dictators. “I’m not sure what he is thinking, particularly since India has been in a cold war and sometimes a hot war with China for decades. So we hope that the Indian leader comes around to see- ing that he needs to be with us and Europe and Ukraine and not with Russia on this and he needs to stop buying the oil,” Navarro said. Yet that is exactly what Modi has no intention of doing. The hectoring of Trump and his servitors has made the issue between the US and India more than just trade. The window for reconciliation has narrowed as feelings of national pride gain prominence and the India-US relationship gets more and more politicised in both countries.

 THE ONGOING RESET with China, most foreign policy commentators agree, is work in progress but is seen as a shrewd move. India displayed foresight in improving relations with China before the US elections with a meeting between Modi and Xi in Kazan in October 2024, leading to a disengagement of forces along the LAC. Chinese assistance to Pakistan and its goal of using its ally to tie down India and create obstacles to its rise is not likely to be junked. The space created by the easing of tensions can, however, help India restore supplies of critical minerals, magnets and equipment like tunnel-boring machines, and ease restrictions on Chinese FDI. The evolving situation will please China as differences between India and the US and continuing tensions between America and Russia provide Beijing room to promote its interests in its immediate zone of influence.

There are, however, limits to the likely benefits not just be- cause of the transactional nature of Trump’s politics but also due to long-term trends. Putin put it bluntly to Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif when he said Russia has been keen to improve ties but “objective circumstances”, a reference to Pakistan’s parlous economy, prevented any improvement in trade.

The US tariff offensive can result in stress in the Indian economy with a slump in exports directly impacting employment, but India’s growth is expected to remain stable. If measures such a reform of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime, along with tax reductions announced in the Union Budget work, consumption should receive a boost and the country will remain an attractive market. There have been persistent reports in Chinese-language media and commentaries by observers based in Hong Kong and Singapore that Xi is facing resistance and discontent at home as the downturn in business and a long-drawn confrontation with the US are making party elders restive. It is highly unlikely that Xi will face anything like a revolt but sackings of military leaders for indiscipline, a euphemism for corruption, and unfilled vacancies in top posts have heightened speculation. Two members of the powerful Central Military Commission have been removed since October 2023. There is social unrest among sections affected by Xi’s policies that support state-run enterprises while deemphasising private capital and the policy measures are believed to have led to retrenchments. Reading the tea leaves with respect to China’s internal dynamics is not only difficult but can be co- loured by the hopes of Western experts and Chinese dissidents that Xi’s authoritarianism will eventually face a backlash. Yet it does seem that the Chinese leader may have to tread carefully at home and abroad with ties with the US far from settled.

 The Tianjin conclave clearly displeased Trump, possibly rattling the president, as commentators noted that the convergence was the result of America’s ill-advised tariff wars. Although their motives and persuasions differ, the leaders of Russia, China and India have one thing in common: a desire as strong nationalists to signal that they will not succumb to bluster and threat. Trump’s sarcasm that Xi convey his “warm regards” to Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, while accusing all of them of con- spiring against the US, is an unmistakable sign of pique. Trump has held out threats that he will act against Russia if Putin does not move to end the war in Ukraine in the next couple of weeks. He has brandished tariffs on Indian goods, which he often dubs “sanctions”, as having increased pressure on Russia, indicating there might be no revision of the decision anytime soon.
The Indian policy establishment is unclear how long the cur- rent freeze will last. “It may not be permanent. It may be a pass- ing storm. But the turbulence is likely to continue for weeks or months. It won’t blow over soon,” said a political source. The assessment is based on the cautious response to informal discussions with both Democrat and Republican leaders as well as organisations representing Indian-American business interests. There is a reluctance to intervene with the Trump administration or voice opinions that might attract the wrath of the MAGA crowd that is much more vocal in Trump’s second term. The view in New Delhi is that while Trump was in many ways just as unpredictable during his previous stint in office, the officialdom around him was perhaps more effective in toning down the effects of his rhetoric when it came to actual policy formulation. There seems to be some merit in the observation as it is apparent that Trump has not understood that Modi’s pointblank refusal to accept any suggestion that the US “mediated” a halt to the India-Pakistan conflict is rooted in a decades-old political consensus adhered to by even weak governments like the HD Deve Gowda and IK Gujral administrations. It is unthinkable that the Modi government, which takes pride in its nationalist credentials, would accept a third-party role.

AFTER THE CONCLUSION of his visits to Japan and China, Modi’s focus is also on domestic matters as he pushes the bureaucracy and party colleagues heading state governments to accelerate deregulation and ease-of-business reforms, an effort many commentators felt was overdue. The looming political challenge is the Bihar Assembly election where the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is in office. So far, the I.N.D.I.A. opposition led by the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Congress has made the alleged exclusion of voters during the electoral roll revision carried out by the Election Commission (EC)—encapsulated by the slogan “vote chori (vote theft)”—the rallying cry. To many, the resonance of the issue seems uncertain as there are few signs of popular dissatisfaction. Any likely stress in the economy could be a matter of more direct concern, feel some Opposition leaders, pointing out that a competitive desire of I.N.D.I.A. allies to leverage EC’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) to appeal to minority voters resulted in the tariffs imposed by the US not being raised during the just-concluded Monsoon Session of Parliament. The Bihar elections are still some way off but NDA seems to have an edge with many voters unwilling to forget RJD’s predisposition for caste and communal mobilisation, dynastic rule and its trail of corruption cases. The two interludes of an RJD-Janata Dal (United) government in 2015 and 2022 have served to remind non-Yadav and non-Muslim voters that RJD’s ways remain unchanged.

Modi will not travel to the US in September to attend theUnited Nations General Assembly. The visit would have normally seen him meet several world leaders and a bilateral meeting with Trump would be on the cards. The current frost in India-US ties ruled out the visit. India and the US might find a way to deescalate trade tensions and end an unpleasant war of words. But restoring trust may take more time and effort. As much as Trump might be miffed by India’s refusal to accept his mediation claims, the president needs to consider the relationship in its entirety. For example, he may need to evaluate if the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), of which India is a key member, serves American interests even if a trade deal is reached with China. Disabling a security structure promoted by successive US presidents has implications for the Indo-Pacific and China’s power-play in the region. If Trump concludes that doing so is not clever thinking, the current churn in relations will be far from over.

businessDonald TrumpIndia-US relationsNarendra ModiSCOtrade tariffVladimir PutinXi Jinpin