Back to Common Sense

THE SUDDEN DOWNTURN IN INDIA-BANGLADESH ties in August 2024 was hard to anticipate although the situation in Dhaka had been spiralling out of then- Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s hands for several months. The end of the Hasina government was not only precipitous but, according to her account of happenings, she and her sister escaped unscathed with minutes to spare. While regime col­lapse can be rapid once a tipping point is reached, the views of the Biden administration and the Democratic surround sound were at sharp variance with perceptions in India. Hasina’s exit was hailed as the victory for “democracy”, violence on the streets sanctified as a “students’ movement” and her successor, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, embraced as an enlightened and welcome choice as head of an interim government.

The anger of Indian X handles over the alleged role of the US in Hasina’s deposition—fuelled by the violence against Hindus in Bangladesh—might be a bit misplaced. Hasina’s inability to respond on time to protests against her and the rapid mobilisa­tion of street mobs were the principal reasons she lost her hold on power. But it is evident that Washington did not care about India’s concerns about the unfolding situation in Bangladesh. As things stand, India will need to grapple with an unstable and populous neighbour, possibly for decades. Hasina’s rule saw economic gains that are in danger of being reversed as Islamist organisations gain disproportionate leverage. The moderate sec­tions of Bangladeshi politics and civil society are keeping a low profile, fearing for their safety as extremists exert influence on the flimsy Yunus administration.

MISPLACED ADVENTURISM abroad is not the preserve of Democratic administrations alone. The invasion of Iraq at a time when the Taliban were far from crushed in Afghanistan does not look any better with the passage of time and the Bush administration left that cross for successive oc­cupants of the White House. But former President Joe Biden’s abrupt pulling out from Afghanistan certainly did not factor in worries that the territory could become a base for terrorism again. It is another matter that Pakistan’s ham-handed diplomacy and misplaced sense of superiority over Afghans have turned its dreams of re-establishing ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan into a dead letter. The poorly considered ouster of Muammar Gaddafi and more mistakes in Syria are evidence that neither the Obama nor the Biden administration considered the impact of their deci­sions that not only did not end conflict but created conditions for major displacement of populations and a massive migrant crisis in Europe. The decision to hail the army-backed Yunus admin­istration as deliverance from a tyrant is naïve and short-sighted.

Much of the commentary accompanying US President Donald Trump’s return to office fears the worst but the Modi gov­ernment will hang on to his assertion promising a “revolution of common sense”. The less optimistic predictions are that Trump will be overbearing in relations with the European Union (EU), particularly Germany and France; disrupt trade by imposing tariffs; and embark on a contentious campaign against the ‘deep state’ within the American bureaucracy he believes prioritises a political agenda of its own. The word ‘transactional’ crops up often in discussions about Trump, given his stated reluctance to accept IOUs. There is no doubt an element of unpredictability in the likely trajectory of the second Trump administration, in keeping with the leader’s personality. Trump does see himself as someone who can resolve problems and can be susceptible to having his ego massaged. He became the first US president to meet North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in 2019 but without dividends. Reports indicate he will re-engage with China’s Xi Jinping and break the ice with Russian strongman Vladimir Putin. India needs to be wary of Trump’s desire to be a deal-maker resulting in New Delhi’s interests being given short shrift, particularly in the context of US-China relations. His stated desire to leave be­hind a legacy as a “peacemaker” and “unifier” is, India will hope, based on hard-nosed realism.

The breakthrough in the Gaza war, despite the Israeli mili­tary’s misgivings about Hamas remaining in control of the terri­tory, is quite evidently linked to the change of guard in Washing­ton. Uncertainty over what Trump might do weighed heavily on Hamas and its backers in Qatar too. If there was no hostage deal, the president might well have green-lighted Israeli options that its military has described as “full leverage” against Hamas. Simi­larly, he can be expected to take a hard look at the poor returns on billions of dollars the Biden administration has poured into Ukraine’s defence. In light of the utter lack of trust and personal animosity between Biden and Putin, the Russian leader too has an opportunity to open the doors to dialogue. India will hope pragmatism and common sense will guide the policies of the incoming administration. This would mean less ideological pu­ritanism and finger-wagging and a greater emphasis on what is possible and feasible.

Though Trump seems keen to restart a dialogue with China’s Xi, his previous administration took a tough view of trade and the official review of defence and security identified Beijing as a rival and threat. Biden did not substantially change the assess­ment about China being more a threat than a competitor with trade benefits that need to be kept in mind, despite pressure from American businesses to go slow on anti-Beijing measures like restrictions on access to advanced computing semi-conductors.

Trump’s speech was free from specifics on foreign policy ex­cept when he expressed satisfaction about the return of hostages held by Hamas. He did mention China once, and not in a very flattering light, when he spoke about Panama having “broken” its promise with regards to US shipping in the Panama Canal: “[A]bove all, China is operating the Panama Canal and we didn’t give it to China, we gave it to Panama and we’re taking it back.”

Trump would like to be the one to seal a ‘deal’ with China but that requires Xi to roll back his geopolitical ambitions as the new administration is unlikely to accept or encourage claims on Tai­wan. The ongoing massive increase in China’s military capacities is read as Xi’s desire to build strong deterrence against any interven­tion on behalf of Taiwan should China decide to move against the island. As things stand, Taiwan’s political system, based on popular elections, makes it very different from the Mainland and options other than force are unlikely to reunify the two. If Trump does stabilise ties with China and this leads to a lessening of military tensions in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific, it will not be a bad thing. India needs to be nimble-footed in tracking US-China relations and make sure its interests do not take a back seat.

The joint statement issued after Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Biden in June 2023 in Washington signifi­cantly expanded the scale and scope of India-US cooperation and outlined the initiatives in effusive terms. “No corner of hu­man enterprise is untouched by the partnership between our two great countries, which spans the seas to the stars,” the state­ment said. This was not hyperbole. The proposed cooperation included joint human space flights, a new technology mission, and manufacture of the advanced Boeing GE F414 engine in In­dia. The declaration should have accelerated Indo-US relations but they hit unexpected bumps due to the Democratic estab­lishment’s susceptibility to ‘progressive’ agendas. Outgoing US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti’s unfiltered comments on the alleged plot to assassinate Khalistani activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, without acknowledging his threats and intimidation against Indian diplomats in the US, and the decision to pursue cases against the Adani Group for alleged violations not com­mitted on American soil rocked bilateral ties. Delays in delivery of GE F404 engines meant for the Tejas fighter are affecting the strength of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet and the Biden ad­ministration waited until practically the end of its term to lift curbs on the Indian nuclear establishment as promised by the expansive vocabulary of the Modi-Biden statement.

During his visit to India as president in February 2020, Trump had not said a word in public about the anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) rioting that was timed to coincide with his itinerary. Unlike Obama, there were no homilies on religious freedom either although Trump later told accompanying US media that he had raised some issues in talks with Modi. His de­scription of Modi as “incredible” and the praise he had lavished on his host, however, indicated the issue was not a matter of seri­ous discord. Apart from the personal dynamics between the lead­ers, the Modi government will expect practical considerations to drive the relationship, yielding economic and strategic benefits to both sides. Despite differences on trade issues, there are strong synergies in the Indian and US economic and political systems that can translate intent into permanent gains.

Bilateral talksdiplomacyDonald TrumpIndia-US relationsNarendra Modi