The Call of Tokyo

PRIME MINISTER Narendra Modi’s upcoming outreach to Tokyo from August 29-30 assumes heightened strategic significance in the context of US unpredictability under President Donald Trump, China’s renewed diplomatic push, and India’s strategy of widening its room for manoeuvre. Unlike the disorder characterising India’s ties with Washington under Trump, Japan has consistently proven to be a steady and dependable partner. The India-Japan relationship is anchored in shared democratic values, respect for international law, and a mutual vision for a Free and Open Indo- Pacific (FOIP). Tokyo has long demonstrated strategic reliability, whether through sustained economic investments, developmental cooperation, joint infrastructure projects, or strategic orientation in the Indo-Pacific.

Tariffs and Trust Deficits

The visit comes in the wake of the Trump administration’s heightened tariffs which have delivered a setback to the India–US strategic partnership, built painstakingly over several administrations. The sweeping duties (which currently stand at 50 per cent) strike a blow not only to India’s export sectors (textiles, gems and jewellery, pharmaceuticals, shrimps, electronics) but also dredge up broader economic and diplomatic ruptures. Indian exporters are now scrambling to find alternative markets amid dwindling US orders, shrinking margins, and indications of eroding trust.

Additionally, defence procurements, such as the Stryker combat vehicles, Javelin missiles, and Boeing aircraft, have been paused by India, further demonstrating the impact of economic arm-twisting on strategic cooperation. The broader implications are graver: the resort to coercive economic tools threatens the foundational erosion of a partnership-based diplomacy and a deepening of disillusionment with the US as a reliable partner.

Parallel to the Japan visit, Modi heads to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin (August 31-September 1), his first trip to China since 2020. While India and China have recently moved to restore limited channels of engagement (after an almost five-year pause), resuming direct flights, easing visa processes, and restarting ministerial dialogues, these steps remain cautious confidence-building measures rather than signals of strategic convergence. The trust deficit that re-emerged after the 2020 Galwan clash continues to shape Indian thinking, making it unlikely that US trade pressures under Trump would push New Delhi meaningfully closer to Beijing. India remains wary of Chinese intent, particularly along the contested border, and views any normalisation as a pragmatic necessity to reduce tensions rather than a pathway to partnership.

Restraint to Resilience

In contrast, Japan’s emphasis on a rules-based order aligns seamlessly with India’s own regional aspirations, particularly in countering China’s growing assertiveness. Tokyo offers stability by doubling down on its commitment with a new $68 billion investment package aimed at infrastructure, semiconductors, clean energy, and strategic technologies, all of which is on the cards during Modi’s visit. This complements India’s goals of supply-chain resilience and self-reliance. The visit will also involve sealing high-tech cooperation, notably the introduction of Japan’s next-generation E10 Shinkansen bullet train technology for India’s Mumbai-Ahmedabad corridor.

The two countries are also expected to revise their Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the first update since 2008. This will likely cover enhanced cooperation across maritime security, intelligence sharing, and critical infrastructure protection, better equipping India to address regional security challenges on a more equal footing with Japan. This deepened alignment between the two underscores their commitment to FOIP and serves as a bulwark against unilateral attempts to alter the regional status quo.

The focus on strengthening bilateral strategic ties is particularly significant as Japan is in the midst of a profound reimagining of its military worldview. For decades, the post-war constitution—anchored in Article 9—imposed strict limits on the use of force, reflecting both domestic pacifist sentiment and American strategic tutelage. Yet, over the last decade, and more visibly in recent years, Tokyo has been recalibrating these boundaries. The shifts are driven less by ideology than by necessity: an assertive China in the East China Sea, a nuclear North Korea, an unpredictable Russia, and a wavering US have all combined to persuade Japan that strategic restraint is no longer a guarantee of national security.

These changes are particularly evident in the three key defence documents of 2022: the National Defence Strategy, the National Security Strategy and the Defence Buildup Program. Tokyo is now investing in counterstrike capabilities, missile defence, and next-generation platforms, pointing to a military that is no longer content with reactive defence. Simultaneously, the Japan Self- Defense Forces are training more frequently with partners, including the Quad countries, signalling Tokyo’s intent to act as a proactive security provider in the Indo-Pacific.

What makes this shift remarkable is the domestic political consensus underpinning it. While pacifist currents remain strong, the Japanese public increasingly understands and accepts that the strategic environment has changed irrevocably. However, challenges persist with questions about budget allocations, fiscal sustainability, and constitutional reinterpretation poised to reignite old debates, especially as economic pressures mount.

The change in the country’s defence and security outlook is not a departure from its pacifist legacy but an adaptation of it. Tokyo’s wager is clear: deterrence and resilience are the new guarantors of peace. As the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape shifts, with Washington unpredictable and Beijing uncompromising, Japan has chosen to step into roles it long avoided. The world must now get used to a Japan that is willing not just to shoulder greater responsibility for its own defence but also to shape the security architecture of Asia in ways unimaginable even a generation ago.

Choices over Sides

In this light, Modi’s outreach to Tokyo does not represent a balancing act between Japan and China in the way it might between Washington and Beijing. Japan, though firm in its opposition to Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, has historically framed its approach through stability, maritime security, and economic resilience rather than direct confrontation. This makes India-Japan cooperation both less polarising and more sustainable, as it aligns with India’s own preference for strategic autonomy without forcing a zero-sum choice.

At the same time, India remains careful not to foreclose dialogue with Beijing. For New Delhi, keeping options open is not about hedging between partners but about preserving flexibility in an increasingly fluid Indo-Pacific. Japan’s reliability and convergence with India’s values offer a stable anchor while measured engagement with China reduces risks of escalation. Modi’s dual diplomacy—strengthening ties with Tokyo while keeping doors ajar with Beijing— reflects India’s broader strategy of expanding choices rather than choosing sides, ensuring it retains agency in shaping the regional balance of power.

geopoliticsIndia-Japan relationLaosNarendra ModiShigeru IshibaTrade tariff warVientiane