Less Paperwork, Same Vigilance

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A rethink of granular disclosure rules offers SEBI a chance to distinguish concentrated investment strategies from concealed corporate control
SEBI’s proposed easing of disclosure rules for foreign portfolio investors could reduce compliance burdens and prevent avoidable market disruption, while retaining safeguards against hidden ownership and regulatory evasion.
SEBI’s proposed easing of disclosure rules for foreign portfolio investors could reduce compliance burdens and prevent avoidable market disruption, while retaining safeguards against hidden ownership and regulatory evasion. Credits: AI-generated

Good regulation should make capital explain itself, not frighten it away. SEBI’s reported rethink of additional disclosure requirements for foreign portfolio investors offers an opportunity to restore that distinction. The regulator is considering relief, including a small-shareholding exemption and exemptions for concentrated investments in public sector undertakings and professionally managed companies without identifiable promoters. These remain reported suggestions, not announced policy. But the direction deserves a qualified welcome.

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The existing framework addresses a serious vulnerability. Foreign funds can become curtains behind which domestic promoters or connected entities conceal ownership. Granular disclosures seek to prevent evasion of minimum public shareholding requirements, takeover rules and investment restrictions concerning countries sharing land borders with India. Funds with more than half their Indian equity assets in one corporate group, or holdings crossing the applicable size threshold, face heightened scrutiny, subject to exemptions. Transparency here is market infrastructure, not bureaucratic decoration.

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Yet, a rule can pursue the right objective through an unnecessarily blunt instrument. A specialist fund might put most of its Indian allocation into one business while owning only a sliver of that company. Its portfolio concentration does not, by itself, establish corporate influence. Treating that investor like a vehicle warehousing promoter holdings risks confusing investment conviction with concealment. The reported proposal for a small-shareholding threshold addresses precisely this mismatch.

The immediate dividend could be less friction. Funds spared exhaustive investor tracing could face lower compliance costs and fewer incentives to trim positions merely to escape disclosure obligations. Custodians could devote more attention to genuinely suspicious structures. For markets, fewer compliance-driven sales could mean less avoidable disruption. Those are plausible benefits, not guaranteed outcomes. Their scale would depend on the final thresholds, exemptions and implementation. Preventing such forced portfolio adjustments is among the objectives cited in the reported discussions.

Nor should easier paperwork be sold as a cure for weak foreign inflows. It can remove an obstacle; it cannot manufacture an investment case. SEBI has already increased the size-based disclosure threshold from Rs 25,000 crore to Rs 50,000 crore, illustrating that proportionality need not require abandoning oversight. The next refinement should likewise be judged by how accurately it separates risk from administrative inconvenience, rather than by an immediate market rally.

The danger lies in exemptions becoming escape routes. A low holding threshold should not reward fragmentation across related funds; the framework already recognises common ownership or control when assessing breaches. Proposed relief for promoterless companies and state-owned enterprises also deserves scrutiny. A different ownership structure should not automatically settle every question about who ultimately controls an investing vehicle. Lighter routine disclosure must leave room for targeted investigation.

SEBI should therefore favour narrow, clearly explained exemptions over blanket indulgence, with aggregation safeguards and periodic review built into the design. The principle is straightforward—ask less where the risk is demonstrably lower, and retain the power to ask more where ownership looks engineered to evade scrutiny. India’s opportunity is not to choose between welcoming foreign capital and knowing whose money it is. It is to become better at both.