Raising the Costs for Pakistan: India’s resolve against terror goes beyond Operation Sindoor

THE YEAR 2025 saw a heinous terror attack on April 22 in the Pahalgam area of Jammu & Kashmir killing 26 civilians. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its proxy, The Resistance Front (TRF), were found to be involved in planning, facilitation and execution of the attack. The act was aimed at spreading a wave of chaos across the country. In the past decade, India’s resolve to fight against terrorism has been challenged multiple times. The Pathankot airbase attack in 2015, Uri in 2016 and Pulwama in 2019 remain three major terror incidents aimed primarily at the security forces. However, India’s determination to tackle terrorism has only seen an evolutionary shift in the last decade. It is marked by a will, resolve and demonstration of capability to address the challenge. During Operation Sindoor, India’s targeting of terror infrastructure, and the wielders of terror, that is, the Pakistani military, created a “new normal” marked by an assured response against future acts of terrorism. However, the assurance of retaliation in future alone is no guarantee against the threat of terrorism. India needs to establish credible deterrence and manage risks to tackle the serious challenge of the military-jihad nexus in Pakistan.

In the past decade, the Pathankot attack of 2015, Uri attack in 2016 and Pulwama terror attack in 2019 remain major terror incidents aimed primarily at the security forces. India in response has created a gradual, yet determined, approach to retaliate with kinetic response and strong signalling against terrorism. In 2016, Indian security forces launched a surgical strike across the border to target terror camps, followed by a public acknowledgement by the political leadership in New Delhi. Against the Pulwama attack, India launched aerial strikes at Balakot to target terror camps, demonstrating the use of airpower for counter-terrorism operations. Both these incidents helped New Delhi establish the precedent of response against acts of terror and a gradual evolution in use of force.

The latest episode of Operation Sindoor came to test India’s resolve but saw a credible employment of military power for cost imposition against the adversary. On May 7, 2025, as part of Operation Sindoor, India targeted nine terror sites, both in the PoK region as well as various locations within the territory of Pakistan. The list included Muridke and Bahawalpur as two major terror training camps.

India’s latest demonstration of force has showcased numerous departures from the past. First, India hit terrorist training camps and locations inside the territory of Pakistan. Second, against Pakistan’s military response to New Delhi’s calibrated and non-escalatory strikes, India targeted 11 Pakistani airbases across the length and breadth of the country. Such demonstrations of deep strikes were a departure from the restraint observed during the Kargil conflict in 1999. Third, India’s use of conventional response within the nuclear environment challenges the asymmetric nuclear posture of Pakistan marked by a lower nuclear threshold. As a result, Operation Sindoor shifts the burden of maintaining strategic stability equally on Pakistan. Fourth, India has clubbed military and non-military measures in combination to place a regime of compellence against Pakistan. The abeyance of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, no-dialogue until revocation of terror sponsorship and an assured response against a future act of terror are three major indicators of strategic compellence in motion.

India’s leadership has made it clear that Operation Sindoor is on a strategic pause. This signalling from the political leadership helps New Delhi’s case to create a “no-war, no-peace” environment for Pakistan on its own terms and conditions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has laid out that any future act of terror from Pakistan will find an apt response from India. This signalling has laid out the new template reflecting a resolve to impose both material as well as psychological costs on terror groups and their sponsor-state, Pakistan. Hence, the strategic pause on Operation Sindoor is not the endgame.

A new regime has been set in motion with a strong messaging about “zero tolerance” for terrorism. Despite a clear demonstration of will and resolve on the part of New Delhi against terrorism, some key challenges remain.

First, New Delhi and the Indian military needs to enhance its conventional deterrence to the extent to achieve a compellent effect against Pakistan if the need arises. Second, in its fight against terror, especially in terms of kinetic response, India’s policy has become intertwined with an element of audience cost. With a future act of terror linked to Pakistan, New Delhi is likely to feel a serious pressure to respond with visible effects against Pakistan. Third, due to the peculiar context of terror in South Asia, India’s counter-terrorism efforts are directed against terror groups as well as its sponsor, Pakistan. A decisive action by the Indian military to compel Pakistan to stop the sponsorship of terror is not free of escalation risks. Hence, the challenges of conventional and nuclear domains beyond a point in the escalation ladder become inseparable for India. Fourth, post-Operation Sindoor, Pakistan is beefing up its capabilities, with Chinese support, to develop credible deterrence against India.

India’s fight against terror is decades-old. However, today New Delhi has moved away from the era of restraint, especially in terms of risk acceptance, and imposing costs on Pakistan. It is necessary but not sufficient in itself. India needs to find a credible, clear and long-term goal of victory. The ambitious project demands breaking Islamabad’s willingness to suffer costs against India. Therefore, at this critical juncture, New Delhi should not shy away from amassing capabilities to enhance its conventional deterrence in action. The policymakers have to confront the question of “how much” capability is sufficient to establish credible conventional deterrence against the emergent threat environment? The answer lies in finding a balance between variable demands of coercion against the military challenge from China as well as Pakistan.

Simultaneously, India needs to develop effective capabilities towards offensive covert actions and robust denial measures to create a strategic exhaustion for Pakistan.