India reimagines geopolitics in a world of shifting alliances

  JUST AROUND THE time External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar was in Kuala Lumpur for the East Asia Summit, a senior Indian diplomat was in Belarus on a two-day visit for bilateral consulta­tions and an address to the 3rd Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security where speakers included Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko and Russia’s long-serving Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to the Belarus foreign ministry, the discussion on Eurasian security amidst “chronic military and political contradictions” between key global players marked by a near-total lack of communica­tion was attended by delegates from 40 nations and half-a-dozen international organisations.

The meeting did not attract much media attention and with Lukashenko seen as a staunch ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Minsk conclave was likely dismissed as a Moscow side­show. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement that India, represented by Secretary (West) Sibi George, presented the Indian perspective on “pressing regional and global issues” and the shared and urgent responsibility of the global community to combat

 cross-border terrorism did not reveal much. But India’s presence at a conference that viewed Eurasian security in a very different light from the European Union (EU) and the US-led NATO was not coincidental or a passing fancy. While the nature of conversations conveyed a pushback to the post-Cold War US-led politics, many attending countries including India were not about to pick a side. They were balancing—or hedging their bets—in an international scenario where pacts and alliances have lost their sanctity.

The Minsk congregation reflected the resentment against Western political and military prescriptions and while India does not share the antagonism that marks Belarus’ and Russia’s relations with the West, it recognises that self-interest has ren­dered principles malleable in the hands of transactional leaders. In his address to the East Asia Summit, Jaishankar made the point plainly, saying, “Energy trade is increasingly constricted, with resulting market distortions. Principles are applied selectively and what is preached is not necessarily practised.” He asserted that multipolarity is not just a current reality but will grow as “the realities of technology, of competitiveness, of market size, digitisa­tion, connectivity, of talent and mobility cannot be ignored.” India is hardly disengaging from the US or the EU—in fact, it is actively seeking to conclude trade pacts with both—but Jaishankar’s mes­sage underlines that needs, strengths, demand and supply will determine international relations. “Adjustments will be made, calculations will come into play, fresh understandings will be forged, new opportunities will emerge and resilient solutions will be devised,” he said. In other words, no one nation, even one as mighty an economic and military power as the US, will be able to dictate the choices of all other nations.

The external affairs minister’s unmistakable dig at the US in the context of the Trump administration’s efforts to arm twist In­dia into halting the purchase of Russian oil even as it seeks a trade truce with China—a bigger importer of Russian crude—should be read as a statement of intent that India will continue to follow the path of strategic autonomy.

Just ahead of his address to the East Asia Summit, Jaishankar met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for a meeting the minis­ter said was a discussion on bilateral ties as well as regional and global issues. Prior to reaching Kuala Lumpur, Rubio injected a note of optimism about India-US ties, say­ing the Trump administration’s outreach to Pakistan was an effort to expand “stra­tegic cooperation” but would not be at the expense of relations with India. Praising Indian diplomacy, Rubio said, “The Indians are very mature when it comes to diplomacy and things of that nature. They have some relationships with countries that we don’t have relationships with. It’s part of a mature, pragmatic foreign policy.”

The remarks were suitably diplomatic and intended to smooth ruffled feathers but US President Donald Trump’s decision to impose punitive tariffs that add up to 50 per cent duty on Indian exports to the US has shaken the relation­ship to its core. Trump’s continued insistence that he mediated an end to the May 7-10 hostilities between India and Pakistan and also claiming that a threat to halt trade was a decisive factor has seriously complicated India-US dialogue. The suggestion that trade had anything to do with India’s decision to halt its reprisals against Pakistan for the killing of tourists at Pahalgam in Jammu & Kashmir on April 22 is an affront that makes Trump’s claims even more preposterous. Trump’s claim that he is “doing a trade deal” with India and his reference to Prime Minister Narendra Modi as his friend and the “nicest guy” will not add up to much until the trade deal is sorted out. Even then, the wariness with which India now views the US means the previous warmth in ties will remain elusive. Trump’s strange references to Pakistan army chief Asim Munir—“They [Pakistan] have a Field Marshal. You know why he’s a Field Marshal? He’s a great fighter”—will do noth­ing to ease New Delhi’s distrust.

In a lengthy article published in Russia in Global Affairs in August 2025, titled ‘Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity’, Belarus Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov wrote of a pushback to American formulations that envisaged the Cold War “containment” doc­trine being replaced by “enlargement” after the fall of the Soviet Union. The implied intent to plant a NATO, and therefore US-led order, in Eurasia, according to Ryzhenkov, gave birth to a new Eurasian resistance.

A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP between China and Russia—described as “key” Eurasian powers—was in­dispensable in propelling indigenous dynamics towards integration. “Eurasian states began to coalesce around the need to resist the external pressure and to work together to advance their common cause in their own huge region… Importantly, these developments in Eurasia have been taking place at a time when globalization began to decline in general. Indeed, the world has not become flat as American writer Thomas Friedman had fa­mously predicted in his bestselling book (The World is Flat, 2005). Instead, the world has become a bumpy road in economic terms,” the article states. India shares concerns about the imposition of a world order that constricts its political and economic freedom even though it is clearly not part of an anti-US mobilisation led by the Russia-China combine. This is ruled out by India’s own deep strategic mistrust of China. Yet, a balancing act is another way of describing checks and balances in international relations.

A scheduled meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea could result in a pause in their trade war which is but a reflection of their intense global rivalry. Chinese control over rare earths that the US needs is a powerful reason for Trump to seek a temporary peace. The immediate concerns in US-China ties and how they influence Washington’s short-term thinking are a major focus area for In­dia. But even as it seeks stability in ties with the US, active engage­ment with other economic and geopolitical blocs and expanded trade have become the bottomline. India’s bilateral and multi­lateral interactions have grown exponentially in keeping with the resilience of its economy—bolstered by astute investments in a digital infrastructure—and growing military capabilities. Belated measures to reform domestic business processes have been initiated even though these will likely cause some pain to traditional industry. There may be no alternative to facing com­petition and making do with less protection as tariff wars, even if resolved for now, can cast a long shadow over international com­merce. Impulses to insulate the domestic economy by increas­ing indigenous capacities in light of the decline in globalisation run into tariffs being weaponised to batter protectionist walls. With no easy answers in sight, a path of internal strengthening needs to be complemented by aggressive efforts to make India more of a trading nation than it has ever been. This requires a re-imagination more radical than the discarding of licence permit raj and embrace of liberalisation in 1991.