Full Circle in Pakistan

THE NATIONAL Assembly of Pakistan has put its stamp of approval on the 27th amendment to the country’s constitution. The Senate, Pakistan’s upper legislative chamber, had ap­proved the amendment ear­lier. The changes that further tighten the grip of the armed forces over Pakistan met with virtually no opposition except for stray speeches.

Among the key changes, the amendment establishes a separate Federal Constitu­tional Court (FCC), which is distinct from the Supreme Court. This will turn the Supreme Court into another court of appeal while consti­tutional questions, including disputes between the federa­tion and the provinces, will be heard by FCC. Appoint­ments to the new court will be carefully screened and it is a foregone conclusion that it will do the bidding of the government or, as is wont in Pakistan, whoever controls the government. Even establishment factotums like Maleeha Lodhi have blanched at the changes. Writing in The Dawn some days ago, Lodhi said: “Objections to a consti­tutional court rest on solid ground. Packed with judges chosen by the government it will set up a parallel execu­tive-compliant court.”

Another ‘controversial’ change is in the manner of appointment and control of the armed forces in the coun­try. Officers who have been designated as field marshal, marshal of the air force and admiral of the fleet, will now have lifetime privileges and their removal has been made almost impossible. The post of chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee, a more or less powerless position in the armed forces hierarchy, has been abolished and a new po­sition, chief of defence forces (CDF), who will command the army, the air force and the navy, has been established.

In the current context, this means Field Marshal Asim Munir, who is also chief of the army staff and now will be CDF, will—in effect—be a modern-day generalissimo, a position that even a praeto­rian state like Pakistan has never known before.

These changes have been commented on and have, in general, been received negatively, not that such sen­timents have any meaning in Pakistan. But they pale before another opaque change that can have far more momen­tous consequences.

The amendment also proposes mechanisms to ‘review’ the National Finance Commission (NFC) awards. Pakistan’s NFC prescribes the principles on which rev­enues are distributed among provinces of the country. In any federation, there is always some friction on this score. But in the case of Pakistan, the distribution is seen as unfair by provinces like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These provinces see the bulk of the resources go to Punjab, a province widely seen as being ‘domineering’ over its peers. Balochistan is in the throes of an insurgency, one that Islamabad finds hard to control. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan’s ‘experiments’ to keep the frontier districts in control has backfired badly.

This particular facet of the 27th amendment, the option to review the NFC awards, is likely to prove detrimental to Pakistan. But the army has never been in favour of Pakistan being a ‘normal’ state. In 2010, after the 18th amend­ment was passed, Pakistan’s provinces got a better deal under the NFC awards. Instead of viewing that situation as a normal evolution in a develop­ing country, the army viewed it as a path to ‘emboldening’ provinces towards separatism. It is a different matter that the reasons for insurgency are to be found in the political stran­gulation of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The purpose of having a constitution is to enable peace­ful change in any country. If a constitution is made too rigid, then only a revolution will ful­fil the aspirations of a people; if it is made too easy to change, it ceases to be a guiding light. Pakistan has found a third option: it has made a mockery of its constitution.