Behind the Curve

Can this PM summon another ‘nuclear’ moment, or will the chaos in Kashmir continue to spiral out of control?

There is a mathematical object called a pursuit curve. A simple example will illustrate what it means. Consider a hound chasing a fox; even if the hound is faster than the fox, to intercept the fox it has to head not where the fox is at the moment but in the direction where the fox is headed. This may have little to do with the situation in Kashmir today or with the art of negotiation. But the Central Government is dealing with a moving target on the ground. If there is to be a meeting ground between the Indian Government and the people of Kashmir, the Indian Government has to be able to anticipate where the public mood in Kashmir is headed, not where it was three months earlier.

Issues on which agreement could have been reached then are not issues which will quiet the situation today.  As I write this, at the end of a day’s fruitless deliberation, the Government has decided an all-party delegation will head to Srinagar. Such pointless steps will only take us farther from a solution. If we have to move forward on Kashmir, the Government has to put its own house in order.

The first problem is the perception that there has been a clear disconnect between Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh on this crucial issue.  Kashmir and the country have been suffering Omar Abdullah far too long, and the common perception, rarely articulated but clearly messaged, is that it is the Gandhi family’s closeness to the Abdullahs that has kept him in place. When the problem had clearly moved beyond militancy, he again turned it into a problem of the Indian State versus the people of Kashmir, through acts of the J&K Police and paramilitary forces. The perception of inaction against the misdeeds of Indian security forces, starting with the Shopian case, has escalated.

Prompt action by Omar in several such cases would have pre-empted the demonstrations on the streets. To begin with, the demonstrators had raised valid and specific complaints against the security forces, and action then could have prevented the groundswell now. Today, nothing less than the ejection of Omar can signal a new beginning. But it comes back to the same question. Can this Prime Minister actually conceive such a step?

The second is the partial moderation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) or its rollback. Again, this is a step which would have been far more effective three months earlier. Today, with the police and paramilitary forces bearing the brunt of the anger, it seems a little besides the point. But it will soon enough find place in the issues up for negotiation. Before this is done, the PM has to remind the armed forces that it is an act of Parliament. It is meant to achieve the national interest, not the interest of the forces, and if there is need to moderate or withdraw it, that’s a political decision. The Army is sounding more and more like another pressure group, and the PM again has to draw a line.

The third is that negotiations and concessions work when the party with whom the Government can negotiate actually has the ability to deliver tangible results. There is only person who can do this in Kashmir, Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Trying to isolate him will only make him stronger.

All this is easier said than done. Manmohan Singh has never looked so out of sorts as he has over the past few months. He has been pilloried before, but his current listlessness is self-imposed. Once earlier, he shed his dependence on the party to realign India’s foreign policy decisively, when he took a risk no one expected him to take on the Nuclear Deal. The time has come for him to make a similar choice. The constraints on him are actually far fewer than he perceives, the judgement of posterity, if he continues to dither, far harsher than he can conceive. 

To be ahead of the curve, he has to lead, not manage.

About The Author

Hartosh Singh Bal