Bibi’s Challenger Has Arrived: Will the October elections uphold Israel’s secular identity?

October 7, 2023 will be remembered as the most tragic day in Israel’s and the most devastating day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust. October 27 this year is set to be another historic day: the much-awaited elections will help determine the country’s direction.

This will be Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12th election campaign as leader of the Likud party. He has led Israel for almost 19 years in total, with a brief interruption between 2021 and 2022, making him one of the longest-serving leaders in the democratic world.

Israeli politics has increasingly become less about traditional left and right and more about Bibi himself. This phenomenon is often called “Bibism”—a political identity in which loyalty to Netanyahu has become the defining factor, with Israelis identifying themselves as either pro-Bibi or anti-Bibi. There is no doubt Netanyahu possesses exceptional political skills. But the October 7 massacre, the criminal charges against him, and the way his government has been run have created a deep divide in Israeli society over its future direction. Israel does not allow overseas voting, and because these elections are so crucial, many Israelis living abroad are planning to travel home to cast their vote.

Yashar is the leading party in recent polls, built around a relatively new face: former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, 66, who entered the Knesset only in 2022. Eisenkot is, in many ways, the antithesis of Bibi—warm, unassuming, short and somewhat heavyset. Unlike Netanyahu’s fluent, eloquent English, Eisenkot speaks with a strong Israeli accent, and a leadership style suited to the army sits less naturally in politics. Eisenkot lost his soldier son during the Gaza war; shortly after, his sister’s son was also killed in the fighting—two devastating losses in the same family that have given his political journey a deeply personal dimension. He grew up in a small town in southern Israel, and his family is originally from Morocco—a fact that matters in Israeli politics, where ethnic background is sometimes used as a political tool.

The ruling Likud continues to emphasise this ethnic divide with its base, arguing that Israelis whose ancestors came from North Africa were historically discriminated against while those of European descent enjoyed greater privilege and still hold a disproportionate share of senior positions. There is real history behind this—Jews from North Africa and the Middle East did face serious social and economic disadvantage in Israel’s early decades—but it no longer reflects the full picture of Israeli society today. Eisenkot’s Moroccan background could serve as a powerful counterpoint to Likud’s discrimination claims: he grew up in the periphery, rose to become IDF Chief of Staff, and is now the leading candidate to become Israel’s next prime minister.

The anti-Bibi camp holds Netanyahu directly responsible for the failures around October 7 and says he should step down. Netanyahu refuses to accept personal responsibility. Almost every senior official at the helm that day has since resigned. Netanyahu maintains he had no indication an attack of that magnitude was imminent; like much of Israel’s security establishment, he believed Hamas had been deterred and that allowing Qatar to channel funds into Gaza would keep the area calm. A recent report by two leading journalists claims that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan called Netanyahu weeks before the attack to warn him of a massive Hamas operation being planned, and that a similar warning came from Egypt. Netanyahu categorically denies any such calls took place. Now 76, he has shown visible signs of fatigue in recent weeks, yet genuinely believes he is the only person capable of leading Israel through this period—with Israel’s global standing at a low point, a nuclear Iran still a real threat, Hamas regaining strength in Gaza, the West Bank tense, and Hezbollah rebuilding in Lebanon.

In early September, parties submitted their candidate lists, most featuring new faces—bereaved parents who lost loved ones on October 7 or in the Gaza war, and activists who opposed the 2023 judicial reforms. One new party, the Reservists, is built around a major fault line in Israeli society: the sharing of the national burden. Reservists are soldiers who keep serving when called up after completing mandatory service, and many served hundreds of days during the Gaza war. The party formed around the fact that many ultra-Orthodox Jews refuse to serve while continuing to receive government allowances; their slogan is “We will die, but we will not join the army.” Israel needs a larger pool of soldiers. Yet ultra-Orthodox leaders continue to oppose drafting their eligible young men. Because Likud needs ultra-Orthodox parties to hold its majority, it keeps accommodating these demands.

Integrating the ultra-Orthodox into the army and the workforce is essential to Israel’s future. Israel’s population is roughly 76 per cent Jewish and 19 per cent Muslim, with other groups making up the rest. Within the Jewish population, the ultra-Orthodox now represent about 18 per cent, growing at roughly 4 per cent a year against just under 2 per cent for the general population. Within 20 years, they could make up almost 30 per cent of Israel’s Jewish population. This isn’t only about the public budget and the growing share of people outside the workforce and army; it’s about the character and future of the country. Will Israel remain democratic and liberal, or grow increasingly shaped by religion? As a secular, liberal Israeli, I cannot ignore what these numbers mean. Many liberal, secular Israelis who see these trends are threatening to leave if Likud stays in power and keeps funding and conceding to the ultra-Orthodox—the same people who pay a large share of the country’s taxes and carry much of the military burden. Over the past three years alone, some 1,500 doctors have already left Israel. The brain drain every country fears has begun.

The Knesset has 120 seats; whoever can secure 61 gets the president’s mandate to form a government. Yashar is currently projected to win 25 seats—proof that no single party will govern alone, and a coalition will be necessary. Usually the religious parties hold the swing vote; this time, the Arab parties may play that role instead. Arab citizens make up about 18 per cent of the population but remain under-represented in parliament. This year two major Arab parties have joined forces, and higher turnout could translate into a stronger Arab presence in the Knesset—potentially deciding which bloc forms the next government.

These elections are therefore about far more than choosing the next prime minister. They are about the direction Israel takes: the balance between security and democracy, religion and secularism, individual responsibility and shared national burden. On October 27, Israelis will vote not just for a government but for the kind of country they want Israel to become.