'The political resolve was to do something big and teach Pakistan a lesson,' says Anil Chauhan

When you took charge as CDS, the border with China was a challenge though there was some progress in reducing tensions. What were the immediate considerations?

When I took charge, on October 1, 2022, the high point of border tensions with China had passed. I had seen this crisis as an Army commander too. When Galwan happened (June 2020) I was in-charge of the Eastern Army. Obviously, the tensions could have further flared up and it was good this did not happen. There was tension on the border but it was manageable. The expectation when I took charge was that there would be movement on theatre commands. That was the discourse. Changing the command-and-control structure of the armed forces from one system to another is a major reform. This cannot be done overnight. This can be done when there is some kind of stability on the borders. It is a pre-requisite. So, by the time there was disengagement in Ladakh in October 2024, we were confident about the structures we needed to put in place. But then Operation Sindoor happened and the process got delayed. We needed a slightly peaceful environment since we were undergoing a major transformation.

With regard to the northern borders, China has had certain assumptions about India’s response to intrusions standoff and then the issue would subside. On this occa­sion, after Galwan, India conveyed that the border situ­ation cannot be viewed in isolation. Even on the border there was heavy forward deployment of forces. Did this mark a change in India’s response to Chinese intrusions?

You are right as from June 2020 till a settlement in October 2024 there was a long interval. Before, there was Doklam for 73 days. Be­fore that it happened for a few weeks in Depsang. While the 2020 Galwan episode took longer to resolve, it was settled on India’s terms. What we said four years before the settlement actually hap­pened—that we want to patrol these places—was accepted. One reason why this (longer standoffs) is happening is that both sides have good infrastructure and can sustain forces for a longer period of time. The situation is now more equal. But we cannot forego the legitimacy of our claims. A via media has to be found to patrol those areas up to our claims and yet without getting into a conflict.

This also requires a political understanding on both sides that things should not get out of hand.

Yes. This has to prevail for peace at the ground level.

In this context, how would you see the creation of buffer zones? One argument is that it reduces chances of conflict but questions are asked whether we are giving up access to certain areas.

The buffer zones came up as an immediate solution to the crisis. It was to separate the two forces who had been party to a conflict. So, it was not that India gave up something; the other side did so too. It was an equal measure. This was important as the forces were at a close range and there was a need to separate them. It was equitable. Four years later when we had a settlement that included Depsang and Demchok, we did it without buffer zones. We went back to the status that existed before 2020. Time was needed to negotiate. We have to touch those patrolling points. The buffer zones had to be done immediately to reduce chances of conflict which could have happened as the forces had not disengaged.

One aspect of theatre commands is managing logistics and operationalisation of a new structure. On the other hand, there is a need to accept the plan at a conceptual level. Is there now a buy-in within the armed forces?

It is because the need for theatre commands has been understood that the differences between the forces have been resolved. We know that warfare is evolving. Wars which were fought in the physical domain are now expanding into the synthetic and cogni­tive domains. We know future wars will be multi-domain. Our services are organised to fight in a single domain but in future there will be space, cyber and the electromagnetic domain too. When we apply force, we must have cross-domain capabilities for targeting and command-and-control. Warfare will be more net­worked. The understanding that warfare will be multi-domain and networked has helped us reduce differences between the services. Operation Sindoor was different and the next war will be different again. We have no choice but to reform and prepare for net-centric, integrated operations.

So, are we close to theatre commands being operationalised?

Yes. I have submitted my final report to the defence minister.

The Pakistan-backed terror attack at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025 was a grave provocation. Considering that various options could have been on the table, what was the thinking behind framing India’s response?

This question must be examined at two levels. First at the politico-military level. The message was “enough is enough” and to respond in a manner that was big. There was a political resolve that we had to do it.

The political resolve was enough is enough?

Yes, and that we would have to do something big and teach them a lesson. It was part of deterrence and messaging. During Uri and Balakot, probably the message was not fully understood. That is at the political level. At the military level, at the level where it has to be executed, it had to be very successful. There couldn’t have been even an iota of a chance of failure. This meant we had to do something new so that there was an element of surprise. For Uri we went by land and in Balakot by air. This time we thought we would use loitering ammunition and exploit the lower air space, catch them off-guard. We wanted to leverage our strength in the use of loitering ammunition and our anti-UAV defences which they did not have. Using the lower air space would mean more chances of success and achieving surprise. Pakistan was unable to counter any of the nine targets that were selected for the May 7 action. One of the targets was deep inside (Pakistan) at Bhawalpur. We did not have that kind of drone. Today, we do. But every time we have to think of a new strategy. Ultimately, both political messaging and military tactics contribute to deterrence.

Operation Sindoor was unique. Nothing had been done on this scale for a very long time. In any such operation there can be ‘unknowns’ and a curve ball can always come your way. Was the scale and scope of the operation a reason why there was a loss of aircraft?

Who does not have losses in a conflict? Look at the West Asia crisis—42 aircraft are reportedly lost. This is despite asymmetrical capabilities between a world power and a regional power. The problem is not about losses. In case you suffer a loss, it should not lead to loss of morale and offensive spirit. We showed that on May 10. Pakistan’s air force did not fly on May 10 but we did and damaged 11 airfields. No loss of capacity or pilots. If you inflict an innings defeat in a Test match, it does not matter how many wickets, balls or runs you win by.

Among the things that stood out was the integration of India’s air defences. The coordination and synergy between the information and command system and the response to a threat or intrusion. How did this work during Operation Sindoor?

The idea is to ensure better situational awareness. I will give you an example. In the initial stages of Operation Epic Fury, the Ameri­cans lost F-15s to friendly fire as they did not have a common operating picture with Kuwait. In an air defence battle things happen in seconds. Unless we have a common air picture, there can be cross-firing and fratricide. Our air defence networks were developed separately for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. If you do not integrate, you will fire on one another. Our achieve­ment was to integrate so that we had a common picture. A naval aircraft should be visible as a blue target, an unknown should be white, and an enemy red. The forward-most air defence gunner should have this picture.

Did this happen in the last few years?

It was a priority. Maybe the institution of CDS helped. Integra­tion is a huge process. This is only one aspect.

The levels seem to cover everything from human observers to an automated response system.

You can theoretically control aircraft in the Leh-Ladakh sector from an IACCS located in Bengaluru. More can be done by way of maximising radar coverage and this is being done. The integration with the Navy had to be perfect too. Images come via satellite and there is a time lag. These technical challenges have been addressed.

There is a contribution of Indian IT industry to all of this.

It has been done by us. Radars of at least five or six countries (manufacturers) have been integrated. To get them to be part of a system to give a common picture was a huge challenge which we achieved.

Operation Sindoor seemed to progress in stages. After the Indian strikes on terror targets, the response to subse­quent Pakistani attacks was calibrated. But then when the attacks did not stop, the response to Pakistani attacks on May 9-10 night was a blitz. What was the calculation?

This particular operation had two distinct parts. The strikes on May 7 were related to terror infrastructure. But it was obvious that if you hit Bahawalpur and Muridke and other targets, they would respond. The Pakistan army has to survive and they cannot say that “we failed to defend ourselves”. The esca­lation ladder had been thought out. The escalation of Pakistan on May 8 and 9 was not very successful. We accordingly calibrated our response.

What was the message conveyed in the May 10 Indian action? Was it to say that the escalation or attacks must now stop?

Pakistan wanted to carry out a ma­jor operation, Bunyan-al-un-Marsoos, and we came to know that it was to be launched on early morning of May 10. This was to go on for 48 hours to teach India a lesson. We decided that if this was attempted we would respond very strongly. We hit the command-and-control centre at Nur Khan and then Sar­godha and others. The Pakistan air force—which in any case was not flying—was effectively grounded. Because of our integration, we had better situational awareness in al­most real time. Our information cycle was faster. In comparison the adversary was blind. When he hit, he did not know what he was hit­ting or whether it was hit or not. This was possibly a reason why Pakistan picked up the phone as they were losing aircraft and airfields.

This must have sowed doubt and created fog in the minds of the adversary.

In the information cycle the adver­sary was blinded. He did not know the result of his strikes. On the other hand, he would know the damage on his side. This led to a ceasefire. We knew much more than the adversary.

The strikes on targets like Bahawalpur and Muridke were very precise. These are not small areas. The strikes were pinpointed—on some houses and buildings only. This means the intelligence was perfect.

The accuracy on the targets was provided by intelligence agencies. Which building had trainees, which had children, which was a library, which to avoid. The identified buildings were precisely hit by the Air Force.

You have explained how conflict is changing. Does this mean conventional warfare has changed for good?

You mean contact warfare. Drones, space and cyber are new capa­bilities. A war can terminate faster; we can get results. But we have disputed borders and territory will remain important. Contact warfare cannot be wished away. But the preference is Operation Sindoor. Why get into a war that drains the economy? Prepare for all situations but choose your options.

There is a change in India’s stance on terrorism—that such incidents will be considered acts of war. What does this mean?

First of all, this means we will respond, no doubt about that. It increases military responsibili­ties manifold. We must try and deter (an attack). If it happens, attribute it quickly and respond. If we say handlers and institutions will not be spared, then the range of targets increases. Not just select­ing 40-60 targets and deciding on nine. Many more.

From Kargil in 1999 to Uri in 2016 to Balakot in 2019 and now Operation Sindoor, India’s response to Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship has changed. How do you view this change? Also, would you respond to satellite imagery apparently showing damage at under­ground sites where Pakistan is understood to have located its nuclear arsenal?

In doctrinal terms, after 1998 when both India and Pakistan conduct­ed their tests, Pakistan wrongly assumed that India would be de­terred. Their idea was, in doctrinal terms, to reduce space for con­ventional operations. That is why they (Pakistan) talk of tactical nuclear weapons—to reduce room for conventional action. But their actions have achieved the opposite. Every act of terror has in­creased our space if you consider Uri, Balakot, and now Operation Sindoor. When the prime minister says we will not accept nuclear blackmail, it is a message of deterrence. Our nuclear doctrine has stood the test of time. Our NFU (no first use) expands the envelope of action for us. At the same time there will be massive retaliation if Pakistan initiates any nuclear action.

Would you say anything about the satellite images of damage at Kirana Hills?

Air Marshal AK Bharti has clearly said we hit Sargodha. The Kirana Hills are about 15-20km north of Sargodha. Obviously, anyone who made those entrances would have ensured they did not face due east! If you are able to hit a 2-by-2m target, you cannot hit Kirana Hills unless you really want to. Air Marshal Bharti has said we did not target it.